While the world of economics is busy debating Jeremy Stein's recent argument that the Fed can -- and sometimes should -- use monetary policy as a de facto regulatory tool (see here for a recent discussion and links), I figure I should use the opportunity to plug a paper of mine which analyzes a similar question in a cross-sectional context. My conclusion is that banks respond to institutional incentives, not just actual central bank policies.
The gist: Copelovitch and Singer found that monetary policy is fundamentally different when central banks are also regulators. Specifically, they argue that when central banks are regulators they tailor monetary policy towards the needs of the firms they regulate. I build off of their framework to show that banks respond to these differences in predictable ways: they act more riskily when central banks are regulators, and note that this effect is independent from actual monetary policies themselves.
The paper is currently in the "revise and resubmit" phase at a journal (it has been revised and resubmitted and I am awaiting a decision), but a previous version is here.
IPE @ UNC
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Tuesday, February 12, 2013
A Shameless Plug
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, finance, regulation, ResearchWednesday, June 1, 2011
The Politics of Stealth Bailouts and Plausible Deniability in the Eurozone
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, ECB, Euro, European Union, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain
My post yesterday on how the German banking sector can likely withstand a restructuring of Greek debt touched on, but did not dwell on, another important aspect of the Euro crisis: it's not just the banks in the Eurocore that own debt in the periphery, but also the governments. I wrote "The taxpayers have already loaned Greece a lot of money, either directly or via the ECB" and quoted a Der Spiegel report that said:
Taxpayers might need to step in, as might the savings banks that are owned by municipalities.
In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has bought up tens of billions of euros of Greek sovereign bonds. Because the Bundesbank, Germany's central bank, holds more than a quarter of the ECB's capital, it would have to take its share of losses accordingly.
This latter point is the subject of this Martin Wolf column that has made the rounds of the blogosphere (Salmon, McArdle, Krugman) and yielded the above graphs. Wolf's column is provocative -- he begins with "The eurozone, as designed, has failed." -- but makes a very important point about the centrality of the European banking system to the broader regional economy:
The role of banks is central. Almost all of the money in a contemporary economy consists of the liabilities of financial institutions. In the eurozone, for example, currency in circulation is just 9 per cent of broad money (M3). If this is a true currency union, a deposit in any eurozone bank must be the equivalent of a deposit in any other bank. But what happens if the banks in a given country are on the verge of collapse? The answer is that this presumption of equal value no longer holds. A euro in a Greek bank is today no longer the same as a euro in a German bank. In this situation, there is not only the risk of a run on a bank but also the risk of a run on a national banking system. This is, of course, what the federal government has prevented in the US.
The ECB doesn't technically have legal authority as a lender of last resort (although it's taken on part of that function since 2007), so domestic central banks as well as the US Federal Reserve have had to fill that role. The upshot? Central banks in the Eurocore, such as the German Bundesbank, are now heavily exposed to debt from the periphery. At current rates of lending they're likely to run out of cash by 2013, and unlike the US Fed, they can't just print more. This is becoming a slow-moving liquidity crisis, in other words, and as London Banker wrote a few days ago, liquidity crises (such as occurred in the Fall of 2008) are really nasty. As Wolf notes, this is serious business:
Government insolvencies would now also threaten the solvency of debtor country central banks. This would then impose large losses on creditor country central banks, which national taxpayers would have to make good. This would be a fiscal transfer by the back door.
In a sense this is already a fiscal transfer, since debtor countries are spending the funds on financing the state, and the creditor central banks don't have a printing press. So why, given that a fiscal transfer was needed, was it done in a way that risks the solvency and credibility of Eurocore central banks? Because they are unelected. Such a large transfer plan on top of the EFSF is unlikely to have been approved by voters in the Eurocore, as my post from yesterday indicates. And as Hans-Warner Sinn notes (via Henry Farrell's Twitter), the size of these hidden transfers "dwarfs the parliament-approved bailouts extended to Greece, Ireland and Portugal." It's easy to see why European leaders would opt for a bailout mechanism that was less transparent, and that involved non-elected actors pulling the strings: it allows bailout financing to continue, but with plausible deniability.
