Friday, May 27, 2011

Is American Political Science Ignored?

. Friday, May 27, 2011
5 comments

In American academic circles, there is often much weeping and gnashing of teeth about how government and academic political science are separated. Few policymakers read academic research, complain academics. Few academics do anything substantively important or intellectually accessible, complain policymakers. So I found it interesting to read this, from a profile of Joe Nye in the UK Independent:

The advantages of the revolving door between academia and government, as it works in the United States, however, are indisputable. It gives academics an opportunity to test their ideas in practice and it gives politicians the benefit of specialist advice. Mid-career, Joseph Nye spent two years as a security official specialising in nuclear non-proliferation in the administration of Jimmy Carter. Fifteen years later, he joined the Clinton administration as assistant secretary for defence, and then became chairman of the National Intelligence Council, a body that coordinates intelligence estimates for the President. Had John Kerry won the 2004 election, Nye was seen as the natural choice to be National Security Adviser. When the Republicans were in power, Nye returned to Harvard.

Such a career would be unusual, not to say impossible, in Britain. Despite hints by Tony Blair, among others, that he would favour academics, business people and others moving in and out of government, the structures are not there and no-one – not the professional politicians, not the civil servants – has a real interest in fostering change. When it does happen, it is the exception and the beneficiaries – Admiral Lord West, for example – have tended to be more accident-prone than other ministers. Sharing a platform with Nye during his sojourn in London, Mark Malloch-Brown – former Deputy General Secretary of the UN and Foreign Office minister under Labour – lamented Britain's single track with more than a touch of envy. At very least, serving in government can be said to lend a practical aspect to the various branches of political science at America's leading universities.

Nye's direct experience of academia and politics – two worlds which in Britain tend to be seen as alien to each other, if not inimical – is the rule rather than the exception for senior US scholars and it ensures that their ideas are given a hearing on both sides of the fence. It allows the two worlds to feed off each other to mutual benefit and those who excel in both become a particular kind of superstar, guaranteed a global audience and needing to feel beholden to no-one.


Clearly Nye is an exceptional case, but the article makes a more general argument. I don't know much about the reporter, Mary Dejevsky, so I'm not sure what cred she's got. I just found it interesting that for all the hand-wringing American academics do over the fact that policymakers don't pay enough attention to us, one view from across the Pond is very different.

The Political Appeal of Financialization

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1 comments

From Orgtheory's ongoing book forum on Krippner's Capitalizing on Crisis:

Ralph Nader, of course, wasn’t the only consumer activist who supported reform of Regulation Q. As Fabio described in his post, the regulation of credit was contested by a variety of interest groups, but it was the support of consumer activists like Nader that gave legislators the political cover to make these changes. Once credit markets were deregulated, the process of financialization could begin. Politicians learned from this experience that deregulation was a great way to win electoral support while also relieving them from accountability over the economy. Politicians learned their lesson and began applying it in other realms as well. The result was a gradual “depoliticization of the economy,” which Krippner describes as “the reorganization of the boundary between the political and the economic so as to allow policymakers to govern the economy ‘at one remove’” (145).


This is set in an electoral context where politicians rely on constituent approval to remain in office. The financialization of the economy, in Krippner's account, was a political winner:

On its surface this seemed like a win-win for everyone. Deregulating interest rates would expand credit availability, while also allowing banks to get more creative in their offerings to potential borrowers. In retrospect we know that this deregulation also accelerated inflation and suppressed production. This had the effect of pushing more of the economy into financial markets and fueling asset price bubbles.


What politician wouldn't love a policy that both Wall Street and Ralph Nader would support?

My first thought on reading this was to ask a comparative question: which countries financialized their economies in this way? What were the domestic and international causes of such a shift? Were the consequences similar in countries that financialized similar or dissimilar?

Any pointers to research that directly addresses these questions would be welcomed.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

The Politics of IMF Leadership

. Thursday, May 26, 2011
1 comments

Daniel Davies titles a recent post on the selection process of the new IMF chief "Taking the politics out of politics, and the international relations out of international institutions". Davies is correctly pushing back the notion that the IMF exists for technocratic perfection, specifically the argument (by Martin Wolf among most other popular writers) that the IMF chief needs to be an economist.

This is real "too important to be left to generals" territory. A "merit-based" selection process for the IMF top job is effectively assuming that all the issues the IMF faces are technical (not political), and that the problem is to find someone with sufficient technical economic skills to pick the right solution from a mass of confusing alternatives.

