One of my favorite blogs is Echoes, subtitle "Dispatches from Economic History", at Bloomberg. There isn't a unifying theme other than contextualizing current events by looking to past episodes. The authors are experts on each topic -- i.e. there aren't just one or several folks writing every day -- and I almost always learn something from the post.
For example, that the Tiananman Square protests weren't exactly liberal. The author of the piece is a sociologist as Kansas State who has studied Chinese development since 1949, and he says that the protesters were "radical reactionaries". This atypical conjunction means that they were anti-authoritarian but also anti-capitalism.
The story goes like so. The early reforms economic reforms in China benefited rural farmers and initially urban consumers as well, but after awhile industrialization efforts and a plateau in farm production increased price inflation. At the same time corruption increased. This hit urbanites particularly hard. They demanded more political access, but mostly so that they could reverse economic reforms. Thus, they urbanites were "radical reactionaries". I guess that means the rural farmers were "conservative revolutionaries".
Deng refused to yield, but had the protests been successful China might've ended up with the opposite of what they've had over the past generation: political reform without economic reform. Ironically this would have hurt urban dwellers in the long run, since the economic reforms Deng undertook eventually benefited them the most.
Anyway, it's certainly not the textbook version of the story. But elements of this still resonate, as this Dissent article about the contemporary anti-reform movement in China illustrates.
IPE @ UNC
Bookshelf
Tags
Thursday, June 6, 2013
The Tiananman Square Protests Weren't Liberal
Labels: China, Contentious Politics, development, ReformWednesday, May 29, 2013
Was Stalin Necessary for Russia's Economic Development?
Labels: Authoritarianism, development, Marxism, RussiaSome of the he-was-a-baddie-but-at-least-he-modernized-the-place say "yes"*. New research by a team of Russian economists says "no":
This paper studies structural transformation of Soviet Russia in 1928-1940 from an agrarian to an industrial economy through the lens of a two-sector neoclassical growth model. We construct a large dataset that covers Soviet Russia during 1928-1940 and Tsarist Russia during 1885-1913. We use a two-sector growth model to compute sectoral TFPs as well as distortions and wedges in the capital, labor and product markets during the two periods. We find that most wedges substantially increased in 1928-1935 and then fell in 1936-1940 relative to their 1885-1913 levels, while TFP remained generally below pre-WWI trends. Under the neoclassical growth model, projections under these estimated wedges imply that Stalin's economic policies led to welfare loss of -24 percent of consumption in 1928-1940, but a +16 percent welfare gain after 1941. A representative consumer born at the start of the Stalin's policies in 1928 experiences a reduction in welfare of -1 percent of consumption, a number that does not take into account additional costs of political repression during this time period. The projected performance under both Tsarist' and Stalin's wedges is much worse than the economic performance of Japan, which in 1885-1913 had similar levels of per capita GDP and distortions as Tsarist Russia, but experienced a rapid acceleration of non-agricultural TFP during the interwar period. Relative to this benchmark, the welfare loss of Stalin's policies are about -31 percent of consumption.Via Cheap Talk, who notes that one of the economists -- Sergei Guriev -- has just left the country under duress from public officials.
The story that Russia's development was impossible or unlikely absent Stalin's repression always seemed unlikely to me. Other places have developed without those levels of repression (e.g. Japan, as the authers note, but not just), or have had repression without growth. The repression-growth relationship is not strictly positive and linear, in other words, so any story about Stalin and development has to be particular to Russia. And, frankly, I've yet to hear one that's had any solid theory behind it. (Perhaps someone could point one out to me in the comments.) I've heard mumblings that "Russia was a backwater hellhole" -- this was more or less Marx's view, although it's not true that Marx believed that socialism could not work there -- but every place is a backwater hellhole before they develop. Yes, Tsarism was bad, but plenty of regimes were bad in the 19th century.
I'd never really considered the possibility that all those supposed gains under Stalin didn't actually happen and in fact made things worse. It puts a new spin on the Cold War races for economic, military, and technological superiority.
I'm not sure I fully believe the two-sector growth model the authors use, which is pretty standard as these things go, but even the descriptive evidence is useful.
P.S. Here are some pictures of Soviet life in the 1950s.