Sinn draws an analogy between the situation in the Europeriphery and Britain in 1992, when Soros sank the pound by selling it off. Eventually, the British Treasury ran out of marks and francs to exchange for pounds, and was forced to devalue. Soon, writes Sinn, there won't be enough funds in Bundesbank to cover the borrowing in the periphery. At that point, the Euro will collapse like the pound. If Sinn is right, then the Euro has two years. I've been saying for awhile now that 2013 was key to the Euro's future. 2013 is officially when haircuts begin, and when new bailout lending ends. It's also when the "stealth bailout", through the central banking system in the EU, can no longer sustain itself. At that point, either the peripheral economies have righted the ship by balancing the budget and/or regaining access to private credit markets, or they exit the Euro.
So right now it's a waiting game. The Eurocore doesn't want a restructuring, which would cost taxpayers (and banks) billions, if it can avoid it. The Europeriphery doesn't want the economic collapse that would accompany a Euro-exit. But both of them want the other to pick up more of the tab. But there's not much more the periphery can pick up, with unemployment above 11% in Portugal, 14% in each of Greece and Ireland, and 20% in Spain. And there's not much more the core can pick up without risky the solvency of their domestic central banks. More direct fiscal funding mechanisms look to be politically impossible. Maybe one of those things changes by 2013, but I wouldn't bet on it.
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Why the Fed Isn't a Tough Regulator
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, Monetary policy; Federal Reserve, regulationFelix Salmon asks when the Fed will start caring about banking regulation, and points to this column by Jesse Eisinger. I'm not sure whether the question is serious or facetious, but I have an answer: never. And it's not really the Fed's fault.
What do I mean? As it happens, I wrote my thesis on this question*. The paper jumps off of previous literature that has established that monetary policy and regulatory policy have a natural tension. Monetary policy is counter-cyclical, regulatory policy is pro-cyclical. The principal-agent dynamic that exists when central banks are also bank regulators is such that central banks cannot credibly commit to either let struggling banks fail, or to tighten monetary policy when that might be damaging to banks. As a result, banks know they'll get liquidity support from regulatory central banks when needed, so they act more riskily than they otherwise would. It's a form of moral hazard that is distinct from the typical TBTF hazard, because the mechanism is monetary rather than fiscal, but it operates similarly. And it may be worse: it applies to all banks, not just TBTF banks.
To answer the question, I compare overall bank capitalization ratios across OECD countries and time (1992-2007) using a standard time series cross-sectional econometric model. These countries were all in compliance with the Basel accords by at least 1999, so they all subscribed to some broadly similar regulatory guidelines, and probably as far back as 1992. I use fixed effects to isolate changes within countries (so the stats aren't biased by idiosyncratic variation), and look at two interventions into the time series: the introduction of the Euro in 1999, which removed monetary authority from a number of domestic central banks and gave it to the ECB; and the reorganization of domestic regulatory institutions in five countries, all of which shifted regulatory authority away from their central banks in 1999-2000. I find that where monetary authority and regulatory authority were split, banking systems had higher capital ratios than when they were unified**. The coefficients are substantively large and statistically significant at the usual levels. The results are robust to the inclusion of controls (sorry Phil) and alternative specifications.
The takeaway is that institutional design is important here. If you give one institution conflicting mandates -- one to act counter-cyclically, and one to act pro-cyclically -- then at the relevant margin one of those two has to give. Private sector actors are smart enough to know that, and adjust their behavior accordingly.
*I'll post it soon, but I need finish up a couple of minor edits before sending it off to a journal.
**The only exceptions are the PIGS (actually just Portugal, Greece, and Spain).
UPDATE: This paper from Douglas Diamond and Raghuram Rajan, uploaded to NBER this week (ungated version), appears to be making a similar theoretical argument, although I haven't had time to go through it carefully yet.
ANOTHER UPDATE: The link to my paper is here.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Why We Can't Prevent Financial Crises with Regulation
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, financial crisisThe U.S. Federal Reserve, for instance, could hardly stand idly by while the Bank of America or Citibank became unable to meet its liabilities. Yet this responsibility creates a problem of moral hazard, since the largest banks, in effect, have automatic insurance against disastrous consequences of risky but (in the short-run at least) profitable loans. They have incentives to follow risk-seeking rather than risk-averse behavior.
That is Robert Keohane in After Hegemony. It was published in 1984, before financial "weapons of mass destruction" were yet to be dreamed of, much less utilized (and Keohane was far from the first to think about these issues). The current crisis wasn't created by credit default swaps or mortgage-backed securities; it's an artifact of the structure of the system*. Since we do not know of any way to transform the structure of the system in a positive way, we are left with marginal regulatory tweaks. If well-constructed, these marginal tweaks can bestow marginal improvements. But we should not convince ourselves that we can transform a structural problem with marginal tweaks. We can't.
