Showing posts with label US Treasury. Show all posts
Showing posts with label US Treasury. Show all posts

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

(Nearly) Daily Reminder That Everything Is Screwy

. Tuesday, September 6, 2011
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Treasuries now more expensive than they've ever been:

Treasury 10-year note yields fell to an all-time low today as concern the euro area’s debt crisis will cripple financial institutions underpinned demand for the safest assets. A government report Sept. 2 showed no jobs were added in August, reinforcing concern the U.S. economy has slowed which may prompt additional stimulus by the Fed.

Saturday, March 13, 2010

Geithner Files

. Saturday, March 13, 2010
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Things I learned from Joshua Green's very long (but excellent) profile of Timothy Geithner:

1. Contrary to popular belief, Geithner was not only aware of the dangers of derivatives and off-balance sheet transactions, but he spoke out about them repeatedly over a number of years. His talk about "fat tails" sounds like it came straight from Nassim Taleb.

2. Bush was routinely lambasted for not properly vetting administration officials, as was McCain during the campaign, but Obama seems to have chosen Geithner based primarily on one hour-long interview. True, Geithner had great references, but given the context -- the height of the financial crisis and administration of the new TARP program -- it still is a bit odd.

3. The Geithner financial crisis plan was forged in the Tequila and Asian crises in the 1990s. The plan: get the muscle of the government involved early and often, or deeper and more costly intervention will be necessary later. No surprise there. But the price of government involvement might be: "shut down weak banks, bust up oligarchies, and clean up corruption. Then withdraw." This is not the popular view of the government bailouts, but I think it expresses the pattern of government involvement pretty well.

4. The entire orientation of the Geithner plan was to minimize government involvement. That's why the stress tests happened, why the banks weren't nationalized, why TARP was structured the way it was. The goal was to recapitalize the banking sector by maximizing private sector input, and thus save taxpayers hundreds of billions, if not trillions, in the process. It was a big gamble, but it seems to have paid off pretty well.

5. Criticisms of Geithner as being too friendly to Wall Street are spot on: he has systematically resisted punitive measures against banks, and has even argued against tight monitoring of how TARP funds are used. The interesting thing? Unlike almost anyone else in senior levels of any recent presidential administration, he's a career bureaucrat. He's never worked on Wall Street, and recently turned down the presidency of Citigroup.

6. Geithner is a pragmatist above all else: “In a crisis, you have to choose: Are you going to solve the problem, or are you going to teach people a lesson? They’re in direct conflict.” This is not good horse-race politics, but if it leads to better outcomes it may be the best political strategy possible.

7. As I've mentioned before, TARP is turning out to be an exceptional bargain. Here's some figures:

Geithner likes to point out that after a year on the job, he’s spent $7 billion recapitalizing financial firms while private investors have put up $140 billion. TARP money is being repaid faster than anyone imagined, and if Obama gets the $90 billion tax on big banks he proposed in January, it could eventually be recouped. It’s likely that the cost to taxpayers will be much less than the 5 to 10 percent of GDP that the Cleveland Fed says is typical for a crisis, and possibly as little as 2 to 4 percent—about the cost of the much smaller savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s. A recent Treasury study indicates that it could be less than 1 percent. By any reasonable standard, this would be an impressive achievement, and it would owe a great deal to Geithner’s strategy.


Green has some criticisms too, but they are pretty boilerplate: regulatory reform hasn't been strict enough, etc. Still, the overall picture that emerges is that Geithner has helped saved US taxpayers quite a lot of pain, and quite a lot of money, by taking the actions he did.

Thursday, July 23, 2009

US Treasury Cashes in

. Thursday, July 23, 2009
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It was announced today that Goldman Sachs' repayment of the $10 billion in TARP funds last month that the government provided to the bank in the midst of the financial crisis last fall, generated a 23 percent annualized return for American taxpayers.

Goldman Sachs agreed to the Treasury’s request for $1.1 billion to repay warrants the government received when it invested $10 billion in the New York-based firm last October. The payment is in addition to $318 million in preferred dividends.

The company’s warrant transaction “was the best deal for taxpayers yet,” said Linus Wilson, a finance professor at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.

The firm is paying about 98 percent of the warrants’ value, based on Wilson’s use of the Black-Scholes and Merton option pricing models. By contrast, he estimates that BB&T Corp. and U.S. Bancorp have struck deals with Treasury to pay less than 60 percent of the value of their warrants.

The 23 percent annualized return to taxpayers “is reflective of the government’s assistance, which benefited the financial system, our firm and our shareholders,” Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein, 54, said in a statement. “We are grateful for the government efforts.”
A warrant is essentially an option that allows holders to buy stock at a previously specified price. The US received these warrants in addition to preferred dividends in the deal to provide the liquidity.

Not too shabby of a return. $1.418 billion, or about 23%, in what is essentially interest payments for that $10b cash infusion. A nice little comparison - in the same 9 month span (from October to July), the S&P 500 is down roughly 20%.

We'll see what the market value at auction on those JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley warrants yield. We'll also wait to see how much the already agreed upon warrant values at a handful of other TARP-taking banks rakes in. From the initial evidence, it looks like the bailout turned out to be a pretty good investment for the US Treasury.

Monday, September 15, 2008

Cooperation in the International Financial System

. Monday, September 15, 2008
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As you may already know, Lehman Brothers, one of the largest investment banks in the world, filed for bankruptcy today after a very long weekend of negotiations that included the main power players of American (world) finance, could not save the investment bank from failing. The Federal Reserve Bank and the US Treasury drew the line this time around and firmly held that they would not provide tax payer money to rescue the investment bank or facilitate a takeover of the troubled firm by another institution (as they did in the Bear Stearns collapse in March) and that the market itself would have to find a solution to the problem or allow the bank to fail.

The New York Times had some interesting analysis on the around the clock negotiations that occurred over the weekend. They paralleled the weekend negotiations with a similar round of talks that occurred during a bank run in the early 20th century:

Over the weekend, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York called together the leaders of most major financial firms in an effort to get them to act collectively to stem any possible panic, but could not force a deal.

In a way, that was similar to what happened a little more than a century ago, when the financier J.P. Morgan called the heads of all the trust companies in New York to a meeting in his library, and demanded that they agree to put up money to stop the bank run at another trust company.

The bankers did not want to do so, in part because they would need that money if the panic spread. Morgan locked the door, and kept the presidents in the library until morning, when they finally gave in. No such coercion exists this year.

This very interesting narrative got me to thinking. How does cooperation come about in the international (or domestic) financial system? Does a coercive mechanism have to be in place to in a sense force the hands of other firms to produce the liquidity necessary to save another financial institution? Do these institutions have to be coerced by the government, a central bank or another mechanism to take over a failing entity? Is it in the best interest of competing financial firms to bail out a competitor in order to ensure confidence in the financial market? Does the government have any responsibility to bail out a failing firm? How do we deem when a firm is too big to fail? Who deems it to big to fail and who saves it from failing? Fascinating questions that would make for an interesting research program (ahh dissertation!)

What do you think? Discuss!

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: US Treasury
 

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