Showing posts with label Africa. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Africa. Show all posts

Friday, January 7, 2011

Chart of the Day

. Friday, January 7, 2011
1 comments




We are rightly concerned about the economic doldrums in the U.S. and Europe, but we shouldn't forget that elsewhere progress marches on. Via the Economist, which adds:

MUCH has been written about the rise of the BRICs and Asia’s impressive economic performance. But an analysis by The Economist finds that over the ten years to 2010, six of the world’s ten fastest-growing economies were in sub-Saharan Africa. On IMF forecasts Africa will grab seven of the top ten places over the next five years (our ranking excludes countries with a population of less than 10m as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, which could both rebound strongly in the years ahead). Over the past decade the simple unweighted average of countries’ growth rates was virtually identical in Africa and Asia. Over the next five years Africa is likely to take the lead. In other words, the average African economy will outpace its Asian counterpart.

Tuesday, February 23, 2010

African Coups and Colonels

. Tuesday, February 23, 2010
2 comments

Over at FP Passport, Joshua Keating asks a really interesting question to fellow blogger Elizabeth Dickinson : "Why does it seem like African coups are always led by middle-ranking military officers?" He asked the question in light of the most recent African coup (the third coup in the last two years on the continent) in Niger led by Col. Salou Djibo, a "little known commander of a platoon based near the capital."


Elizabeth offers some pretty interesting insights as to why relatively obscure colonels are leadings coups rather than generals that have resources and clout:
At least in the countries I know in West Africa, this makes perfect sense. Generals are often close to the leadership; their appointments are usually somewhat political and come with the benefit of a bit of patronage and a lot of pomp and circumstance. I met Generals in Nigeria who led more comfortable lifestyles than some Lagos bankers. They're educated, often cosmopolitan, and know that they have more to lose through a coup than by simply staying put. They have no reason to upset the status quo. And at least in countries where there is a history of coups, politicians are also equally wary of annoying their military upper ranks for a similar reason.
An extension of this is that the chief executives in these countries are simply buying off the loyalty of the top military brass in order to ensure that they don't try to take power. So it's not just a function of military generals being satisfied, but that the government in power is buying off their satisfaction. By allowing them to live "more comfortable lifestyles than some Lagos bankers" they are able to ensure that the generals are comfortable enough to not want to overthrow the executive. However, when these payoffs are no longer sufficient, we should observe military coups coming from top military generals (which may explain differences in coup leaders between African and Latin American countries). Because the generals are relatively happy with the status quo, they will not seek to change the power structure as a change in power will probably hurt their privileged positions in society.
So why not the little guys? Well, because they could never do it. The usual ranking soldier is underpaid, if paid at all. They're often undertrained, and couldn't mobilize the resources or strategy to get the job done. (Having said this, the little guys do often go along with a coup once it's happening ... nothing like the sense that your paycheck or next meal is moving to make you want to follow it.)
Little guys calculate the probability of success of the military coup as well as the increase in position and prosperity of a successful new coup regime vis-a-vis their current position. If they can reasonably expect a nice bump in position or pay assuming that they expect the coup to work, they will typically go along with the coup. Their expected utility functions are relatively easily to calculate.
So the middle guy is the one left. They're paid better than some, but not good enough for most. Like the coup leader in Niger, they've often had foreign training. They control strategic components of the miltiary -- in Guinea's case, the petrol procurement, and in Niger's case, a platoon in the capital. They know enough people to mobilize the ranks, but they are not as politically tainted. They're well connected but not appointees; they've often just risen through the ranks.
These middle guys have the largest expected payoff if the coup works. They will not only observe a nice jump in military clout, but will also be awarded a pretty big financial reward (this is assuming that the coup works and that there isn't a backlash to the coup leaders once the military junta returns control of the country to civilian leadership). She also argues that because of the skimming off the top structure of pay in most West African militaries, these middle rank officers are managing forces and doing serious work,
but they're not getting paid. They have a taste of power but not enough fiscal incentives not to rock the boat. Lo and behold, you get a coup. A well trained, well connected, underpaid, and generally disgruntled middle man is your suspect -- guilty as charged.
These military colonels face a pretty simple cost-benefit analysis, wait for a nice opening, gauge the probability of success and go through with the coup if they're dealt a good hand. Dickinson provides a nice logical explanation for why coups are typically led by military colonels rather than generals. Although not in West Africa, this may be the reason why Libya's leader for the last forty years, Colonel Gaddafi hasn't promoted himself to general and still refers to himself as colonel. He's trying to signal that he's still a lowly military officer in the hopes that another colonel won't throw him out of power.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