Yes, this means that we'll always have financial crises (although they won't always be as bad as this one). We could throw every Wall Street banker and AIG insurance underwriter in prison, abolish all derivatives, require huge down-payments for mortgages, and we'd still have periodic crises. Just as we face a tradeoff between security and liberty, we face a tradeoff between financial stability and dynamism. We'll have to accept some of the one in order to get any of the other.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
Ode to Skeptics
Labels: Business cycle; recession; financial crisis, central banks; moral hazardNassim "Black Swan" Taleb and Nouriel "Dr. Doom" Roubini are characteristically upbeat in this 11 minute CNBC segment [/sarcasm]:
One thing that jumped out at me is Taleb's discussion of the moral hazard that has pervaded basically every economic policy made by the Obama administration, from PPIP to "cash for clunkers". Health care reform is on everyone's lips, but few discussions of the merits and demerits of the public option even mention adverse selection. Everyone was talking about moral hazard last October, but that talk died down as we all assumed that plunging the world economy back into the 1930s was more distressing than worrying about long-run moral hazard. But now that we seem to have averted Armageddon it seems like we should be asking those kinds of questions: How can we reduce asymmetrical information in financial markets? Should we really be punishing the prudent to reward so many consumers, investors, and homeowners who made very poor decisions? Should we continue to give large amounts of power to those -- Bernanke, Summers, Geithner -- who failed to prevent the current crisis (even if few would have done better)?
Those questions are not rhetorical; they are complicated and difficult, and the answers are not obvious to me. But I am a little bit shocked that they are so rarely asked these days.
Where have the skeptics gone?
Monday, September 22, 2008
Deal or No Deal (U.S. Congressman Edition)
Labels: Business cycle; recession; financial crisis, central banks; moral hazard, Fed; Monetary Policy, financial crisis; subprimeHate to make this place all-bailout, all-the-time, but that's the biggest issue of the day.
If I'm a U.S. Congressman, and I'm being asked to give $700bn to the Treasury Department with no string attached, I say "no deal" whether I'm a Republican or a Democrat. If I'm a Republican, I'm ideologically opposed to massive government programs with essentially no oversight. I'm concerned about the fact that the current Treasury Secretary will likely be replaced in five months, and will presumably be seeking a job on Wall Street at that time. The term "moral hazard" has been tossed around a lot in recent weeks; this plan, if enacted, would immediately go in the Guinness book. If I'm a Republican, I'm also worried that I don't know who the new Treasury Secretary is going to be in five months, he's probably going to be appointed by President Obama (still the favorite according to the betting markets), and if the Congress gives up power to the Treasury Department now it may not get to change its mind later. I'm also wary of the provisions which will be added by Congressional Democrats in exchange for their votes. I note that right-leaning economists are very skeptical of this plan, and not just the far-right libertarians.
If I'm a Democrat, I'm thinking that I'm generally not happy with the way the Bush administration has used the unilateral authority it's had in the past. I'm thinking about Iraq (and not just the decision to invade), a host of civil liberties issues, lack of transparency in general, and corporatist tendencies. I'm thinking about the fact that while McCain is still an underdog he still has a 48% chance of winning (per Intrade), and his most notable executive decision so far has been to appoint Palin as his running-mate, which doesn't give me much confidence about his ability to pick capable technocrats in his administration. I'm very worried about the lack of oversight, since in this proposal Treasury decisions are non-reviewable by the Congress or the courts, essentially making Sec. Paulson the Supreme Monarch of Wall Street, and am even more cynical about moral hazards than my Republican counterpart. I'm concerned that President Obama will be constrained in his ability to enact social spending programs in January if all the money is spent today. I note that left-leaning economists are almost united in opposition to this plan, and not just the far-left anticapitalists.
If I'm a non-partisan wonk, I wonder what the point of this is. If the broader problem is still liquidity, then the Fed can fight that on its own. It's true that Treasuries were actually trading negative for a moment or two last week, but they were still trading, so it doesn't yet look like the Fed is "pushing on a string". In other words, it doesn't yet appear that the Fed has used up all its bullets. Additionally, there is still private and foreign capital out there to be had; if it's become difficult to get that capital, then the Fed and/or Treasury can do some regulatory tweaking on the margins to improve the situation without nationalizing all the risky assets in the world*.
