Showing posts with label Cap and Trade. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cap and Trade. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

The Next Trade Spat?

. Wednesday, June 8, 2011
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This has been brewing:

"The trade war between China and Europe will not break out over manufacturing industry, customs duties, dumping or the yuan exchange rate, but on a front that no one expected: in the sky," writes La Stampa, in the wake of a threat voiced by the Beijing representative at the IATA (International Air Transport Association) Conference to simply close Chinese air space "if the EU, as it has already decided, introduces an emissions tax on all intercontinental flights leaving the EU on 1st January." The European Commission plans to grant a "license to pollute" similar to those already esablished for other industrial sectors to every airline operating in Europe, explains Le Monde: 82% of emissions rights will be free, but a 18% will have to be purchased on "carbon credits market."


My understanding is that so long as the EU rules are applied non-discriminatorily, such an emissions tax is WTO-legal.

Thursday, January 20, 2011

Green Graft

. Thursday, January 20, 2011
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This doesn't strike me as a very large problem, but it is interesting:

The European Commission suspended trading in greenhouse gas emissions permits on Wednesday for at least a week after the theft of permits worth millions of euros via online attacks. ...

The attacks raised new questions about the viability of Europe’s main tool to combat a rise in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

The stolen permits are part of Europe’s effort to cap the amount of carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, that companies may emit each year. Europe’s system is the world’s largest market for greenhouse gas emissions credits.

Companies exceeding their emissions quotas buy certificates from companies that succeeded in shrinking their carbon footprint by, for example, adopting lower-emission technology or modifying production in other ways.


This is not the first problem that Europe has had with its cap and trade system, however:

Europe’s system has had a rocky ride since trading began six years ago, including extreme volatility, tax fraud, recycling of used credits and suspicions of profiteering, in addition to online attacks.

One year ago, swindlers used fake e-mail messages to obtain access codes for individual accounts on the national registries that make up Europe’s system.


This is all pretty low-level theft, but in small ways it does undermine the integrity of the system. This is one reason why most technocracy-minded folks prefer straight carbon taxes rather than cap and trade. When cap and trade works well it mimics carbon taxes, but it is prone to rent-seeking, inefficiency, and (apparently) fraud. Carbon taxes have fewer moving pieces and they're more difficult to game.

More broadly, cases like these demonstrate that reaching an international agreement on climate change isn't the whole battle. Preventing leakages, inefficiencies, and poor incentives may be just as difficult, especially since states with weak or corrupt domestic institutions (e.g. China, India) are involved. It's a very real problem, but it isn't discussed very often.

Sunday, July 5, 2009

The U.S. Plays Chicken with the BRICs

. Sunday, July 5, 2009
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A few days ago, Dr. Oatley wrote about the attempt by the U.S. House of Representatives to cap greenhouse emissions and coerce other countries into doing the same:

This time it is the Waxman-Markey cap and trade legislation. The intent of the legislation--reduce greenhouse gases--addresses concerns of the Democrats' median voter, who cares deeply about climate change. Producers, however, are concerned that the higher energy costs generated by cap and trade will disadvantage them relative to Chinese firms who are not facing higher energy costs because China does not regulate greenhouse gases. The solution, added late to the legislation, is to impose tariffs on goods from countries that do not regulate GHG (i.e., China). Nobody really wants to impose tariffs, but the hope is that the threat of tariffs will be sufficient to induce China to agree to international regulations on CO2 emissions.


This realist view is often borne out in the politics of international regulations. But in this case it is difficult to see whether the U.S. has the muscle to coerce China (and others) into adopting the U.S.-preferred strategy. Krugman loves it, but the push-back from China and India has already begun:

The Chinese government also said it believed the carbon tax proposal violated the principle set out in the Kyoto protocol that developed and developing countries should respond to climate change together but with different responsibilities. “[It] severely harms developing countries’ interests,” Mr Yao said.

The WTO report, which gave a cautious nod to carbon tariffs, was prepared by the organisation’s secretariat, which can advise and facilitate discussion among the WTO’s members but does not set the rules itself. If a government such as China’s challenged such taxes, the case would be decided by the WTO’s dispute settlement system – panels of independent trade experts and lawyers.

Some trade lawyers point out that past WTO decisions have permitted governments to restrict trade in order to protect natural resources. But others say the case law is patchy, and it is hard to prove that such measures are being applied in a fair and consistent manner – a necessary condition for meeting WTO rules.


And the Indians have quite a point:

With 1.1bn people – roughly a sixth of the world’s population – India has one of the lowest per capita emission levels, with 1.2 tonnes per head, about 4.6 per cent of total global emissions. “India has not polluted – we are bearing the brunt of global climate change caused by the developed countries and we are being asked to curb emissions,” he said. “I find this ludicrous.”

However, India’s carbon emissions are expected to rise sharply in the future, especially as the country tries to meet its power deficit through the rapid development of generating capacity. India uses about 450m tonnes of highly-polluting coal for power generation each year, a figure that Mr Ramesh said would rise to about 1bn tonnes in less than a decade.

“There is no running away from our karma – without coal, we have no economic future,” he said.