*Terry Eagleton is of this sort, in his execrable recent book which manages to both misunderstand Marx and his critics at the same time. One relevant bit is quoted here.
Friday, April 26, 2013
Understanding the Bangladesh Tragedy with Political Science
Labels: Contentious Politics, development, labor markets, MNCs, Trade
Matt Yglesias is being raked across the coals for this. It's understandable. The best time to parrot an econ 101 line is not immediately following a tragedy. Yglesias now understands this. But neither is this the best time to completely denounce neoliberalism or engage in the sort of extreme wishful thinking through which it is suggested that Bangladesh could (or even should) have levels of labor protection equivalent to the U.S. That is quite literally impossible: Bangladesh's GDP per capita is about $2,000 per year. Taken together, U.S.-level unemployment protections, retirement accounts, safety regulations, and other programs which benefit labor are more costly than that. So it's impossible.
Let's take this situation as it is. Bangladesh is not a bastion of neoliberalism. It has only recently, and after a long struggle, been able to consolidate a democratic regime (hopefully) which is in any case quite corrupt. Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world, but it has been able to grow fairly rapidly over the past few decades by exporting textiles and people to the rest of the world: exports and remittances are about 12% of the economy. Roughly 40% of the labor force is "underemployed", working only a few hours per week for very low wages. It is a poor country, which means it has low domestic savings, so to generate the sort of domestic investments it needs to continue to develop it must import capital and in particular foreign direct investment. Most of that goes into the production of textiles.
It is commonplace to hear folks say that multinational corporations encourage a "race to the bottom" in labor and environmental standards: if you regulate them, the thinking goes, they will go to another jurisdiction. To get the capital they need to develop, poor countries must therefore deny worker protections. Here's an application of the argument to Bangladesh. The story has a nice logic to it, but it is false.
This question has been studied quite a lot by political scientists. The state of the art in the literature (much of the best of which has been done at UNC by Layna Mosley) is as follows: multinational corporations tend to improve labor standards, and exposure to multinational production chains tend to raise countries' de jure labor (and environmental) standards. Through the pressure of global civil society advocacy groups,
"California effects", and other processes, standards tend to go up rather than down. But quite frequently de facto implementation of these standards does not keep up with the de jure enaction of them. This is especially true when multinational corporations subcontract with local firms: MNCs almost always have higher standards than local firms, especially if the MNC is from a highly-developed country (i.e. not China). As countries develop, local labor practices tend to improve to meet the standards.
Remember, these are poor countries. The local standards tend to be very
low before multinationals come in. The capacity of governments to
engage in inspection and enforcement is weak. Often, corruption is rampant. (These are basically other ways of saying that the country is quite poor.) This is not a problem that invoking the neoliberalism bogeyman can fix, however, nor would it be likely to improve if the country was shut off from the global economy. The problem was not created by neoliberalism -- it existed already -- and the best hope for rapid improvement it will come from participation in the global economy rather than autarky. State capacity cannot improve until incomes are higher, which requires growth, which requires participation in the trading system. Over the past two decades, since it has begun producing for export in earnest, Bangladesh has grown at about 6% per year; it has a long ways to go, but shutting itself off would be the wrong move. It is on the path to development, at long last.
Enforcing the laws already on the books is a necessary step. But it is hard to ask multinational corporations to take responsibility for more than their own production floors. They do not have the local authority to do this, and I don't believe anyone wishes to grant it to them. This is the governments' job. If the government does not have the capacity to perform it, they may ask for outside help from the ILO or other NGOs which operate internationally. (Keep in mind that enforcement requires resources, which means additional taxes. Practicably speaking, some of these costs would be borne by labor.) If the government does not have the interest to do so, then the entrenched power structure needs to be overturned. The best chance for this happening is by increasing the market power of foreign capital and domestic labor -- the groups which would both prefer higher standards -- and eroding that of domestic capital -- the group which, according to recent example and careful political science research, most prefers low standards. Thus, various suggestions to boycott products made from Bangladesh, or otherwise isolate the country economically, would almost certainly make the problem worse rather than better.