In fact, in general the IMF tends to face situations in which there are only about three or four real options, one of which is usually both massively obviously the best idea, and politically very difficult for some powerful constituency or other. That's why it's a political job. And the allocation between the USA and Europe was agreed at the original Bretton Woods conference as part of a very dicey compromise between the only two blocks which can print unlimited hard currency. It's an international institution, and one of the biggest problems in designing such an institution is to persuade the major powers that it is worth their while working through the institutional framework rather than through bilateral diplomacy. That's why the UNSC has permanent members, for example, and it's why France and Germany tend to get first dibs on important Commission posts.

I am no fan at all of the IMF (or of the way in which history is being rewritten to cast them as opponents of pointless austerity). But it does at least kindasorta work as an international institution, which is why I'm in favour of not fixing it.


Davies is right that the IMF is more about politics than about economics. That's the whole point of having an established international institution rather than a series of ad hoc transfers as needed: sometimes the ad hoc transfer won't come for political reasons, and that can lead to disasters like the 1930s. There are a number of political dimensions related to the IMF. One is the austerity politics in the debtor nation. The IMF is routinely portrayed (including by Davies here) as some kind of bogeyman, externally imposing its imperial will (or the imperial will of the US) onto smaller, less powerful countries. This is only some of the story. James Vreeland has done a lot of the best research on the IMF, and here's the abstract of a new working paper by him:

Many argue that governments use IMF programs to push unpopular policies past domestic political opposition. Many others have argued that the IMF is merely a tool of US foreign policy, providing loans without enforcing policy conditions. This paper addresses the inconsistencies between these two views, presenting large-n evidence supporting both. The domestic politics story, however, depends on international politics. The IMF can only be used to push through unpopular policies when the institution is not being used to reward friends of the US.


In other words, the IMF is a useful bogeyman for domestic leaders that want (or need) to pursue unpopular reforms, but do not have the domestic political constituency to do so. To the extent that some of these reforms are necessary (as they certainly are in Greece today), we may not want a kinder, gentler IMF. Better for the IMF to remain the scapegoat, thus giving domestic reformers some political room to move. Blame the institution, but pass the reform. Some of Vreeland's other work supports this idea.

There's another political aspect of the IMF that is less discussed. Dr. Oatley wrote a post last year about the politics of bailouts in creditor nations. Basically, the story runs like so: it is often politically unpopular for one country to give aid to other countries in times of need. Think about the typical German voter, who wonders why her tax dollars should be spent to reward the Greeks for their profligacy? A direct funding mechanism (like EFSF?) may not be politically sustainable in democracies. But an indirect funding mechanism (like the IMF) may be more politically successful, by making the bailout one step removed from budget politics in creditor countries.

We're seeing both elements at play in this crisis. Austerity is unpopular in debtor countries like Greece but is inevitable in some form, so if politicians can shift some of the blame onto the IMF it may help them get necessary reforms through. At the same time, voters in Germany and France don't like being expected to pick up the tab of the Europeriphery indefinitely, and have set 2013 as the expiration date for bailout funds. But the IMF doesn't have such a limit. It can extend funds when and where they are necessary. And funding the IMF is not as politically salient as funding other countries directly.

Because the IMF is facing domestic political pressures in creditor and debtor nations, as well as international political pressures from its constituent governments (particularly the US, but the role of EMs are growing too), its next leader should be someone that can navigate the political space and doesn't mind be blamed for everything that goes bad in debtor countries. The next leader should not be someone chosen for their technical economic nous, much less for their country of origin, but for their political sensibility.

I have no idea of Christine Lagarde is that person. I know very little about her. What I do know is that she's a bureaucrat, not an academic, and so presumably has a good sense of the European political situation. That's a start.

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Blogging May Be Light

. Tuesday, May 24, 2011
1 comments

New Research

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1 comments

A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Deniz Igan, Prachi Mishra, Thierry Tressel
NBER Working Paper No. 17076

Has lobbying by financial institutions contributed to the financial crisis? This paper uses detailed information on financial institutions’ lobbying and mortgage lending activities to answer this question. We find that lobbying was associated with more risk-taking during 2000-07 and with worse outcomes in 2008. In particular, lenders lobbying more intensively on issues related to mortgage lending and securitization (i) originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized a faster growing proportion of their loans, and (iii) had faster growing originations of mortgages. Moreover, delinquency rates in 2008 were higher in areas where lobbying lenders’ mortgage lending grew faster. These lenders also experienced negative abnormal stock returns during the rescue of Bear Stearns and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but positive abnormal returns when the bailout was announced. Finally, we find a higher bailout probability for lobbying lenders. These findings suggest that lending by politically active lenders played a role in accumulation of risks and thus contributed to the financial crisis.



