Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Another ISD Follow Up

. Wednesday, June 5, 2013
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Since I seem to only blog about investor-state dispute related issues, I thought I pass along a recent UNCTAD policy note about reforming the ISD system.

UNCTAD's summary of the report's key findings:


Concerns with the current ISDS system relate, among others things, to a perceived deficit of legitimacy and transparency; contradictions between arbitral awards; difficulties in correcting erroneous arbitral decisions; questions about the independence and impartiality of arbitrators; and the length and the costs of arbitral procedures. These challenges have given rise to a broad discussion about the need to reform the current system of investment arbitration. To give shape to this debate, the Note puts forward five main reform paths:
  1. Promoting alternative dispute resolution.
  2. Tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs.
  3. Limiting investor access to ISDS.
  4. Introducing an appeals facility.
  5. Creating a standing investment court.
Each of the five proposed reform options comes with its specific advantages and disadvantages and responds to the main concerns in a distinctive way. Some of the options can be implemented via actions by individual governments, while others require joint action by a larger group. The options that require collective action would go further in addressing the existing problems, but would also face more difficulties in implementation. The Note calls for a multilateral policy dialogue on ISDS to search for a consensus about the preferred course for reform and ways to put it into action.

Friday, January 25, 2013

Argentina Withdraws From ICSID

. Friday, January 25, 2013
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In a follow up to my previous post, Argentina has announced its intention to withdraw from ICSID. In this clip, government officials and commentators emphasize favoritism of firms over governments in ICSID rules. It bears mentioning that, according to ICSID case statistics, 48% of all cases ever referred to ICSID resulted in a monetary judgement in favor of investors. In 2012, 60% of all referred cases resulted in a similar monetary judgement. So, perhaps opinions on whether ICSID is biased toward investors depend in part on whether you look at levels vs. change. And, it bears repeating, Argentina has (probably) never paid an arbitral award.

HT Rob Galantucci

Friday, October 1, 2010

This Week in "The World Is Messy"

. Friday, October 1, 2010
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Apparently no general theorizing is allowed. From the new Journal of Politics:

Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties on State Behavior

Daniel W. Hill Jr

Abstract

Though research suggests that international regimes that coordinate economic and security policy can alter state behavior, research examining the effect of human rights treaties on state behavior has found that these agreements do little to curb repressive practices. However, those studies neglect to account for the fact that several of the state-level characteristics which are known to affect repressive practices also influence the likelihood of a state making a formal commitment to the human rights regime. States that commit and states that do not are likely to have different domestic institutional features. Systematic heterogeneity across ratifiers and nonratifiers makes it difficult to infer the level of repression that would have been observed in a state had it not committed to the treaty in question. This paper employs matching techniques that address this problem and allow for more valid inferences about the effects of human rights treaties on repressive practices. The impact of human rights treaties is examined in the context of three of the five core UN human rights treaties. The results are quite interesting; ratification of the CAT and, to a lesser extent, the ICCPR is associated with reduced respect for physical integrity rights while ratification of the CEDAW has a positive impact on observance of women’s rights. These findings suggest that more treaty-specific theory building is needed.


(emphasis added)

Ungated pdf here. I'm buried under a pile of exams that need to be graded, so I haven't had a chance to read this yet, but my first thought is: What about the badasses?

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Judgment Day for Kosovo?

. Wednesday, July 21, 2010
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Tomorrow the International Court of Justice will rule on the legality of Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia. The ICJ was tasked by the UN General Assembly to make this judgment, but what will it actually mean? Stephanie Carvin sees the ruling as not having much importance for the Kosovo case, but could have some ramifications for future secessionist movements:

Second, no matter what the ICJ decides in its decision on Kosovo, I wonder if it is really going to make a difference. The starting point for this, of course, is that it is an advisory opinion – so it’s not going to make a huge difference either way as it is non-binding. It is either going to help solidify a fait accompli or it is going to basically make a decision that will fly in the face of political reality – Kosovo is not going back to whatever is left of the Former Yugoslavia. It may allow the Serbs to score some political points, (particularly if it goes to debate at the UN General Assembly) but that is about it.

Where this is obviously going to have greater implications is on other sovereigntist movements around the world. How they go about achieving their separatist ends will be of some interest.