It appears that the Bangladesh garment factory was locally-owned, and had been subcontracted to do production for MNCs. The building was in violation of many laws -- the problem wasn't de jure but de facto -- and it appears that the owners will be arrested and prosecuted (as they should be). The multinationals, for their part, had engaged international third-party inspectors under E.U. code to validate the safety of the factories. The factories themselves passed inspection, but the building which housed them was not examined by the foreign inspectors.
This is, sadly, pretty predictable from the point of view of political science research. And that research gives us some indication of what needs to happen to improve the situation: consolidate the democratic regime in Bangladesh, reduce the influence of local capital owners, try to maintain rapid economic growth, and have some measure of patience. It takes a long time for poor countries to become rich countries. It will take a lot longer if well-meaning folks on the left cut out their best means of development.
UPDATE: In the comments, Latinamericanist provides some links to research on the effectiveness of international advocacy groups that are worth looking at.
Saturday, March 9, 2013
Global Trends Are Not Caused by Local Factors
Labels: development, income inequality; globalization
In the above video from last Fall, Brad DeLong describes three types of inequality:
1. Global inequality, which was expanding from 1800-1975, and receding since (due primarily to China and India).
2. US inequality, which was declining from 1925-1980, but increasing since, in two ways:
2.a. The separation of the top 20% from the bottom 80%, partially as a function of college wage premium.
2.b. The separation of the top 0.1% from the rest of the top 20%, for reasons unexplained.
3. The rise of the top 1% globally -- the development of a new international plutocracy -- since... 1980 or so?
For reasons that escape me he does not link the three together. It seems an obvious thing to do. It's what Oscar Landerretche (the other participant in the discussion) does, in the context of explaining outcomes in Chile. But he doesn't do it.
This is something that has disappointed me about the conversation regarding American inequality over the past few years more generally. (I've written about it before.) Folks like DeLong, Krugman, Cowen, and others think in global terms quite frequently. But when they seek to explain the Great Stagnation and the rise of inequality they concern themselves almost entirely with local explanations. I think such analyses are very likely to suffer from omitted variable bias.
Around the 43rd minute, DeLong takes a direct question about this from the audience. He answers it fairly well, but still downplays the role of the global economy in influencing outcomes in the US, favoring cultural explanations (e.g. explosion of CEO pay) and changes to marginal tax rates. He does not consider that these might be related to global dynamics either. If global forces eroded the bargaining power of American Labor, then maybe that's why society has tolerated the enormous increase in executive pay. If global forces are pressuring American corporations through new competition, then maybe we've cut top-end taxation in an attempt to gain back some competitiveness.
Friday, February 22, 2013
How the World Works, Redux
Labels: China, development, JapanMichael Pettis has written "A brief history of the Chinese growth model" which reads quite a lot like James Fallows classic 1993 essay on Japan's growth model, "How the World Works". Pettis hits many of the same notes: it isn't new, it was advocated for by Alexander Hamilton in the US and Friedrich List in Japan Germany; it is focused on enhancing national capabilities as much as improving the actual standards of living of citizens; to that end it prioritizes investment and exports over consumption and imports. There are other similarities as well.
In other (related?) news, here's a right-up-to-date essay on the economic situation in China from Caixin (sort of a Financial Times of China). It's not very optimistic; the title is "Waiting for a Crisis".
FWIW, Fallows' article on Japan appeared about a year before that country's financial crisis in 1994.
Saturday, December 22, 2012
The New Global Savings Glut and the Politics of Imbalances
Labels: Current Account, development, imbalanceBut it’s not just the United States and Japan. Name a country with three elements—a stable political system, a credible central bank to call its own, and a free flow of capital across its borders—and it has, right now, extraordinarily low interest rates. That’s true for Canada and Australia (10 year yields of 1.85 percent and 3.36 percent), of Switzerland and Sweden (0.55 percent and 1.6 percent). Britain, certainly (1.94 percent), but even some countries that don’t technically fit our classification because they lack their own central bank (Germany at 1.42 percent and France at 1.99 percent. That would be the same France that The Economist, in a cover story last month, called “the ticking time bomb at the heart of Europe.”).