Exchange Rates in Emerging Countries: Eleven Empirical Regularities from Latin America and East Asia
Sebastian Edwards
NBER Working Paper No. 17074

In this paper I discuss some of the most important lessons on exchange rate policies in emerging markets during the last 35 years. The analysis is undertaken from the perspective of both the Latin American and East Asian nations. Some of the topics addressed include: the relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth, the costs of currency crises, the merits of “dollarization,” the relation between exchange rates and macroeconomic stability, monetary independence under alternative exchange rate arrangements, and the effects of the recent global “currency wars” on exchange rates in commodity exporters.



Financial Protectionism: the First Tests
Andrew K. Rose, Tomasz Wieladek
NBER Working Paper No. 17073

We provide the first empirical tests for financial protectionism, defined as a nationalistic change in banks’ lending behaviour, as the result of public intervention, which leads domestic banks either to lend less or at higher interest rates to foreigners. We use a bank-level panel data set spanning all British and foreign banks providing loans within the United Kingdom between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. During this time, a number of banks were nationalised, privatised, given unusual access to loan or credit guarantees, or received capital injections. We use standard empirical panel-data techniques to study the “loan mix,” domestic (British) loans of a bank expressed as a fraction of its total loan activity. We also study effective short-term interest rates, though our data set here is much smaller. We examine the loan mix for both British and foreign banks, both before and after unusual public interventions such as nationalisations and public capital injections. We find strong evidence of financial protectionism. After nationalisations, foreign banks reduced the fraction of loans going to the UK by about eleven percentage points and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. By way of contrast, nationalised British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates. Succinctly, foreign nationalised banks seem to have engaged in financial protectionism, while British nationalised banks have not.

Monday, May 23, 2011

IPE Everywhere: DSK Gets Euro Advice in Rikers

. Monday, May 23, 2011
1 comments

Ferguson + Kissinger = Mush

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2 comments

This has to be the worst thing I'll read this week. Niall Ferguson slobbering over Henry Kissinger for discovering... wait for it... the security dilemma:

Such fundamental cultural differences may give rise to conflict with China in the future, Kissinger warns: “When the Chinese view of preemption encounters the Western concept of deterrence, a vicious circle can result: acts conceived as defensive in China may be treated as aggressive by the outside world; deterrent moves by the West may be interpreted in China as encirclement. The United States and China wrestled with this dilemma repeatedly during the Cold War; to some extent they have not yet found a way to transcend it.”

Could the United States and the People’s Republic come to blows again? The possibility cannot be excluded. As Kissinger reminds us, war was the result when Germany rose to challenge Britain economically and geopolitically 100 years ago. Moreover, the key factor that brought America and China together in the 1970s—the common Soviet enemy the Chinese called “the polar bear”—has vanished from the scene. Old, intractable differences persist over Taiwan and North Korea. What remains is “Chimerica,” a less-than-happy marriage of economic convenience in which one partner does all the saving and the other does all the spending.


This is the most basic principle in IR, and remains the orthodox story for how major power conflicts occur. Of course there are big problems with it -- Germany challenged Britain, but the U.S. did not -- but it's the basic story. For this staggeringly simple insight, which any of my Poli 150 students should be able to regurgitate in their sleep, Ferguson writes that Kissinger "remains without equal as a strategic thinker". I sure hope not.

The worst part is that Kissinger hasn't appropriately internalized his own lesson. The bulk of his new book On China (per Ferguson's description) seems to focus on cultural and psychological explanations of China's behavior and the possibility of Sino-US conflict. The Korean War happened because of a "cultural gap"; China entered into it to "change the psychological balance" by changing the US's "calculus of risk". In other words, China was signaling resolve. But there's nothing cultural or even psychological about that. It's pure information revelation, of the sort Schelling (and plenty of others) described.

And cultural explanations are notoriously fraught; why would cultural differences cause conflict with China, but not other Asian (or non-Asian) countries? Why have major European countries, about as culturally similar as nations will be, historically been antagonists? Why would the US get along with India in the future, but not China?

How about this sophistry:

The Chinese value patience; as Mao explained to Kissinger, they measure time in millennia.


