Showing posts with label Trilemma. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trilemma. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

The Devil's Trifecta

. Wednesday, March 27, 2013
2 comments

The Mundell-Fleming "unholy trinity" is that a small open economy can choose two, but not all three, presumably desirable policies: capital account openness, a fixed exchange rate, and monetary independence. Quite a lot of political economy research goes into figuring out which two countries will choose.

But what do we call it when a country chooses none of them? Cyprus right now has a closed capital account, no monetary independence, and severe limitations on external exchange at any rate.

I nominate "The Devil's Trifecta" but I'm not great at titling things so perhaps readers can do better.

This is a nice way to think about just how screwed up the EU is right now: tasked with choosing one suboptimal policy, they choose three.

But non-economists can play too! Take Rodrik's trilemma, in which states can choose two of national sovereignty, democracy, and economic integration. In Cyprus, the last is gone and the former two are questionable: it looks like democracy might win the day but it was dicey there for a minute, while Cyprus's sovereignty is restricted by the EU and faces a possible threat from Russia. So let's score it a 1.5 with a negative outlook.


Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Who Gets Optimized?

. Wednesday, June 15, 2011
0 comments



Ryan Avent reports on some research from the SanFran Fed that includes the above figure:

[I]t's clear what was going on; the ECB stood idly by while the periphery overheated because it was making policy with an eye toward the core nations. Now that the peripheral booms over which the ECB presided have collapsed, the central bank is...continuing to pursue a policy that's most appropriate for the core economies.

Now perhaps the ECB thinks it isn't responsible for managing divergent economic cycles within the euro zone. Indeed, the ECB may well be trying to force core nations to take on this responsibility and move toward closer fiscal union. If the ECB is unsuccessful in winning such progress from core governments, however, we shouldn't be surprised if peripheral economies find euro-zone policy intolerable and—eventually—drop out of the system entirely.


For those in the dark, the Taylor Rule is one simple device for determining what monetary policy should be. Krugman makes the appropriate caveat:

So here’s the thing: if you use the output gap Taylor rule that, for the US, corresponds to the unemployment version of the rule used in the SF Fed letter, it surely implies a negative interest rate. In short, the ECB has no business raising rates.

What is true, however, is that the rule might still point to a rate rise for Germany.

So the point is that while the ECB could suffer from a one-size-fits-all problem, the fact is that it isn’t even doing that; it’s tightening when only Germany even arguably needs it.


The deal underlying the foundation of the Euro was that peripheral countries would get a reduction in currency risk and therefore lowered borrowing costs. They would also get access to Europe's biggest markets at a fixed exchange rate. In exchange, they would lose monetary policy autonomy. That worked as long as their economies were growing, but obviously creates problems when the economy contracts. This is classic trilemma politics: fixed exchange rates are fine while there's growth, but monetary policy autonomy becomes more pressing during contractions. It's a lot like the Asian crises in the late 1990s.

Meanwhile, I see that Trichet is defending the eurozone by saying that the US is not an optimal currency area either. This gets said a lot, certainly more often than any definition of which currency area is "optimal" or even what that means, and there is certainly some truth to it. But my definition of what size zone is "optimal" would be something like: "As large as is politically feasible, as long as there is a fiscal adjustment mechanism included". In other words, I don't think size of area is the real problem. It's about the political organization of the area, and what other institutions come along with the currency.

Friday, May 13, 2011

Hooliganism and the Unholy Trinity

. Friday, May 13, 2011
0 comments

I’m with Krugman on this:

Putin says we’re hooligans; Brazil accuses us of “currency wars”; and the Chinese are, well, being their usual charming selves. But what’s going on in the international currency scene?

I don’t know why I didn’t think to put it this way before — and I don’t know if anyone else is saying this — but what we have here is a classic example of the Mundellian impossible trinity, aka the trilemma, which says that you can’t simultaneously have free movement of capital, a stable exchange rate, and independent monetary policy. …

So, how does this apply to current issues? Advanced countries, very much including the United States, are weighed down by the aftereffects of the 2008 financial crisis; this has led to low investment returns. Meanwhile, emerging markets are in much better shape, so capital wants to go there.

And this creates a problem for the EMs. They don’t want their currencies to rise sharply…

But not letting the currency rise would be inflationary – that is, Brazil doesn’t want to give up on its independent monetary policy. So what’s the answer?

All those accusation of hooliganism, currency wars etc. are in effect demands that the trilemma be resolved by having America give up having an independent monetary policy — basically, that the Fed give up on trying to stabilize the US economy so that emerging markets aren’t faced with the uncomfortable tradeoff between massive appreciation and imported inflation. But this shouldn’t and won’t happen.


Yes. And thinking in terms of the Trilemma is important because it helps us understand domestic politics within an international context. Brazil and the other EMs are worried about (nominal) exchange rate appreciation because it hurts their exporters, which is a politically powerful group. Inflation hurts consumers (and creditors), which is also bad for democratically-elected politicians. So that leaves capital controls, which remains the preferred trade-off of many EMs.