If the problem is solvency, then I'm questioning the wisdom of putting the solvency of the U.S. government at risk. If that's too much Chicken Little for you, then I'm wondering why the government should, without oversight or even a structure of decision-rules, be nationalizing investment losses while keeping investment gains private. We've all heard of corporate welfare, but this may take the cake. And yes, some pension funds and retirement accounts will go down with the ship. That sucks, but that's what we've got a safety net for. Maybe the $700bn would be better spent shoring up those safety nets rather than bailing out Wall Street?
for more from the right, see Mankiw, Cowen, and Naked Capitalist.
for more from the left, see Krugman and DeLong.
Nadav Manham defends the plan here. Let's say that I think his view is best-case, and we have no reason to think that we're in best-case territory here.
*Sebastian Mellaby channels some academics proposing other solutions:
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales of the University of Chicago suggest ways to force the banks to raise capital without tapping the taxpayers. First, the government should tell banks to cancel all dividend payments. Banks don't do that on their own because it would signal weakness; if everyone knows the dividend has been canceled because of a government rule, the signaling issue would be removed. Second, the government should tell all healthy banks to issue new equity. Again, banks resist doing this because they don't want to signal weakness and they don't want to dilute existing shareholders. A government order could cut through these obstacles.
Meanwhile, Charles Calomiris of Columbia University and Douglas Elmendorf of the Brookings Institution have offered versions of another idea. The government should help not by buying banks' bad loans but by buying equity stakes in the banks themselves. Whereas it's horribly complicated to value bad loans, banks have share prices you can look up in seconds, so government could inject capital into banks quickly and at a fair level. The share prices of banks that recovered would rise, compensating taxpayers for losses on their stakes in the banks that eventually went under.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Credible Credibility in Credit Markets
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, Fed; Monetary Policy, financial crisis; subprime, IMFAlex's earlier post posed an interesting question:
If the United States is not going to follow its own advice of not intervening in its own financial market to bail out failing domestic firms when staring down one of the biggest financial crises in its history, why should/would any other nation follow the non-intervention policy when a similar financial panic occurs in their economy?
Has the United States lost all credibility to prescribe strict free-market, non-interventionist solutions to financial panic around the world?
It is certainly a question worth asking. But there's another way to look at it. First, consider that there is a difference between the IMF and the US government. They often act in tandem, but that doesn't mean that the actions of one can be conflated as an implicit act of the other. I know Alex didn't mean that, and was instead looking at broader philosophies, but it's still an important distinction.
Secondly, there is a major difference between one country using its own assets to bail out local companies and another country using borrowed money for domestic corporate welfare. Loans always come with strings attached, and the IMF has traditionally taken a pretty strong line: IMF loans are to be used for short-term balance of payments deficits, not for domestic welfare spending. In exchange, the IMF demands structural adjustments in the hopes of preventing a reoccurrence of whatever problem they are trying to fix. (I'm not defending the history of the IMF here; there's plenty to criticize. My point is simply to make distinctions.)
So the proper analogy isn't between IMF loans and domestic US policy, but rather between the terms of the IMF loans as compared to the terms of the Fed/Treasury loans. The Fed/Treasury loans have all come at a high price: Bear Sterns is dead; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cease to exist in their previous form, and appear likely to be broken up and liquidated in a fire sale; Lehman Brothers is dead; AIG is still alive, but their problem was liquidity and not insolvency. In all cases, the shareholders lost almost their entire investments. The Fed/Treasury loans, like the IMF loans, came at a heavy price: the way that these entities had previously done business has been completely eliminated, with major losses for the parties involved. In most cases, these business don't even exist anymore. In short, I can see more similarity than difference between the terms of IMF and Fed/Treasury loans.
As for credibility in the eyes of foreign governments and investors: if I were the manager of a sovereign wealth fund which was highly leveraged in US credit markets, recent actions by the Fed and the Treasury would increased their credibility in my eyes. By granting an implicit guarantee to practically the entire U.S. financial system, U.S. investments now look less risky than they would have if all these businesses were simply allowed to collapse without any further thought, with devastating repercussions for the domestic and global economies. If these moves by the Fed/Treasury work out, then future investors can look at U.S. credit markets with some reassurance, knowing that if their investments are on the verge of completely failing the U.S. government will likely step in provide some relief.