I recall being told that the most notable thing about China's rise was its rapid pace. I remember hearing that China's advantage was that its authoritarian government was able to more quickly adapt to new circumstances, and more perfectly practice mercantilism. This was how they'd win the future. These cultural "explanations" sure get confusing... forgive me if I continue to think that conflicts occur because power shifts are not accommodated by governance structures, and bargaining under anarchy is perilous.

I'm not sure how much of this is Kissinger and how much is Ferguson. After all, Kissinger does pick up on the fairly important fact that China has no intention of challenging the US' order:

Yet Kissinger remains hopeful that cooler heads will prevail in Beijing: thinkers like Zheng Bijian, who urges China to “transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge” and “not [to] follow the path of Germany leading up to World War I.” Rather than attempting to “organize Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade,” the United States would do better, Kissinger suggests, to work with China to build a new “Pacific Community.”


In fact, it seems like the opposite is of the nightmare scenario is true, as China seems perfectly happy to integrate more fully into the US-led system:

China’s economic rise has been facilitated by the regional security provided for by the United States since the end of Cold War hostilities in the region. Ashely J. Tellis, former advisor to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs and senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, similarly states that American protection provided a “stable security environment” which allowed Asian states to “mitigate the most acute tradeoffs between guns and butter.” U.S. hegemony has allowed China to benefit from globalized trade without having to incur costs for maintaining the necessary stable environment. In a 2008 diplomatic cable from the Beijing Embassy, U.S. Ambassador Clark T. Randt recalls a conversation with an unnamed Chinese party: “when it comes to the basic Chinese interest in securing energy supplies and raw materials for our economic growth, free-riderism works for us right now.”


Free-riderism will continue to work for China for the foreseeable future. China is still a poor country, facing a number of internal adjustments that will test the new political leadership in the coming years. Moreover, China's economy has grown faster than its political capital. China has a lot of business partners, but not a lot of allies. Certainly not many allies that would take its side against the US in an attempt to overturn the post-WWII order. China will continue to build up goodwill in Asia, Europe, and elsewhere, but it will be quite a long time before China has a set of allies that rival the US's. During that period, China may become one of the US's allies, as other formerly antagonistic regional powers have done.

I haven't read Kissinger's book, but based on Ferguson's recommendation it doesn't sound like there's anything new or profound in it. I know the man has plenty of disciples, and it may be good for some of them to read this stuff, but for people who study IR in an academic context this is pretty weak sauce. This take, by Princeton political science Prof. Aaron Friedberg, is better. Still too pessimistic, I think, but greater clarity of thought and all the appropriate caveats.

Sunday, May 22, 2011

Spain Feels the Pressure

. Sunday, May 22, 2011
4 comments

To this point Spain's economy hasn't suffered as much as Portugal, Greece, or Ireland, but that doesn't mean things are going well. Economic pressures continue to mount, and Spain faces the same exchange rate pressures as those other countries. A currency devaluation would help boost competitiveness and thus employment, but that isn't possible under the euro. In a fixed exchange rate system, internal devaluation via wage cuts and increased unemployment is the only option. And democratic publics don't like that very much:

About 28,000 people, most of them young, spent Friday night in Puerta del Sol, a main square in downtown Madrid, the police said. They stayed even as the protest ban went into effect at midnight under rules that bring an official end to campaigning before the election in 13 of Spain’s 17 regions and in more than 8,000 municipalities.

Fueling the demonstrators’ anger is the perceived failure by politicians to alleviate the hardships imposed on a struggling population. The unemployment rate in Spain is 21 percent.


And Spain looks likely to be the next European country to tilt right since the economic crisis:

Sunday’s election is expected to result in a countrywide sweep by the Popular Party, the main center-right opposition, at the expense of the governing Socialists, whose popularity has plummeted because of the economic crisis. The most recent opinion polls suggest that the Socialist Party may lose in regions and municipalities where it has been in power since Spain’s return to democracy in the late 1970s, notably Castilla-La Mancha.


There are other issues at stake, including concerns about corruption, but those get magnified when unemployment is at 21%. Some folks on Twitter are saying that the police tried to break up some protests, but I haven't seen a credible report on that yet. Either way, these issues aren't going away.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Some Politics of Housing

. Thursday, May 19, 2011
18 comments

At a few points recently I've heard people argue that housing policy is either not politically salient, or has little to do with the sorts of macro outcomes that led to the housing crisis. So I was interested to receive an e-mail from my senator, Kay Hagan, pointing me to this Politico op-ed she co-wrote with Sen. Isakson and Sen. Landrieu:

Families are working hard to rebuild savings while the housing market remains unstable. Recent news from the Commerce Department shows that U.S. home builders continue to struggle despite signs of recovery in other segments of the economy. According to real estate data released this week, home prices in the first quarter of 2011 suffered their worst decline since 2008.