So what is going on? Interest rates are, essentially, the relative price of money today versus its value in the future. And investors are saying that they don’t need very much compensation to delay their spending for the future, as long as they can feel secure that they will get their money back and that the money they get back will be worth roughly what they put in.
To put it a different way, around the world there are all sorts of savers—pension funds, wealthy individuals in emerging nations, governments that want to ensure they have reserves put aside in case there were to be a run on their currency—for whom the goal is not so much to get a big yield on their savings, but rather to ensure that they will get their money back when they need it.I may have more to say about this over the coming weeks as I'm writing a book chapter related to the topic, but for now let me just mention that this isn't only about the domestic factors that Irwin describes. It is also related to broader developments in the global economy in recent decades. The only development model which has sustained success is export biased: emerging economies export resources and consumer goods to developed countries. Second, the opening up of global trade has increased reliance on comparative advantage, thus benefiting the owners of the abundant factor of production. Third, the decline in capital controls have allowed financial flows to increase markedly. These three factors have led to a world where trade flows constitute 60% of global GDP, international financial balance sheets are 150% of global GDP ($100 trillion), and income inequality has increased markedly.
But it also means that the global economy is fundamentally imbalanced: developing countries must run persistent current account surpluses, while developed countries must run persistent current account deficits. These must be offset by financial transactions: developed countries essentially hand over IOUs to developing countries. And this process must be indefinite; or, rather, they must continue until the whole world has reached roughly equivalent levels of development, until a new political system makes the export-biased development model impossible (restrictions on trade and/or capital movement), or until the imbalances reach a tipping point and a crisis ensues.
The question is what deficit governments should do in this environment. Irwin suggests that they should take advantage of cheap finance to make domestic investments in infrastructure and education. Another option is to try to reduce the probability of a future (domestic) crisis by balancing the books. In the 1990s they largely chose the latter, which ended up leading to crises in the developing world as imbalances unwound. In the 2000s they chose the latter, which ended up leading to crises in the developed world as imbalances fueled asset price bubbles in real estate and sovereign debt.
The story of the 2010s will be how these imbalances are managed.
Tuesday, May 29, 2012
Democracy and Development
Labels: democracy, development, regimeXavier Marquez has a very interesting series of posts on the relationship between democracy and economic growth since the end of WWII:
The basics of this relationship in the post-WWII era seem pretty well understood: basically, the richer the country, the more “democratic” it appears to be (in the sense I’ve discussed here and here, where democracy is conceived as a system of normatively regulated competition for control of states including the usual paraphernalia of elections, freedoms of speech and assembly, etc.), though the reasons for why this is the case remain disputed, and there are obvious and significant exceptions to this pattern. Conversely, the academic literature suggests that democratic regimes have a slight and indirect long-term development advantage, though the evidence for this claim is much more controversial, and there is no consensus on how this particular advantage operates, if it exists at allThere are links to literature describing all of these assertions in the original post. Marquez then runs down some simple data (and presents it very well) and notes:
The median income of democratic regimes has been higher than the median income of both hybrid and fully authoritarian regimes since at least the 1950s, and the gap has in general widened, not narrowed, even as the number of democratic countries has increased. (From this graph we cannot tell, however, whether the gap has widened because democratic countries have grown faster, or because non-democratic countries that grew fast turned into democracies; from the graphs below, we may infer that it was a mixture of both). The gap was highest during “peak authoritarianism” in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when most poor and newly independent countries were either hybrid regimes or dictatorships, but it stopped growing after the end of the cold war, when a number of relatively poor countries became democratic. ...
What about growth? Is any particular regime type consistently associated with economic growth? ...The answer is "not really" or at least "not very much". Dictatorships and hybrid regimes have more variability -- some grow very quickly, at least for awhile, but also go bust more frequently -- but averaging across regime types shows very little difference in central tendency:
To the extent that we can ignore these confidence intervals and focus only on the trend performance, democracies have not always done better than these other regimes. In the early post-war era it seems that dictatorships did better (though most did about as well as democracies), but then decolonization came along and the growth performance of dictatorships basically cratered. Indeed, the 80s, when the so-called “third wave” of democratization began, was also (not coincidentally perhaps?) the time when the “growth gap” between democracies and hybrid and dictatorial regimes was at its widest. Ominously, the last decade has seen a reversal of this pattern, which explains much of the (not very well thought out) commentary about the rise of the “Chinese model.”He has a very cool motion chart at his blog (that I can't find the embed code for) that maps out the null effect, so click through to watch it.