Blog Post of the Week

. Wednesday, September 23, 2009
0 comments

Reproduced, in its entirety, from Wronging Rights (definitely one of my favorite blogs; i only wish they'd post more frequently):

You may think it's a bit premature to award "Headline of the Week," given that today is only Monday, but I feel confident calling this one.

The award goes to the Independent (of Ireland) for "We can't abandon Africa to cannibalism and genocide." (Does the notion of intervention being necessary to keep "Africans" from eating each other ring any faint colonial bells for anyone else?) Sadly, they do not mention lions.


Yep. Blog post of the week.

Tuesday, August 4, 2009

Is Obama Exploiting Africa?

. Tuesday, August 4, 2009
0 comments

Michael Stulman sees something sinister:

It seems the White House and the Obama administration has made the African continent the focus of their P.R. campaign this summer. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will soon begin her seven-country tour of Africa. This comes on the heels of President Barack Obama’s speech in Ghana earlier this summer; the aim of both tours appear to stress U.S. commitment to Africa. The public is made to believe that addressing health, corruption, gender-based violence, poverty, trade, conflict, democratization and foreign assistance, among others, are the goals of a U.S. newly devoted to Africa and its unique challenges.

In their recent book, The Scramble for Africa: Darfur, Intervention and the USA Steven Fake and Kevin Funk eloquently detail how U.S interests in Africa are far from altruistic or humanitarian, even though they appear so on the surface.

According to the authors, the U.S. is engaged in a scramble for Africa’s resources, chiefly oil. The U.S. gets more oil from Africa than it does from the Middle East; by 2015, up to a quarter of its oil imports will come from Western Africa, including Ghana. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that Ghana was chosen for Obama’s first Sub-Saharan Africa appearance. It is a democratic and stable country for one, and the recent discovery of oil certainly has weight. U.S. interest in Africa has grown as the oil fields have multiplied. Africa is of national strategic importance because of what it can do for the U.S., not because of what the U.S. can do for Africa.


The same is true of recent Chinese, Indian, and European excursions into Africa as well. I don't know whether this is supposed to be surprising, but I do wonder what motivates conclusions like Stulman's:

Far from humanitarianism, the U.S. policy towards Africa has become increasingly concentrated on creating an environment amenable to resource exploitation, no matter the consequences on the level of poverty or democracy in African nations.


On the one hand, the rich West must dedicate itself to African development; on the other hand, the rich West must not engage in any commerce with Africa that might actually foster such development. On the one hand, Africans should lift themselves out of poverty; on the other hand, Africans should not use their natural resources to lift themselves out of poverty. On the one hand, the U.S. should abstain from nation-building; on the other hand, the U.S. should not "support corrupt and oppressive regimes" in Africa.

To some extent, I share Stulman's cynicism about all of this. But in many ways, the best thing that could possibly happen for Africa is for the rest of the world to start throwing themselves at Africa's feet. Africa needs to strengthen economic ties with the world's major economies, it needs to develop national industries, it needs a source of employment, and it needs a rising middle class to challenge corrupt governments. Foreign aid hasn't worked; why not try commerce?

Sunday, April 12, 2009

Map of Pirate Attacks in 2009...

