Showing posts sorted by relevance for query countercyclical regulation. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query countercyclical regulation. Sort by date Show all posts

Monday, April 6, 2009

Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?

. Monday, April 6, 2009
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McMegan has a nice post on reserve requirements and accounting rules for banks:

The problem with things like reserve ratios is that while in theory they should be countercyclical, in practice they aren't. A nice fat stack of reserves should enable you to better weather downturns. But of course, as long as they're required reserves, you can't actually touch them. If the government required you to carry $300 in your wallet at all times, you wouldn't have plenty of spending money; you'd have no spending money, unless you carried a lot more than $300.

A perfect regulator in an ideal market would relax capital requirements in bad times, and raise them in good times. The actual regulators we have, however, are terrified of spooking the markets if they do so--and more importantly, terrified of the all-out political war that would follow. So we lower capital requirements in good times, when all that capital seems like an untouched gold mine, and leave them stat, or raise them, when everything's going to hell.


Exactly right. The whole point of having reserves is to provide flexibility when times are bad. But if reserve requirements are fixed even in tough times then you don't get the positive benefit of having them. You do, however, still pay the cost of meeting the requirement.

The idea that policymakers should pursure countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies is uncontroversial, but when the source of the crisis is in the financial sector, it might make sense to tweak regulatory policies as well. In addition to giving damaged firms more flexibility in bad times, such a pattern might tamp down some "irrational exuberance" in good times.

Of course, countercyclical policies are often politically problematic: in good times, people and firms don't want the reins pulled in, and in bad times the tendency is to over-regulate in the areas causing the crisis. It is also too much to expect regulators to always make proper decisions, if given latitude (the recent flailing by the Fed and Treasury is proof enough of this). So it might make sense to set hard-and-fast rules in order to maintain stability.

Still, our current regulatory structure makes little sense. Improvements might be difficult, but regulation should make the system more stable, not less.

Wednesday, August 12, 2009

Staying Afloat During the Great Recession

. Wednesday, August 12, 2009
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Nouriel Roubini offers a list of countries that are doing well:

What do these countries have in common? One major theme is that they tended to have lower financial vulnerabilities due to more restrictive regulation and less developed financial markets, as well as larger and stronger domestic markets that sustained domestic demand. Moreover, they had the resources to engage in countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, actions that were not possible in past crises. In contrast, countries that borrowed heavily to finance domestic consumption in the days of easy money are now facing sharp economic contractions. Despite the relative strength of these countries, however, their ability to return to sustained growth will depend on structural reforms that support consumption.


(bold added)

Drawing any particular set of policy recommendations from this list risks selecting on the dependent variable. Plenty of countries with less developed financial markets and strict regulation have done very, very poorly in this crises (c.f. most of E. Europe and many export-biased economies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East). The second component -- "larger and stronger domestic markets that sustained domestic demand" -- may be more important, but there are plenty of counter-examples there are well. Another key may be found in Roubini's discussion of Latin America:

Brazil and Peru stand out for their relatively healthy fundamentals and financial systems. Both countries have benefited from being relatively closed economies and from having diversified export markets and products. They also took advantage of the boom years (2003-08), reducing external vulnerabilities and increasing savings (fiscal and international reserves). By the time these the crisis hit, both countries had well regulated financial systems that saved them from being contaminated by toxic assets. The fact that their domestic credit markets are at an early developmental stage, so consumption is not very dependent on credit, helped them shelter internal demand.


Chile has also done fairly well during the crisis by pursuing robust counter-cyclical policies, made capable by years of extreme prudence during good times. But note two of Roubini's observations about Brazil and Peru: they are relatively closed economies with poor access to credit. These are bad things that stymie economic growth (in normal times at least), make their citizens poorer, and lead to more unequal societies. In this event these circumstances led to some insulation from the global meltdown, but that is mostly a result of being somewhat disconnected from the global economy. If such policies persist in the future, they will lead to stagnant growth and underperformance.

Just look at the list. Other than China, India, and Egypt, almost every country had underwhelming growth before the crisis, and that trend could easily resume after the global recession reverses. So we should learn our lessons from countries that have shown resiliency, but we should not necessarily hold up the countries on Roubini's list as exemplars of economic performance.