Meanwhile, Steve Saideman sees even less in it:

So, I am saying that the ICJ ruling, whatever it is, will be used as justification for those countries that can use it as such, ignored by those countries that cannot use it as justification, and will not really affect what secessionists will do. I am truly a norm skeptic, although I am currently reading a book that addresses a dark side of norms that I am finding compelling--hypocrisy costs. But that is a post for another day.

What would I want to have happen here? Well, if the international community really supports the responsibility to protect and all that comes with it, it would make sense for the ICJ to allow for a remedial right to secession (as the normative literature on secession call it)--those who face significant repression/oppression should be allowed to determine their future and secede. Those who are not oppressed (that would be you, Quebec) would not have a right to secede, as granted by the international community. If host states, such as Canada, let their wayward provinces go, that is something else. But again, I am skeptical that norms will stop committed actors from doing what they want, at least in the short term and especially when domestic political incentives push in a particular direction (see Ties That Divide).


I'm with Saideman, especially his last sentence. It seems persuasive to me that sovereignty norms are usually window-dressing for power and interests: they are upheld when the powerful have in an interest in upholding them, and violated when they do not. The Kosovo case is a good example of that, as is the war in Iraq. These cases also reveal the vacuousness of another norm, the "responsibility to protect" oppressed peoples that requires the violation of state sovereignty under certain conditions. These norms are never upheld in a consistent fashion, usually because of domestic political incentives in the states that would have to enforce them.

I don't know enough about the ICJ to venture a guess about the ruling, but I know enough about international politics to predict that it is (almost) completely irrelevant. Tomorrow, just as today, the strong will do what they can and the weak will suffer what they must.

As to my personal feeling, I believe Kosovo was justified in separating from Serbia, and the international community was right to support them. That doesn't mean that I support everything done by Kosovo before and since the declaration of independence, and it certainly doesn't mean I support all separatist movements. But the situation in Kosovo was untenable; refusing to secede would have been suicidal. As Saideman says, this is not true in Quebec. I don't think it's true in Catalonia either, nor in Flanders. It's probably impossible to draw a straight line that adjudicates all of these cases, but for the most part I don't think it's terribly difficult to see which groups have legitimate claims to secession and which do not.

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Vreeland on the "Bad Ass" Theory of Dictators and Human Rights Agreements

. Saturday, February 13, 2010
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Henry Farrell passes along the welcome news that James Vreeland has a blog, which is now in my daily rotation. The first substantive post discusses Rosendorff and Hollyer's "bad ass" theory of why dictators sign on to human rights agreements that they know they will violate:

So, if a dictator enters into the CAT, he better be darn sure that he will never fall from power. And this is precisely the point. He is sending a signal to his domestic audience that he intends on doing whatever is necessary to hold on to power, and he's quite confident in his ability to survive in office. Only the strongest resolve dictators will take such a step. Soft dictators can't rist faking it - if they sign the CAT and lose their grip on power, they're libel to end up in the slammer. So the signal the tough dictators send is unambiguous, and might even serve to quite opposition, who realize that resistance is futile.


A non-gated pdf of the article he's discussing is here, and Eric Voeten discussed it here. The upshot is that signing on to international agreements like the Convention Against Torture (CAT) incurs costs for leaders, which sends a credible signal to domestic audiences that they aren't going anywhere.

I agree with everyone that this is an interesting, creative theory. My first reaction to hearing about the theory was this: if the logic is right, then the domestic audience should recognize the signal as credible and thus we should see dissident movements, and thus the torture intended to combat them, dry up. In fact, the authors do find such an effect: torture continues in signing states, but seems to decrease after signing the CAT. They also find that dictators who sign the CAT stay in power longer than those who don't.

I haven't had time to fully digest the model, but I like what I've seen so far.

Tuesday, November 3, 2009

How Effective Is International Law?

. Tuesday, November 3, 2009
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It starts here (and with the Bloggingheads above), then here and here, then here, here, here, and ending (for now) here. The debate is centered on Posner's new book, The Perils of Global Legalism, which I have not yet read but which seems to argue that international law is generally not effective.

One interesting aspect of the debate is the players: Farrell is an international relations scholar, Posner is a lawyer. Posner is advocating more rigorous methodological inquiry by lawyers (e.g. applications of rational choice theory) while Farrell is warning of their limitations. Farrell cited Daniel Davies on the topic:

The Folk Theorem in game theory states that any outcome of a repeated game can be sustained as an equilibrium if the minimax condition for both players is satisfied. In plain language, it can be summarised as stating that “if we take strategic considerations into account, there is a game-theoretic rationale for practically anything”.