Thursday, February 9, 2012
Climate Change, Development, and Conflict
Labels: Climate Change, developmentThe Journal of Peace Research has a special issue on the security implications of climate change. The issue can be found here, and is open access through the end of February. Over at DoM, Cliff Bob has already posted some (very good) thoughts, and highlights the main takeaway from the issue:
Only limited support for viewing climate change as an important influence on armed conflict. However, framing the climate issue as a security problem could possibly influence the perceptions of the actors and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy.That is one takeaway, but Eric Gartzke makes a much more provocative claim: from the perspective of global security, climate change might actually be a good thing. That is, climate change is a byproduct of increased economic activity, increased economic activity is an indicator of increasing wealth, and increasing wealth is associated with a more stable security environment. Or, as Gartzke puts it:
Ironically, stagnating economic development in middle-income states caused by efforts to combat climate change could actually realize fears of climate-induced warfare.In a series of posts a few years ago I argued that it was not contradictory to believe that climate change was real and would have a non-negligible impact on the planet, but that we shouldn't do anything to stop it. This is true if you believe the costs of mitigation would be lower than the costs of prevention. There are pretty good reasons to think that is true, particularly in the developing world. Gartzke offers another possible worry along those lines.
Sunday, October 16, 2011
We Are the 1%
Labels: development, income distributionI came across the Occupy Prishtina Tumblr the other day. While I find the rapid spread of the #OWS movement across the globe to be interesting, it also got me thinking. Kosovo is the poorest country in Europe. According to the CIA World Factbook, about 15% of its GDP GNP comes from remittances, and another 7.5% comes from aid and foreign donors. Kosovo has 40% unemployment and per capita income is under $3,000/year. And, of course, they are perpetually threatened by their stronger, richer, larger neighbor -- Serbia.
Almost anyone in Kosovo would gladly trade places with almost anyone camping out in Zuccotti Park. This is illustrative of the fact that the "We are the 99%" sentiment very much depends on which sample you are looking at. If you make $39,000/year you are below the US mean and median, and thus firmly within the domestic 99%. But an income of $39,000/year puts you in the top 1% of the global income distribution.* The American middle class may have stagnated in recent decades, but it is still a much better life than that of 99% of the world's population.
Not including my tuition remission, the stipend UNC gives me for teaching is about $15,000/year. I am occasionally able to supplement that by another grand or two through various sources. While that is above the poverty line, I obviously don't lead an extravagant life. And yet I am in the top 8% of the world's income earners, with expectations of doing far better within a year or two.
Of course the top 1% of Americans are even more elite. I'm not trying to diminish that fact, and I know that the "We are the 99%" is a slogan intended to amplify a broader political point. But I'd like to encourage folks to think globally. There are few people in the US whose lives are not within the world's top 10-15%.
*Yes that is PPP-adjusted.
UPDATE: Suzy Khimm and Scott Sumner make similar points. Khimm's numbers are slightly different than mine; I'm not sure why, but the takeaway is the same. I think this portrayal by Sumner drives it home:
Now let’s start down through Dante’s seven circles of Hell:
1. The US is much richer than Mexico. So much so that millions of Mexicans will risk the horrors of human trafficking into the US to get crummy jobs picking tomatoes all day in the hot sun.
2. China in 2011 is still considerably poorer than Mexico. The Chinese take much greater risks to get here.
3. China today is so much richer than China in 1997 that it’s like a different planet. The changes (even in rural areas) are massive.
4. The China of 1997 seemed like paradise compared to the China of the 1970s. Throughout Hessler’s book, people keep talking about how horrible things were during that decade and how prosperous they are now (1997 in Sichuan!)
