It would be interesting to see if:
1) Pro-home ownership policies decrease union power
2) Pro-business groups actually lobby for pro-home ownership policies to decrease the ability of workers to collectively bargain
Such a dynamic would be particularly interesting given the strong rhetorical connections between pro-labor social welfare programs and tax policy and government subsidies that favor home ownership. Of course, I could also buy the logic that when labor becomes less mobile due to home ownership, workers are better able to overcome collective action problems because they do not have the option of moving to where there are higher wages. Thus, immobile workers may be more willing to bear the costs associated with centralized wage bargaining.
Anyone out there with some references to work on this subject?
Did you search this:
ReplyDeletehttp://tinyurl.com/y5nw2r5
You won't find much (if any) political science literature on it, cause the corporatism/wage bargaining lit was all focused on centralization's impact on macro outcomes.
Not obvious to me how you see politics fitting into your question?