To which Posner responded:

I agree with Henry’s discussion of the limits of rational choice theory and so don’t understand why he thinks I commit the fallacies that he describes. It would be one thing if I said that states’ compliance with treaty X is consistent with rational choice because the folk theorem allows for cooperation, while states’ noncompliance with treaty Y is consistent with rational choice because the folk theorem allows for noncooperation. Or if I said that states comply with treaty W because they care about their reputations for complying with W but that states fail to comply with treaty Z because they don’t care about their reputations for complying with Z. But I never make such arguments, instead ruling out the first type of argument as uninformative and the second as circular. My account of international law is parsimonious, and the usual criticism directed at it is not that it can be manipulated so as to explain anything, but that in fact it fails to explain why certain legal regimes have been successful. So, for example, if in fact states do overcome a collective action problem and collectively sanction states that violate human rights, that is a problem for my theory, not something that I try to explain away by asserting that states have an interest in (say) having a good reputation for enforcing human rights treaties.


I'm not going to discuss this exchange more broadly because I don't have the time to do it justice, but this is the blogosphere at its best: two brilliant scholars, from different disciplines, arguing intelligently about real problems and real research. This is the "invisible college" that DeLong refers to. If you are at all interested in international law, human rights, state sovereignty, or high-minded debate, please read these posts.

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

A Moon Race?

. Tuesday, October 20, 2009
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Richard Bilder, Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School has a new article in next spring's Fordham International Law Journal on the legal ramifications of a possible "race to the Moon" by the Earth's current and future major space powers (US, Russia, China, India) to mine Helium-3, a valuable isotope of helium that has the potential to provide the Earth with "an unlimited source of safe, non-polluting energy for centuries to come." Here is the abstract:

This article addresses questions of U.S. international legal and space policy arising from current proposals of the U.S., Russia, China and India to establish national bases on the Moon, in part with the purpose of mining and bringing to Earth Helium-3 (He-3). He-3 is an isotope of helium that is available in quantity only on the Moon and could, as an ideal fuel for nuclear fusion reactors, furnish humanity a virtually unlimited source of safe, non-polluting energy for centuries to come. For example, it is estimated that 40 tons of liquefied He-3 brought from the Moon to the Earth – about the amount that could comfortably fit in the cargo bays of two of the existing U.S. space shuttles – would provide sufficient fuel for He-3-based fusion reactors to meet the full electrical needs of the U.S. – or a quarter of the entire world’s electrical needs – for an entire year. However, there is as yet no international consensus on whether, or how, any nation or private enterprise can exploit or acquire title to He-3 or other lunar resources. The article calls attention to what may become a “race to the Moon” to obtain He-3 and discusses: (1) the technical and economic prospects for the development of He-3-based energy; (2) the present legal situation concerning the exploitation of lunar resources such as He-3; and (3) policy options for the U.S. regarding the establishment of an international legal regime capable of avoiding conflict in the exploitation of He-3 and other lunar resources and facilitating the broad scale development of He-3-based energy.
We put our flag on the moon in 1969. I thought that meant we owned it! Free Helium-3 for everyone! And, yes I have evidence:

Wednesday, May 27, 2009

We Can't Stop Carbon Emissions (redux)

. Wednesday, May 27, 2009
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Ryan Avent takes Wilkinson to task for having the audacity to claim that there may be some collective action problems involved in getting the major world powers to credibly commit to reduce their carbon emissions, and in the process unwittingly stumbles onto the principle problem in international relations: in the absence of an over-arching international authority, cooperation among states is very difficult to achieve. Problem is, he has no idea that he's stumbled onto any problem at all. In fact, he denies that there even is a problem:

This seems almost deliberately dense. In particular, it makes no distinction between the world of billions of daily, anonymous transactions and the world in which a handful of great powers attempt to hammer out a diplomatic agreement. Unsurprisingly, it's very difficult to get millions of urban denizens to voluntarily come together to build and fund a road network or transit system in the absence of a coercive mechanism. The benefits are too broadly shared, and the incentive to free ride too great. But the smaller the number of players, the more concentrated the benefits, and the easier it is to find a mutually beneficial agreement. ...