That last sentence is the crux: India and China will not yield because they cannot. They can credibly commit to hurt U.S. consumers and producers in retaliation (in this case, retaliation could be as simple as accepting reduced economic gains from trade; of course, they could also slap retaliatory tariffs or simply stop buying U.S. bonds). So the question is whether the U.S. thinks that the environmental gains from carbon tariffs will out-weigh the economic costs of a trade war during a nasty recession. More specifically, does the president and the 60th most-progressive senator think so? So far, Obama has indicated that he is not interested in playing chicken with the Chinese.

From my seat (nowhere near the table), it appears that the provision will be stripped from the Senate version of the bill, and/or the bill will not pass. The costs to American consumers of challenging China and India (and Canada) have already become too great. That could change if the U.S., E.U., Japan, and others make a concerted stand against the BRICs, but that would allow the BRICs to accuse the rich world of preventing the development of some of the world's poorest people in order to fulfill their pet preferences. And they would be right.

Addendum: China may have actually started the trade war over a month ago.

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Cap, Coerce, and Then Trade

. Tuesday, June 30, 2009
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I once wrote a paper in which I asserted that international agreements are a consequence of dilemmas of domestic politics. Voters pressure politicians to enact regulation (say, to protect the environment). Producers ask legislators to not pass the regulation because it will put them at a cost disadvantage in international trade. Legislators are thus forced to choose between making voters happy but losing producer support (and campaign contributions), and making producers happy but losing votes.

I argued that legislators often escaped this dilemma by using international agreements to force foreign producers to accept regulations identical to those imposed at home. As Hubert Humphrey once said, "Germans don't vote" [in the U.S., that is] and so it makes sense to push the cost of regulation onto foreigners. Sometimes, however, foreign governments are unwilling to change their regulation. In such cases, the government that wants new regulation must somehow force the recalcitrant government to do so. I suggested that one way they did so was by threatening to impose even stiffer costs onto the reluctant government if it continued to refuse to enact new rules.

Though the paper is one of my most often cited, it has not had much impact on how people think about where international regulation comes from. (Someone once told me that this reflects the paper's unfortunate focus on something nobody cares about--the Basle Accord.) Every once in a while, however, something happens that reminds me that the paper says something important.

This time it is the Waxman-Markey cap and trade legislation. The intent of the legislation--reduce greenhouse gases--addresses concerns of the Democrats' median voter, who cares deeply about climate change. Producers, however, are concerned that the higher energy costs generated by cap and trade will disadvantage them relative to Chinese firms who are not facing higher energy costs because China does not regulate greenhouse gases. The solution, added late to the legislation, is to impose tariffs on goods from countries that do not regulate GHG (i.e., China). Nobody really wants to impose tariffs, but the hope is that the threat of tariffs will be sufficient to induce China to agree to international regulations on CO2 emissions.

Monday, May 18, 2009

From "Obscure Journal" Article to Mainstream Policy

. Monday, May 18, 2009
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Cap and trade has become the "hot" environmental policy of choice as of late. Both those on the right and those on the left increasingly see it as the most efficient and practical way to tackle the issue of global warming using a market-based approach. 


The hard-core environmentalists and champions of global warming on the left would much prefer a strict carbon tax that would levy a tax on emissions of carbon dioxide as a way to cut down on pollutants. The global warming skeptics on the right do not want increases in regulations on businesses and oppose taxing companies on their emissions. They still oppose cap and trade as unnecessary regulation seeking to tackle a mythical problem, but see it as preferable to a strict carbon tax. In other words, if something is going to be implemented, they'd rather see a market based cap and trade, similar to that of the acid rain cap and trade in the early 1990's, rather than higher taxes and regulations. 

A cap and trade program, with its relatively broad appeal, is easier to sell politically and cheaper to administer:
It is almost perfectly designed for the buying and selling of political support through the granting of valuable emissions permits to favor specific industries and even specific Congressional districts. That is precisely what is taking place now in the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which has used such concessions to patch together a Democratic majority to pass a far-reaching bill to regulate carbon emissions through a cap-and-trade plan.
The bill is poised to win committee approval this week, although with virtually no support from Republicans. If there was a single moment when cap and trade crossed the threshold from relatively untested economic concept to prevailing government policy, it came in May 1989 in the West Wing office of C. Boyden Gray, counsel to President George H. W. Bush.
Cap and trade evolved from an academic debate that began in the early 1960s when Ronald H. Coase, then a professor at the University of Chicago Law School, wrote an influential paper, "The Problem of Social Cost,” that examined when government should intervene in cases where a private entity causes public harm.

In 1971, W. David Montgomery, a Harvard graduate student in economics, fleshed out the idea of emissions trading in his doctoral thesis and has spent much of the last three decades trying to figure out how the marketplace can deal with environmental problems that are caused by relatively few actors but have consequences felt globally.
So a cap-and-trade system is poised to make its way through Congress and into legislation. An idea that was hashed out, critiqued and critiqued again in "obscure journals" across a wide variety of disciplines including economics, political science, public health and environmental science, among others, has finally made the long journey from mere idea to "policy" and it only took about 50 years. 

I find it really interesting when policies and proposals have their foundations in academic journal articles written by economists and political scientists (mostly because it gives me hope that I will one day be relevant and may come up with some crazy idea that may actually impact the real world), specifically when proposals and positions are exactly lifted from the literature. The interesting question is: When are policies most likely to get lifted from academic journals? I'm guessing it is during times of crisis, which is when there is an impetus to try new things and actually push through changes in regulatory structures. (Kindred brought this up in a recent paper and discussion.)

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Cap and Trade
 

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