This is an illustration of how the U.S. really is still the most powerful global economic actor, as everyone else is having to adjust to U.S. policy rather than the other way around. The same thing happened (in slightly different ways) during the collapse of Bretton Woods, as Yglesias noted:

This is one reason why I’ve grown impatient with nostalgia for the good old days of the Bretton-Woods system.This system, which really was working great in its heyday, essentially involved the United States playing precisely the role that we now reject. The dollar was pegged to gold, other currencies were pegged to the dollar, foreign countries could change the dollar price of their currencies, and we couldn’t reset the value of the dollar. This worked fine as a means of facilitating catch-up growth in Japan and Western Europe but that growth make it impossible to sustain, so it wasn’t sustained and there’s no practical method of bringing it back.


I would add one thing. The Trilemma refers to the ubiquitous "small, open economy" and therefore leaves out a component that is highly salient for politics: one country in the system can have all three of free capital movement, fixed exchange rates, and independent monetary policy. As Dr. Oatley explained awhile back, this is because exchange rates are not monads:

But in what sense does the US not pegging the dollar imply that the dollar is not pegged? China and the other East Asian governments peg to the dollar. And even Japan, which doesn't peg the yen, does limit its fluctuation as if it has a target zone. For all practical purposes, then, the dollar is pegged against many of its most important creditors (the Euro is the only exception, but the euro area as a whole is a debtor rather than creditor area). If this wasn't the case, we wouldn't be having this conflict.

More generally, any discussion about the unholy trinity needs to recognize the n-1 problem. In any system of n countries there are n-1 independent exchange rates. Think about a three-country system. If China pegs to the dollar and South Korea pegs to the dollar, the China-South Korean rate is fully determined by the cross rate.

As a result, every exchange rate system (other than a gold standard) has one degree of freedom: one country can attain a fixed exchange rate, and capital mobility, and monetary independence. Whichever country holds this position gets to set monetary policy for the system as a whole. International monetary politics revolve who gets this degree of freedom and how it is employed. …

This suggests that we are back in a world very much like the late Bretton Woods: the US has a pegged exchange rate against many of its major creditors and capital mobility and monetary autonomy. The current conflict is a consequence of East Asian governments forcing the US to accept a peg at a rate it does not think is appropriate. Like Geithner and Co. now, the Nixon administration believed it couldn't devalue an over-valued dollar unilaterally.


And this is why the U.S. gets called “hooligans” and everything else.

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

The Effect of the Unholy Trilemma on the International System

. Wednesday, November 10, 2010
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McMegan can't find anything wrong with Drezner's post about international politics and the unholy trilemma. Let me try to help her. Drezner's is a decent post, but it reads like he might have been a bit short of time because it's a bit under-developed. First, his claim:

The unholy trinity in open economy macroeconomics is pretty simple. It's impossible for a country to do the following three things at the same time:

1) Maintain a fixed exchange rate

2) Maintain an open capital market

3) Run an independent monetary policy

One of the issues with macroeconomic policy coordination right now is that different countries have chosen different options to sacrifice. China, for example, has never opened its capital account. The United States, in pursuing quantitative easing, has basically chucked fixed exchange rates under the bus, no matter how many times Tim Geithner utters he "strong dollar" mantra in his sleep to reporters.


So far so good -- although I'd emphasize more than him that it is possible to do any two of those three, so the choice is which one to neglect, not which one to pursue -- and he's honing in on an important dimension of IPE right now: what happens when the major economies disagree about which two to prioritize? Bretton Woods I emphasized #s 1 and 3; Bretton Woods II emphasized #s 2 and 3 (see graph above). Right now there doesn't appear to be a consensus.

As Drezner notes, right now the U.S. is letting the exchange rate float (which is nothing new; it has been official policy since the early 1970s), China maintains a closed capital account, Brazil is trending towards that direction, the E.U. has sacrificed independent monetary policy within its borders and fixed exchange rates beyond them, the U.K. is allowing sterling to float, Japan is also eschewing a fixed exchange rate, while open exporting economies like S. Korea and Switzerland have worked to protect their exchange rates. Right now nobody is stressing too much about maintaining capital account openness, but this is a relatively new development.

The interesting part of this, to me, is that divergent policies could put states, especially major trading partners, at cross-purposes. This could under-cut the effectiveness of states' domestic policy goals, which could lead to confrontation and instability. Unfortunately Drezner ultimately neglects the question of why different countries will prioritize different policies, and what the implications of those choices are for the macro system. Instead, he argues that we'll see "a lot more capital controls". That's true, but we'll also probably see a lot more central bank activity and a lot more exchange rate manipulation, depending on the domestic political incentives of states. We've already seen increased management along all of these dimensions recently. In other words, I think we should expect a more active role overall for states in managing their economies in the coming decade that in the past one, but different states will prioritize different goals.

What intrigues me is how the financial sector responds to a situation in which their freedom of action in emerging markets becomes more and more constrained. It's possible that they could pressure the Fed to change its position in the future. It's also possible, however, that big firms could see these controls as a useful barrier to entry for new firms.

My money is on the former response, however.


Or they could revert to their default position: the Washington Consensus. The major criticism from the advanced economies of emerging economies prior to the Asian financial crisis was the persistence of capital controls. The major IPE controversy from 1973-2000 or so was the use of the IMF to break those controls down. It's definitely possible that that debate flares up again in the coming years, precisely because capital owners in emerging countries benefit from a more-closed financial system while capital owners in developed countries benefit from a more-open financial system.

We'll have to wait and see, but the longer it takes the global economy to rebound, the stronger these pressures will become.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Trilemma
 

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