In fact, there are fewer than ten relevant players, and only two really relevant players not already committed to reductions -- the US and China. Given that climate negotiations are part of a repeated game between the two great powers (that is, they're more or less constantly talking about one economic or political issue or another), it seems very likely indeed that an American pre-commitment to emission reductions would facilitate a similar Chinese commitment.


Ignore the rich condescension for a moment, and the irony as well. Avent is poking around at a game-theoretical argument: an over-arching international government isn't necessarily needed, because we only have to get a "handful of great powers" to agree to things, and coordination is easier with a smaller number of players. Well, that should be simple then. But there are all sorts of problems with this.

First, while it might be true that it is easier to coordinate among fewer players, it isn't necessarily true. In many game-theoretic models the number of players is irrelevant: coordination is just as difficult with 2 players as it is with 2,000. In other models, there may be lots of players, but only some have any ability to influence the final decision. In the picture Avent is trying to paint, this is actually the case: despite there being 200-odd states, really all that's necessary is securing the commitments of a relatively small number of those.

But even if Avent were completely correct about this, he's missing something else entirely: the salience of the issue. It's easier to tax millions of people a small amount and build roads with the proceeds than it is for neighbors in a property dispute to resolve the matter without litigation. If Avent's story were complete, this would not be the case. But the history of international relations is filled with instances of disputes between two states that lead to very costly wars or trade disputes. This occurs when the salience of the issue is high, or when the costs of some action are sufficiently high to dissuade a state from taking that action.

Finally, even if states could negotiate an agreement, there is no mechanism to prevent them from defecting. States say one thing and do another all the time, especially in violation of multi-lateral agreements like this. This is what Wilkinson was really driving at, and Avent doesn't even seem to consider the possibility. But this is a very, very big problem. In a nutshell, this is what the study of international relations is all about: finding the conditions under which actual cooperation occurs, and not just cheap talk. Turns out, it's harder then one might think, especially if the major powers are in major disagreement as in this case.

Even Avent's own examples speak to this: he says that of the "necessary" handful of countries needed to reach a meaningful agreement, only the U.S. and China have not committed to reducing emissions. Well, perhaps, but an agreement is not the same as an actual change in behavior. Among E.U. states, only the U.K. and Sweden are on track to meet their Kyoto obligations by 2010, and the U.S. has actually had fewer increases in emissions than many countries that ratified the treaty (including Canada and Australia, as well as a half-dozen or so E.U. states). The incentive will always be to defect, because compliance is costly and enforcement is essentially impossible. One simply cannot assume, as Avent does, that these collective action problems magically disappear if a formal agreement is made. In fact, Avent does worse than that by arguing that if the U.S. could only lead the way, China would surely follow. Really? He's never heard of the free-rider problem? When have the Chinese followed the U.S. on anything? China has given absolutely no indication that they will be willing to curb emissions if that means reducing economic growth by any calculable amount. Nor can the Chinese regime halt growth and still remain in power. And without China, the world's largest polluter (and the gap is growing amazingly fast), no overall progress can be made. And this says nothing of India or Brazil or Eastern Europe or Southeast Asia or Africa (if that continent ever starts achieving real growth). Getting real global cooperation on this issue would be the single greatest achievement in the history of international institutions. Which makes it very unlikely that it will happen.

In any case, Avent is arguing in this way to support the Waxman-Markey cap-and-trade legislation currently in the U.S. Congress. Strangely, Avent doesn't even like this bill, calling it "highly imperfect" and "totally inadequate". He also acknowledges that more progressive legislation is politically impossible despite an amazingly popular president who campaigned on this very issue and exceptionally large majorities in both houses of Congress. (Indeed, even this watered-down bill is unlikely to become law.) So Avent finds himself using deeply flawed logic to argue in favor of a wasteful, ineffectual bill that will make some people worse off by imposing a series of costs on them, but will not make anyone better off. He hopes that this bill will create better options in the future, but why? The electorate seems more likely to oppose future actions if present actions are wasteful and ineffective.

This is all odd, because Avent is usually much better than this, and he certainly knows enough economics to know better. So what's going on?

For even more difficulties, please see Tyler Cowen and Jim Manzi, and this previous post by me.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: International Law
 

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