5. The China of the 1970s was nowhere near as bad as during 1959-61, when 30 million starved to death.
It’s fine to worry about income inequality in the US. I also worry about this issue. But it’s important to keep in mind that there is much more to life than income inequality, and much more to the world than the US. In the grand scheme of things, tinkering with government programs to help the poor, pitiful, beleaguered American middle class isn’t likely to make much difference, at least from a utilitarian perspective. We need to broaden our outlook.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Political Instability and Commodity Prices
Labels: commodity prices, Conflict; globalization, developmentI've been pondering this from Yglesias for a few hours:
Think of a world in which there are two kinds of growth. One is leap-ahead growth in which technologically advanced societies dream up even more advanced technology. The other is catch-up growth in which technologically backwards societies learn to use the advanced technology that already exists in the advanced countries. In the twentieth century we saw some instances of catch-up growth, but leap-ahead growth accounted for the majority of global growth in output. One result of that is that we got much much better at extracting natural resources (energy, food, metal) from the fixed supply of land, and commodity prices generally went down. But over the past ten years, catch-up growth in India, Brazil, and (especially) China has been the majority of world growth. Consequently, the rate of stuff-utilization is going up higher than the rate of stuff-production, meaning we’ll see rising commodity prices rather than falling ones.
For rich countries, that’s inconvenient but we’ll deal. For China, it’s fine—the whole point is that incomes will be rising faster than prices. But for poor countries that aren’t growing rapidly, it’s potentially a disaster. This kind of trend is what’s driving the current instability in North Africa and will probably be a major story for years to come.
My first thought was "This sounds plausible" and then "But why just North Africa?". A quick glance around the region gives me pause. Yemen is growing at over 5%, yet there is instability. Tunisia has had solid growth for years, and has a GDP/capita of nearly $10,000, among the highest in the region. Egypt has had high growth rates (5-7%) as well. Lebanon has been growing from 7-9% per year, and has a GDP/capita of over $16,000. Obviously there has been instability in all of those places lately. But also in Iran, which has had anemic growth. Sudan has obviously had lots of conflict, but has it always corresponded with rising commodity prices? The current peace has occurred at a time when energy prices have been relatively high. I'm less familiar with the rest of North Africa, but I don't see an obvious pattern here.
This new research (ungated pdf here) seems to support Yglesias' position:
We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.
But Paul Collier's research suggests that conflict is more likely when commodity prices fall. (More precisely, when prices are volatile.) Many low-income countries are commodity-exporters, so their incomes go up when global commodity prices rise. Does this imply that if commodity prices rise conflict is less likely? Does it depend on which commodity? Does it depend on how the income gains are distributed? Surely there is some research on these, but I'm not familiar enough with the civil war/development literature to reach any firm conclusions. The Blattman/Miguel survey of the civil war econ literature indicates that poverty and slow growth is the most consistent factor, not necessarily commodity prices.
My provisional takeaway is that it will depend on which commodity prices are rising and which countries are producing those goods. Prices of different commodities do not necessarily covary (or has that changed?), so the effects will not necessarily be homogenous across countries.
Monday, December 6, 2010
Interesting New Research
Labels: Current Account, development, financial crisis, imbalance, Mexico, MiscellanyMonday is the day that the NBER releases its working papers for the week, and sometimes there's some interesting stuff. This week, for example. I haven't had the chance to actually, you know, read any of these papers, but here's a few abstracts that caught my eye:
Why Have Economic Reforms in Mexico Not Generated Growth?
Timothy J. Kehoe, Kim J. Ruhl
NBER Working Paper No. 16580
Following its opening to trade and foreign investment in the mid-1980s, Mexico’s economic growth has been modest at best, particularly in comparison with that of China. Comparing these countries and reviewing the literature, we conclude that the relation between openness and growth is not a simple one. Using standard trade theory, we find that Mexico has gained from trade, and by some measures, more so than China. We sketch out a theory in which developing countries can grow faster than the United States by reforming. As a country becomes richer, this sort of catch-up becomes more difficult. Absent continuing reforms, Chinese growth is likely to slow down sharply, perhaps leaving China at a level less than Mexico’s real GDP per working-age person.