Yet banking regulators are dangerously close to issuing a rule that would put homes out of reach for many Americans and further cripple the fragile housing recovery. ...

But federal banking regulators last month proposed a 20 percent down payment requirement on QRMs. Regulators went for rigidity, rather than a balanced, flexible approach.

In contrast to our express intent — and despite repeated warnings from other members of Congress, consumer groups and bankers — regulators crafted a narrow definition that could unnecessarily slow the housing market recovery, increase costs to otherwise qualified homebuyers and dampen incentives for sound underwriting.

The 20 percent down payment requirement leaves millions of qualified potential homeowners with two grim alternatives: pay higher rates upfront for a mortgage that falls outside the regulators’ proposed QRM standard or delay homeownership for a decade or more to save for an onerous down payment.


Here we have three senators, two Democrats and one Republican, arguing against tougher regulation that would lead to higher lending standards. They obviously think this issue is salient enough to write an op-ed about it, at a time when most political attention is being paid to budget reform and other issues. And this is the first e-mail of this sort that I recall having received from Hagan's office. In fact, I'm not even sure how I got on their mailing list.

This is merely the most recent in a series of policy choices that incentivize home ownership in the U.S. The most notable of these is probably the mortgage interest deduction, which not only encourages home ownership, but also encourages the building and purchasing of larger homes. And the mortgage interest deduction is pretty firmly embedded in the U.S. political economy. In Showdown at Gucci Gulch, journalists Alan Murray and Jeffery Birnbaum describe how the proposal to end the mortgage interest deduction was almost immediately removed from early versions of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, because it was a political non-starter. Indeed, Congress was better able to reduce and eliminate subsidies to some of the interest groups usually considered to be among the most powerful -- finance and energy -- than subsidies for home ownership.

The 1986 Tax Reform Act did eliminate some loopholes in the tax code that incentivized tax sheltering through real estate investment, but these did not affect primary residences. And TRA1986 also eliminated tax deductions from other types of interest, such as on credit cards and other personal loans. But not mortgage interest on primary homes. Nor was TRA1986 able to reduce or eliminate the exemption of capital gains on home investment, so long as it was a primary residence and the capital gains were under $500,000 (for a married couple filing jointly). Some estimations have claimed that these subsidies increase home values by 15%. Considering that roughly 65% of the country are homeowners, and it is not uncommon for a majority of peoples' equity to be in their homes, it's no surprise that this is a politically salient issue.

This despite the fact that there is a broad consensus among economists, environmentalists, and urbanists that this policy skews behavior away from the social optimum. An inflated market incentivizes speculation and over-purchasing. It leads to too much investment. It also leads to suburbanization, and increased energy usage from heating/cooling/commuting. Consider as well that it benefits the middle-class and wealthy at the expense of the poor, particular those poor that live in urban areas. To make up for it, the government extends loans to lower-income (or otherwise less creditworthy) borrowers through Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loans Banks. These organizations fund or guarantee over $6tn in mortgages, or over 40% of U.S. GDP, representing nearly half of the country's real estate market. The GSEs are well-known to have a lot of political clout, and have resisted repeated calls for reform during every presidential administration since Reagan, at least. And, of course, they were the biggest originators of subprime (and Alt-A and interest-only) loans, the securitization of which was rewarded by the pre-crisis regulatory structure. (Note that current research indicates that the bulk of GSE losses were Alt-A, which are prime loans, if untraditional.) The GSEs held approximately 45-50% of all mortgages in the country throughout the 2000s. Fannie and Freddie were also the largest purchaser of AAA-rated MBS, which created a market for other mortgage lenders to lend subprime and securitize the loan, which fulfilled their requirements to support affordable housing, particularly for low-income borrowers*.

Other aspects of public policy incentivized home ownership (or real estate speculation) in less obvious ways. The large, persistent current account deficit did not lead to a currency crash as many had predicted, but it did lead to an increase in demand for non-tradable goods. Like housing. This current account deficit is not attributable to any single factor, but persistent budget deficits in the private and public sectors certainly played a major role. The large demand for AAA-rated financial instruments in which to invest a "global savings glut" also led to a demand for securitized home loans. Finance was happy to oblige. There were major geopolitical dynamics at play as well.