. Sunday, April 12, 2009
2 comments

The American captain of a cargo ship held hostage by pirates jumped overboard from the lifeboat where he was being held, and U.S. Navy SEALs shot and killed three of his four captors, according to a senior U.S. official with knowledge of the situation.

Capt. Richard Phillips was helped out of the water off the Somali coast and is uninjured and in good condition, the official said. He was taken aboard the USS Bainbridge, a nearby naval warship.

At the time of the shootings, the fourth pirate was aboard the Bainbridge negotiating with officials, the source said. That pirate was taken into custody.
CNN.com has a really interesting map that shows the location of pirate attacks in 2009. Check it out here. 

Friday, April 3, 2009

Bono vs. Bill

. Friday, April 3, 2009
0 comments

Now this is interesting. A Clash of Development Titans: Bill Easterly has picked a fight with the Bono-fronted ONE campaign over their response to Dambisa Moyo's new book Dead Aid, which is highly critical of aid programs in Africa. Easterly and co-blogger Laura Freschi:

The vigorous and public debate that has greeted the release of Dead Aid is a good thing for transparency and effectiveness in aid, no matter what you think of Moyo’s book. ONE apparently doesn't agree. There are two things wrong with ONE’s campaign to discredit Moyo.

First of all, ONE misrepresents Moyo’s ideas to better tear them down. For example, ONE characterizes Moyo’s plan as a call to “shut off all aid in 5 years,” when Moyo is very clear about excluding humanitarian aid and NGO/ charitable aid from her discussion.

Second, rounding up some Africans who happen to disagree with Zambian-born Moyo doesn’t alter the quality of her proposals, which deserve to be debated on their own merits. (We’ve blogged about the intellectually dishonest technique of the “authenticity trump card” before.) When the ONE campaign says in its email “We are collecting quotes from Africans who might disagree with her…”, it seems to be saying we will not trust or allow Africans to have this debate on its merits on their own.


Ouch. In aid circles, the "authenticity trump card" is like the "race card" in American politics: you don't go there unless you're losing. But ONE isn't giving in, and Easterly was magnanimous enough to post a response on Aid Watch:

In terms of the emails you refer to, yes, we emailed people in Africa who we work with to see what they thought, as many are involved directly with aid-funded initiatives. Their experience is very relevant in thinking through the impact of Ms. Moyo’s claims. So it wasn’t an attempt to shut a conversation down, but an effort to open one up. And it’s succeeded! We’ve also been in a direct and ongoing conversation with Ms. Moyo, before and after the book’s release. Our concerns are no surprise to her. We agree with your concerns about aid transparency and, as you know, we recently helped launch “publish what you fund”, an aid transparency effort. We share the goal of “asking that aid benefit the poor” (as you write on your website) and we campaign to ensure that it does.


We don't get that many (public and interesting) feuds in the social sciences, especially not spats that include the world's biggest rock-star-cum-aid-proponent fending off charges from the world's biggest aid skeptic.

We can only hope this escalates.

Wednesday, March 18, 2009

Cheetahs vs. Hippos: Against "Swiss Bank Socialism"

. Wednesday, March 18, 2009
1 comments

Ever heard a Ghanaian economist scream before? George Ayittey is unhappy with African governments, is trying to foster local entrepreneurial activity in Africa rather than external investment, and doesn't want any more foreign aid. Below is his talk from this year's TED conference. Most interesting to me is his argument that traditional African institutions promoted norms of decentralized power and community-based capitalism. The modern history of authoritarianism and corruption actually contradicts the long-standing legacy of Africa. Perhaps the point is debatable, but Ayittey uses it to stress that development programs may be more successful if they aims to strengthen traditional African, rather than Western, institutions.

For those in the Triangle, he will be speaking on campus Friday at 12:30 in 1301 McGavran-Greenberg (UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health). The lecture is free and open to the public, and the subject is "African Solutions to African Problems".

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Africa
 

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