This analysis jives with my priors, and also with a lot of things I've been thinking about lately. One point is that we probably expected too much from Mexico, which never had as much room for development as China or the Asian Tigers. Another is that not all development is the same. China has been able to mobilize large factors of production that were essentially idle a generation or so ago. Mexico was not in the same position. Yet another is that we cannot, and should not, expect China's meteoric rise to continue at pace indefinitely. Michael Pettis wrote a good post on this point recently, drawing the obvious analogy to Japan. Mexico has problems with inequality and the environment, but they pale in comparison to China's. Right now China's state is more consolidated than Mexico's, but we should probably expect it to become more sclerotic over time. Mexico's demographics are also much more favorable for future stable economic performance. Obviously comparing the development record of any two countries is problematic, but we should recognize that Mexico has done fairly well over the past generation, and has a good opportunity for sustained growth in the future.
An ungated version of this paper is available from the Minneapolis Fed here.
Classification, Detection and Consequences of Data Error: Evidence from the Human Development Index
Hendrik Wolff, Howard Chong, Maximilian Auffhammer
NBER Working Paper No. 16572
We measure and examine data error in health, education and income statistics used to construct the Human Development Index. We identify three sources of data error which are due to (i) data updating, (ii) formula revisions and (iii) thresholds to classify a country’s development status. We propose a simple statistical framework to calculate country specific measures of data uncertainty and investigate how data error biases rank assignments. We find that up to 34% of countries are misclassified and, by replicating prior studies, we show that key estimated parameters vary by up to 100% due to data error.
Measurement problems with the HDI have been well-known for a long time, but this is the first paper I've seen that tries to reestimate the index after correcting some of these problems. Also note that the 2010 HDI report uses a new methodology than previous reports. Didn't hear much about that? Perhaps it's because the U.S. moved up to #4 (behind only Norway, Australia, and New Zealand) in 2010, from #13 in 2009. I strongly favor using a variety of well-being measures to rank outcomes in countries; GDP is too crude to be used for everything. But other indices have their own problems, among them measurement errors and the necessity of a "philosophy of weights", i.e. how much importance to give what factors in creating the index. These choices are often motivated by normative concerns. A more open and nuanced discussion of these issues is good.
An ungated pdf is here.
Financial Crises, Credit Booms, and External Imbalances: 140 Years of Lessons
Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor
NBER Working Paper No. 16567
Do external imbalances increase the risk of financial crises? In this paper, we study the experience of 14 developed countries over 140 years (1870-2008). We exploit our long-run dataset in a number of different ways. First, we apply new statistical tools to describe the temporal and spatial patterns of crises and identify five episodes of global financial instability in the past 140 years. Second, we study the macroeconomic dynamics before crises and show that credit growth tends to be elevated and natural interest rates depressed in the run-up to global financial crises. Third, we show that recessions associated with crises lead to deeper recessions and stronger turnarounds in imbalances than during normal recessions. Finally, we ask if external imbalances help predict financial crises. Our overall result is that credit growth emerges as the single best predictor of financial instability, but the correlation between lending booms and current account imbalances has grown much tighter in recent decades.
Thomas may find this one interesting. I have a feeling that when I read it I'll be asking for a political explanation for the growth in credit and imbalances pre-crisis. I'll reserve more substantive comment until I've had a better chance to look it over.
An ungated pdf is here.
Saturday, December 4, 2010
Saturday Morning Videos
Labels: developmentIt doesn't look like I can embed the videos, so here's a link to Chrystia Freeland interviewing Daron Acemoglu.
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
Rosling Talks to TED (Again)
Labels: Data, development, MDGFriday, October 1, 2010
Politics Everywhere or Markets in Everything? Fake Brazilian Currency Edition
Labels: Brazil, development, inflationAn interesting Planet Money podcast on Brazil's economic turnaround. How did they reverse decades of economic stagnation, excessive inflation, and severely-underdeveloped markets? Four grad school drinking buddies invented a fake currency. The summary:
For a while, inflation was so high that grocery stores were raising their prices every day. Shoppers would run ahead of the guy changing the price tags, so they could pay the previous day's price.
A series of leaders tried and failed to stop inflation. One guy instituted a price freeze. Another froze peoples' bank accounts. None of it worked.
Then, the government brought in in four economists who had been talking to each other for years about how to fix Brazil's inflation problem. Their solution: Create a currency that doesn't exist. No coins, no bills.