All to say that housing policy is an important political issue. It's important for citizens in the United States, and therefore for politicians. It's important for numerous interest groups, in the U.S. and abroad. The housing bubble wasn't engineered entirely by Wall Street, although they certainly worked hard to accommodate it. There was demand from many corners.

*I'm not trying to argue here, as many have, that the financial crisis was caused by the GSEs. It wasn't. I'm merely trying to demonstrate that public policy is oriented towards promoting home ownership in many ways that take many forms. The GSEs are part of that. The have a public mandate to extend loans to less-qualified borrowers, but that is not all of their business or even the largest part.

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

It's the Stupidity, Stupid

. Tuesday, May 17, 2011
0 comments

Roger Lowenstein says the reason no Wall Street executives have been prosecuted is likely because their actions were stupid but not criminal. But people don't find that satisfying:

While it may be harder to prove criminal guilt, it's easier for people to believe that some bad actor is the cause of bad things. This is a persistent trait in the national character. Historian Richard Hofstadter identified it in 1964 as The Paranoid Style in American Politics. He was writing mostly about McCarthyism, though he recognized that paranoia isn't limited to the political Right. Nor is it always harnessed to an unworthy cause; convicting criminals, especially in high places, isn't just worthy, it's crucial to democracy.

The paranoid style, as Hofstadter defined it, has as much to do with "style" as paranoia—it's about "the way in which ideas are believed [more] than with the truth or falsity of their content." It spawned a rhetoric that tilted every question toward conspiracy, so that random or unfortunate events were seen to compose a "baffling pattern." Thus, the "sharp decline"—Hofstadter was writing about America's perceived international strength, not the price of real estate—did not "just happen." It was inevitably brought about by "will and intention."


He writes elsewhere that the crisis was caused mostly by rank idiocy, not by fraud. He puts it something like "fraud accompanied the crisis, it didn't cause it". This is a view that I am pretty sympathetic to. I believe there was a some outright fraud, but I suspect that is always the case in financial markets. The bigger problem during the crisis was that all sorts of people thought very risky assets were not very risky. And, while some actions taken in the lead-up to the crisis are obviously crazy in retrospect, being wrong is not criminal. We don't imprison the gambler for backing the wrong horse and losing his rent.

In general I think we are too quick to assign bad motives to people when things go wrong, and are too slow to accept that people do very stupid things all the time without intending to. We often assume that people in high positions of business or government are more competent than they really are, so when things go wrong we conclude that it was intentional. I think we're also too quick to connect unrelated dots, rather than starting from the assumption that the world is pretty stochastic. This gets to the "Black Swans" post from yesterday.

There's a political element to this, of course. Hofstadter's famous essay largely focused on 1960s examples of right-wing paranoia (e.g. McCarthyism), but he was clear that this particular pathology affects people across the political spectrum. (One of the examples he mentions, but does not dwell on, is scare-mongering against bankers in the 1890s. It reads like it could have been writing today.) Politicians often try to tap into latent paranoia, and in some cases actively encourage it. (Think of Gingrich's "secular atheist radical Islamist" nightmare, which must have filled out somebody's Bingo card.) Sometimes, as in the case of the Republican establishment, incorporating the Tea Party movement (which I view as a somewhat-coherent but certainly-paranoid mass movement) is more an act of desperation: if they don't, their coalition risks fragmentation, as happened during the populist movements in the 1990s that led to Ross Perot's presidential runs. A big part of Perot's success was manipulation of fear of a "giant sucking sound", and Perot's relative success may have affected legislators' later votes on NAFTA.

Sometimes encouraging isn't really needed. Current populist movements in America on the left and right have strong grassroots characteristics, although media and policy elites sometimes encourage and try to co-opt them. Just as often they try to minimize them. The Birther, Truther, and Deather movements started small and grew, although none have really affected the political landscape in the same way as Perot or the Tea Party. As Hussein Ibish witnessed recently, fear of an Islamic conspiracy to annihilate Western civilization approaches common belief. It doesn't take much to convince lots of people that the financial crisis was the result of conspiratorial actions of bankers, and both Glenn Beck and Michael Moore have built careers playing to certain types of American paranoia. It doesn't take a lot to convince people that foreigners will take their jobs, or attack the homeland, or brainwash their children, or otherwise take away everything they hold dear.

Conspiratorial explanations are obviously appealing, and clearly conspiracies do sometimes exist. But quite often it might be worth taking a step back, acknowledging that the world is a messy place that often doesn't make sense, and chalk up bad outcomes to stupidity instead.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina
 

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