Does that create a moral hazard? Like the world has never seen before. These short-term fixes could prove to be incredibly costly down the line, and that's the worry, which is why Lehman was allowed to collapse, Merrill Lynch was forced into selling to Bank of America: the Fed had to draw the line somewhere. After all, a lot of the current troubles were aided by massive inflows of foreign capital into U.S. markets, which made loans so affordable in the first place. The U.S. credit markets were already perceived as being the safest in the world; with an explicit government guarantee, that safety might look even more appealing to foreign investors, and dramatic flows of foreign capital might keep coming. Right now, we need the liquidity, but in the future if money stays as cheap as its been in the past 5-7 years we might face another crisis similar to this one. Unless we get a lot better at assessing risk, of course.
UPDATE: Ken Rogoff is thinking along similar lines:
One of the most extraordinary features of the past month is the extent to which the dollar has remained immune to a once-in-a-lifetime financial crisis. If the US were an emerging market country, its exchange rate would be plummeting and interest rates on government debt would be soaring. Instead, the dollar has actually strengthened modestly, while interest rates on three- month US Treasury Bills have now reached 54-year lows. It is almost as if the more the US messes up, the more the world loves it. ...
It is a very good thing that the rest of the world retains such confidence in America’s ability to manage its problems, otherwise the financial crisis would be far worse.
Let us hope the US political and regulatory response continues to inspire this optimism. Otherwise, sharply rising interest rates and a rapidly declining dollar could put the US in a bind that many emerging markets are all too familiar with.
Export-biased foreign countries know that their economic fortunes are tied to ours, so it's likely that they'll keep pumping money into our markets as long as they have no better alternative, keeping interest rates low and the dollar relatively high. If they ever stop, it'll hurt us badly, but it might hurt them worse. Another key: U.S. debt is dollar-denominated, so we don't have to worry about exchange-rate fluctuations when servicing this debt. Indeed, we can just inflate the debt away if it comes down to it. Foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds know all this; they are incentivized to keep the U.S. markets afloat by providing capital to ease liquidity trouble, just as the U.S. government is.
Live Together, Die Together....?
Remember that factoid of money markets "breaking the buck" the other day? Well, central banks around the world didn't take the news lightly, as the NY Times reports today.
Friday, September 12, 2008
Good Discussion of the U.S. Economy
Labels: Business cycle; recession; financial crisis, central banks; moral hazard, finance, financial crisis; subprime, Fiscal Policy; monetary policy; elections, Monetary policy; Federal ReserveRobert Rubin and Lawrence Summers were on Charlie Rose a couple of nights ago. The conversation was very good, although Rubin and Summers are both more pessimistic than some other economists. They spent most of their time discussing ways to improve the U.S. economy in the future, and the dangers of playing political games while the nation's economy burns. The entire episode may be watched here, but a snippet is below.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Fannie, Freddie, and International Relations
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, dollar; exchange rate policy, financial crisis; subprime, Markets, Sovereign Wealth FundsFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the quasi-private investment groups that own or guarantee roughly half of the U.S. mortgage market, have now effectively been nationalized. The purpose of this blog isn’t to run-down all of the domestic effects of this (for that, see Brad DeLong and Calculated Risk, and keep in mind that Fannie & Freddie own or guarantee about $6 trillion in American mortgages), but there are implications for IPE study as well.
For example, central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and other international investors bought heavily into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, because they were under the impression that the investments were as close to riskless as one could get*. As Treasury Secretary Paulson noted, nearly $5 trillion in Fannie/Freddie debt and securities are owned by investors all over the world. To put that into perspective, the combined GDP of the U.K. and Italy in 2007 was less than $5 trillion. There is simply no way that the U.S. Treasury could let the companies fail and allow those nations (and other investors) to take a hit that big. If they did, says Tyler Cowen, the effects would be catastrophic:
The flow of capital from them and from other central banks, sovereign wealth funds, and plain old ordinary investors would shut down very quickly. The dollar would fall say 30-40 percent in a week, there would be payments system gridlock, margin calls at the clearinghouses would go unmet, and only a trading shutdown would stop the Dow from shedding half its value. Most of the U.S. banking system would be insolvent. Emergency Fed/Treasury action would recapitalize the FDIC but we would lose an independent central bank and setting the money supply would be a crapshoot. The rate of unemployment would climb into double digits and stay there. Many Americans would not have access to their savings. The future supply of foreign investment would be noticeably lower. The Federal government would lose its AAA rating and we would pay much more in borrowing costs. The deficit would skyrocket.