Tuesday, October 6, 2009

Regulation: It's Not about Partisanship

. Tuesday, October 6, 2009
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We hear a good bit about how deregulation contributed to the financial crisis. Much less often do we specifically hear which pieces of deregulation are to blame. As expected, Krugman puts it all on Reagan's shoulders, but this is a very selective view of history. McMegan:

For starters, of course, deregulation kicked off under Jimmy Carter, with the Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act of 1980. More importantly, deregulation wasn't simply the brain child of some Chicago-crazed lunatics at Treasury. It was the brainchild of Fernand St. Germain, the Democratic representative from Rhode Island, which is not surprising, because of course, Democrats had control of the House of Representatives. And he wasn't being driven just by ideology, or even bank lobbying; he was being driven by the fact that the previous regulation regime had driven the Savings and Loans into a ditch. They were stuck with a bunch of fixed rate mortgages paying low interest rates at a time when Paul Volcker was driving short term interest rates up to 20%. Mortgage deregulation was supposed to be a solution to the problem of banks that borrowed short and lent long bleeding to death.

And why were they borrowing short and lending long so disastrously? Because Congress had prohibited banks from making anything other than long-term fixed rate loans, and until the deregulation of 1982, sellers could pass their low-interest loans on with the house when they sold it. ...

More broadly, it doesn't make a whole lot of sense to deride those who have linked the crisis to the Community Reinvestment Act because 1977 was such a very long time ago . . . and then claim that it can all be linked back to one law passed a few years later.


Ah, but what about the repeal of Glass-Steagall? Surely such blind faith in the market is what sunk the financial system? Not according to the leading Democratic economists:

Many critics have argued that Clinton’s 1999 repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial and investment banks, contributed to the meltdown last year. “It was a clear signal to the big banks to get much bigger and to become kind of financial supermarkets,” Robert Reich, Clinton’s first Labor Secretary, said. “It’s not the biggest factor, but it’s certainly a step along the way.” In an article on the causes of the current crisis, Joseph Stiglitz wrote, “When repeal of Glass-Steagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the investment-bank culture came out on top.”

But others note that the pure investment banks, like Lehman Brothers, have been the greatest source of instability, while the banks with combined commercial and investment arms have fared the best. “Banks did terrible things, investment banks did terrible things, a big insurance company named A.I.G. did terrible things, but basically none of that was enabled by the repeal of Glass-Steagall,” said Alan Blinder, an economist at Princeton, who had his share of confrontations with Summers when he was a member of the C.E.A., in the first two years of the Clinton Administration. Brad DeLong added, “To say that the breaking down of the Glass-Steagall wall between investment banks and commercial banks was the source of the current crisis is just wrong.”


Volcker, Summers, Blinder, DeLong... these are not slaves to a rigid laissez-faire ideology. And the two greatest periods of financial deregulation of the past 25 years were begun by Democratic presidents. Meanwhile, Reagan/H.W. Bush raised capital adequacy standards (Basel Accord) and W. Bush strengthened accounting standards in the wake of the Enron scandal (a move applauded by Greenspan). Many think that strict mark-to-market accounting rules and high capital requirements made the financial crisis in the Fall of 2008 much worse than it needed to be, by placing more stress on already-strained banks.

The point of this is not to play a partisan blame game. I couldn't care less about that, and there have been enough tweaks to regulatory policy by both Republican and Democratic administrations that that conversation could go back and forth forever. The point is that constructing good regulatory policy is very difficult, and what works at one point in time may not be effective at another. When Republican or Democratic administrations strengthen or loosen regulations they do so for specific, contextual reasons: the status quo is untenable, so reform is needed. Policy-makers aren't necessarily looking 30 years down the road, nor should they be.

But this should give us pause when thinking about policy. It's not necessarily about making regulations tougher or looser across the board. Instead, some financial practices may need tougher regulations while others need looser regulations. Adding a layer of flexibility giving regulators the power to adapt their requirements to changing circumstances and making regulations countercyclical might not hurt either. What does seem clear is that regulatory policy cannot remain fixed for very long: the status quo is constantly shifting, and if regulations are constantly addressing the last war then we'll always be susceptible to financial panics.

Tuesday, January 18, 2011

The "New Rules": Not New, Not Rules, and Not Helpful

. Tuesday, January 18, 2011
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In anticipation of his new book The Globalization Paradox, Dani Rodrik imagines what a new Bretton Woods arrangement would/should look like, and comes up with this bizarre list of seven "new rules for the global economy". I'll take them in turn.

1. Markets must be deeply embedded in systems of governance. The idea that markets are self-regulating received a mortal blow in the recent financial crisis and should be buried once and for all. Markets require other social institutions to support them. They rely on courts, legal frameworks, and regulators to set and enforce rules. They depend on the stabilizing functions that central banks and countercyclical fiscal policy provide. They need the political buy-in that redistributive taxation, safety nets, and social insurance help generate. And all of this is true of global markets as well.


