tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1331441403058020963.post1931084973172848648..comments2024-03-28T06:49:24.930-04:00Comments on International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Why Matthew Yglesias Doesn't Understand International RelationsThomas Oatleyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14092437150746625670noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1331441403058020963.post-9222965043521807912009-06-13T01:05:46.935-04:002009-06-13T01:05:46.935-04:00point-by-point:
1. He didn't just misuse a wo...point-by-point:<br /><br />1. He didn't just misuse a word, in my view, but rather come to poor conclusions by using poor logic.<br /><br />2. Games can have multiple equilibria, and moving from one to another can be Pareto-improving. I think we can agree that governments often play sub-optimal equilibrium strategies. If good advice can help governments move from one equilibrium to a better one, then there may be some purpose for scholars in policy.<br /><br />3. I think that the U.S. security guarantees make cooperation more easily achieved because the condition of anarchy is weakened by the over-arching strength of the U.S. If you create a power vacuum, then the influence of anarchy becomes stronger. That is what Yglesias is advocating, and he doesn't seem to understand the implications of it. (i may have missed your point; i found that comment a bit opaque.)<br /><br />4. The current situation is not a PD. Moving into one is a bad idea.Kindred Winecoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14330671232391851377noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1331441403058020963.post-12631808587808396562009-06-13T00:36:48.295-04:002009-06-13T00:36:48.295-04:001. He misuses a word and you believe it's a di...1. He misuses a word and you believe it's a different game. Don't see how that means he fails to understand game theory and IR.<br /> <br />2. "Perhaps. But my point then and my point now is that IR scholars can do more than say "iterate and play tit-for-tat" in every situation."<br /><br />That wasn't actually my point, you know; it was an illustration of my broader point. Games have equilibrium strategies. If governments play them, we have nothing to say. If they don't play them, then advice based on the game is useless. <br /><br />3. "(which isn't really what Yglesias is saying; he's saying that cooperation under anarchy is somewhat easy to achieve)."<br /><br />Your objection to what he is saying is exactly my broader point. <br /><br />4."A better recommendation in this case would be to "stay out of the game entirely". Everyone has incentives to stay out of the PD trap, which is why the present equilibrium has persisted for the last half-century."<br /><br />I don't know what this means.Thomas Oatleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14092437150746625670noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1331441403058020963.post-11990611639551631512009-06-13T00:17:18.808-04:002009-06-13T00:17:18.808-04:001. As you say, what Yglesias calls an equilibrium ...1. As you say, what Yglesias calls an equilibrium is not actually an equilibrium. Therefore, he does not understand the basic logic of game theory, which is the basic logic of international relations theory.<br /><br />Moreover, the present situation (in which the U.S. maintains a dominant military and issues credible security guarantees) is *not* a PD. Yglesias is advocating moving into one (think Powell (2002)). That is unwise, and not Pareto-improving.<br /><br />2. Perhaps. But my point then and my point now is that IR scholars can do more than say "iterate and play tit-for-tat" in every situation (which isn't really what Yglesias is saying; he's saying that cooperation under anarchy is somewhat easy to achieve). A better recommendation in this case would be to "stay out of the game entirely". Everyone has incentives to stay out of the PD trap, which is why the present equilibrium has persisted for the last half-century.<br /><br />3. No. I'm criticizing him for mis-understanding international relations theory. In this case, theory can influence policy in a positive way. He just doesn't understand why or how.<br /><br />If all that is wrong, then I can't see why. Perhaps you'd straighten me out.Kindred Winecoffhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14330671232391851377noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-1331441403058020963.post-53491702735941560632009-06-12T23:30:33.878-04:002009-06-12T23:30:33.878-04:001. Isn't Yglesias merely explicating the logic...1. Isn't Yglesias merely explicating the logic of a simple prisoners' dilemma applied to an arms race? And isn't he saying we would be better off and no one would have less security if all would agree to not spend more? Yes, he is mistaken in calling cooperation an equilibrium, but otherwise I don't see the logical problem. There are joint gains to be had.<br />2. In proposing that we try to reach the low spending equilibrium, isn't Yglesias proposing exactly the kind of recommendation I said last week was the best IR scholars could hope to offer (i.e., the kind no one had an incentive to enact) http://tiny.cc/ggcuN .<br />3. Aren't you now criticizing him for precisely the reason I criticized IR and game theory's policy aspirations?Thomas Oatleyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14092437150746625670noreply@blogger.com