Tyler Cowen isn't known as a pessimist, but considering that “when the U.S. sneezes, the world gets a cold,” the prospects for international financial markets as a whole could have been catastrophic if the U.S. had not acted. In short, it’s likely that international political concerns, such as maintaining the credibility of the U.S. government in the eyes of other foreign nations, have essentially forced the Treasury Department to step in, even if they didn’t want to.
The news of nationalization was greeted warmly by nearly everyone. The announcement was made yesterday for the benefit of foreign financial markets trading overnight, and those markets responded by posting large gains. The heads of the European and Japanese central banks spoke positively of the take-over. There is still some pain ahead, especially for domestic banks, but by nationalizing Fannie and Freddie the U.S. Treasury may have dodged a bullet. At least temporarily.
*As it turns out, they were right: these investments were largely riskless since the implicit guarantee of the debt by the U.S. government has now turned into an explicit guarantee. Are there moral hazard concerns? You betcha. But, as the saying goes, "in the long run, we're all dead."
[UPDATE: U.S. markets posted huge gains today in response to the bail-out news. The dollar gained against the Euro, Pound, Swiss Franc, and Yen.]
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
I Walk the Line...
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, Monetary policy; Federal ReserveThe Fed's job is to create moral hazard. Discuss.
Monday, September 17, 2007
How Fragile We Are
Labels: central banks; moral hazard, financeOne might have hoped that after the weekend pause saner heads might prevail. But, the run on Northern Rock continues into the new week. The Telegraph had some interesting coverage over the weekend, providing a glimpse of the underlying mentality of the "panickers": As one man standing in line said, "It's my life savings," he said. "I think the risk is pretty low but you never know." Right, when a long line forms at your bank, the safe thing to do is join.
What I find most puzzling is that the amounts that people claim to have deposited with Northern Rock are invariably less than the maximum deposit the British government insures. Hence, even if NR is insolvent,depositors don't lose. We are not talking about huge investments being pulled from uninsured hedge funds, after all, but thousands of pounds being withdrawn from fully-insured institution. At worst depositors are moderately inconvenienced (become illiquid until the government check arrives). So, does this rush to withdraw mean that they don't trust the British state to make good on its promises either?
I guess this shows how rapidly people cease acting rationally. Especially when financial institutions that hold their life savings seem about to fail. Makes you wonder how bad things can get if we lose collective confidence in those parts of the financial system that are not federally insured. As Hayek once said, in commenting upon the 1929 crash and its ugly aftermath, "we did not know just how fragile our society was."
Friday, September 14, 2007
Panic on the Streets of London?
Labels: central banks; moral hazard 

Customers line up to enter a branch of Northern Rock in southeast London. Extra credit if you can name the band that inspires the post title...
Another Outbreak of Foot in Mouth Disease
As long as I am poking fun at central bankers, did anyone else notice the following?
On Wednesday, Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England was all self righteous about his bank's steadfast refusal to inject additional liquidity into the market. "Unless the economy was in danger an injection of funds to encourage banks to lend to each other would reward reckless behaviour. Mervyn King said the closure of the money markets was the result of the mis-pricing of risk in the financial system rather than the state of the economy, though he warned that the supply of credit to households and businesses may tighten and borrowing costs would rise." So, a governor who actually admits in public to belief in moral hazard.
And then I awake today to the following news: "The Bank of England Thursday provided extra short-term funds to the money market through its weekly open market operation and sharply widened its reserve-requirement range for banks' accounts at the BOE." They followed this up on Friday by "rescuing [a] mortgage lender by providing emergency funds after Northern Rock was unable to finance its operations in the money markets." Can anyone say bailout?
Maybe the BOE bailed out Northern Rock at penalty rates, I haven't seen the details. Even so, it remains a pretty big about face in two days. And while it is tempting to make fun of pompous central bankers, one must also wonder, what did Mervyn learn that caused the 180? Should we be worried?
Update: "The Bank of England emphasized Friday that its lending to Northern Rock would be conducted at a premium to market interest rates."