Umm... are there no courts? No laws? No regulators? No safety nets? No social insurance? No countercyclical fiscal policy? Rodrik and I are looking at different economies. Perhaps the precise mix of these does not satisfy Rodrik (although that shouldn't matter, since he adopts a pluralist position below), but he cannot seriously argue that they do not exist. As for "all of this is true of global markets as well", I'm not sure what he means, he doesn't elaborate, and this seems to contradict some of his later points. To whit:

2. For the foreseeable future, democratic governance is likely to be organized largely within national political communities. The nation state lives, if not entirely well, and remains essen­tially the only game in town. ...


Agreed. But again, this is the status quo. We have some international agreements (he lists the Basel Accords and some WTO rules), but we maintain national standards in addition to those, and all of them are subject to approval from domestic polities. Is Rodrik asking for less international cooperation? What problem does he think that would solve?

3. Pluralist prosperity. Acknowledging that the core institutional infrastructure of the global economy must be built at the national level frees countries to develop the institutions that suit them best. The United States, Europe, and Japan have produced comparable amounts of wealth over the long term. Yet their labor markets, cor­porate governance, antitrust rules, social protection, and financial systems differ considerably, with a succession of these “models” – a different one each decade – anointed the great success to be emulated. ...


Right. Again, this is the status quo. The Washington Consensus is well and truly dead, if in fact it was ever alive. The Brazilian model is different from the UAE model is different from the Chinese model is different from the Indian model is different from the German model, etc. No one is trying to coerce anyone else to adopt their system.

4. Countries have the right to protect their own regulations and institutions. ... We should therefore accept that countries may uphold national rules – tax policies, financial regulations, labor standards, or consumer health and safety rules – and may do so by raising barriers at the border if necessary, when trade demonstrably threat­ens domestic practices enjoying broad popular support. If globalization’s boosters are right, the clamor for protection will fail for lack of evidence or support. If wrong, there will be a safety valve in place to ensure that contending values – the benefits of open economies versus the gains from upholding domestic regulations – both receive a proper hearing in public debates. ...


This is a major part of his previous book, One Economics, Many Recipes. I see this largely as status quo too, although I can see why there would be an argument. It's true that emerging countries were often bullied in previous trade rounds, but the failure of the Doha round is partial indication that emerging economies now possess a stronger bargaining position. As for the specifics he lists -- tax policies, financial regulations, labor standards, or consumer health and safety -- there are no international prohibitions limiting national sovereignty in these areas. In fact, WTO rules make explicit exceptions for things like consumer health. To the extent that governments are pressured to change national policies in these issue-areas, that pressure comes mostly from markets or global civil society, not foreign governments. Which is why there is so much cross-national heterogeneity over those policies.

5. Countries have no right to impose their institutions on others. Using restrictions on cross-border trade or finance to uphold values and regulations at home must be distinguished from using them to impose these values and regulations on other countries. ...


Oh, I see. So you can use protectionism to uphold your own values, but only if that does not impose on others. Excuse me? A tariff or border adjustment is by definition coercive. Either you adopt my values or else you cannot make money in my markets. One cannot have this both ways, no matter how much one would like to.

6. International economic arrangements must establish rules for managing interaction among national institutions. Relying on nation states to provide the essential governance functions of the world economy does not mean that we should aban­don international rules. The Bretton Woods regime, after all, had clear rules, though they were limited in scope and depth. A completely decentralized free-for-all would benefit no one.

What we need are traffic rules for the global economy that help vehicles of varying size, shape, and speed navigate around each other, rather than imposing an identical car or a uniform speed limit. ...


I guess the disclaimer is meant to head-off criticism that this explicitly violates everything that came before it. Other than the fact that it does, it is also meaningless. Traffic rules? Not including a speed limit? Does he mean, like, using your turn signal? I wish there was a for-instance here, because I cannot guess what Rodrik is driving at.

7. Non-democratic countries cannot count on the same rights and privileges in the international economic order as democracies. ...


Look, either the norm of national economic sovereignty and the need for local decision-making and autonomy is important or it isn't. If it is, then regime type should be irrelevant. If it isn't, then #s 1-5 are irrelevant. Rodrik justifies this by saying that "legitimacy" comes from democratic deliberation, but what happens when democracy yields illiberal outcomes? When majorities oppress minorities? When majorities in one country oppress minorities in others? This is to elide the most obvious criticism, which is that democracy itself is in the eye of the beholder.

Looking over this list, there isn't a single thing that addresses any of the major issues facing the global economy, which Rodrik lists as "the eurozone crisis, global recovery, financial regulation, international macroeconomic imbal­ances, and so on". There are very few things that even count as functional "rules" in a way analogous to Bretton Woods. As general principles, almost all of them are already present in the status quo, and the ones that aren't (#7) are almost surely wrongheaded.

This column is intended as a precis of his forthcoming book, so maybe he offers better argument and example there. I hope so, because what's in the column is weak sauce.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Search results for countercyclical regulation
 

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