Brazil is now the Western hemisphere's second largest economy (take that, Canada), the world's 8th largest, and is growing at 7% a year.
ht: Modeled Behavior's Twitter.
Saturday, September 18, 2010
A New Development Model?
Labels: development, Latin America, TourismClaire Berlinski reports from the other half of Hispaniola: Santo Domingo, Dominicana:
Unlike Haiti, the Dominican Republic made a series of wise political and economic decisions. It didn’t cut down all its trees, it made the place safer to visit, and when it built up its economy, it focused on growth industries: drug trafficking, money laundering, and sex tourism. It’s impossible to take a photo in Santo Domingo that doesn’t involve a massive pair of breasts. I try, but the damned things are everywhere. ...
[A]fter living in Turkey, I’m just grateful to be around people who don’t seem driven enough to plot conspiracies or foment coups. I’m aware that the country has seen both, but it doesn’t seem plausible.
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
The Bottom Billion
Labels: Demographics, developmentHans Rosling, who we've covered before, has a new TED talk. In that past he's done a lot of interesting things illustrating data on computers. This time, he uses plastic IKEA boxes to talk about demographics and development.
Friday, July 16, 2010
Factor Price Equalization, Part II
Labels: China, development, TradeThis NYTimes article, which features a quote by Barry Eichengreen, focuses on the shift of textile manufacturing from China to places like Bangladesh:
It is the sort of place to which foreign manufacturers may increasingly turn, if the rising wage demands of factory workers in China prompt companies to seek new pools of cheap labor elsewhere.
Already, in factories behind steel gates and tall concrete walls, tens of thousands of workers, most of them women, spend their days stitching T-shirts, pants and sweaters for Wal-Mart, H&M, Zara and other Western retailers and brands.
One of the Bangladeshi companies here, the DBL Group, employs 9,000 people making T-shirts and other knitwear. Business has been so good that the company is finishing a new 10-story building with open floors the size of soccer fields, planted with row after row of sewing machines.
Eichengreen adds on his Twitter that China should be worrying that this trend will continue. Maybe it should, but China is moving up the value-added production ladder very rapidly. It may be willing to lose some textile jobs so long as it is adding semi-durable and technological jobs. Importing consumer non-durables from places Bangladesh could help keep inflation down a bit and help steer investment to more lucrative production. Such as providing inputs to manufacturing in Bangladesh, as the article points out. Yes, China still has hundreds of millions of under-employed, but many of those were never going to work in sweatshops anyway. China should be a bit worried... but not mortified.
In recent posts I noted that a rise in China's exchange rate would not necessarily benefit American import-competing manufacturers, since production would simply shift to other developing countries. Consider this another data point supporting that claim.
Also note that workers in Bangladesh have already gained more bargaining power than they had before the trade came, and that multinational corporations have (at least sometimes) sided with the labor movement. Local corporations, however, have resisted:
In January, H&M, Wal-Mart, Gap, Tesco and other Western clothing buyers asked the Bangladeshi government to raise the minimum wage and reset it every year, although the group did not specify what the wage should be. A spokeswoman for H&M, Malin Bjorne, said the company was willing to pay more for clothing to help support higher wages. It is unclear whether other companies would do the same.
But factory owners here argue that a big increase in wages would make them uncompetitive against Vietnam and other big producers, which have higher labor costs but also have better infrastructure and are more efficient producers. If that happened, Bangladesh’s China opportunity could prove all too fleeting, they say.
“If it’s 5,000 taka, I would close all my factories,” said Anisul Huq, a former head of the Bangladeshi garment industry’s trade group and a factory owner whose customers include H&M and Wal-Mart. “Even if it’s 3,000 taka, lots of factories will close within three or four months.”
Here we see the "California effect" and the "race-to-the-bottom" in play at the same time. Sort of. These countries are practically at the bottom already, so it's not clear how much further they can go. And even though some manufacturing is shifting around looking for the lowest wages, it appears that overall wages and working conditions are going up everywhere MNCs go. Yesterday China, today Bangladesh, tomorrow Vietnam?
Monday, June 14, 2010
Are Resources Good or Bad for Afghanistan?
Labels: Afghanistan, development, natural resourcesAlex posted last night about the rich mineral deposits in Afghanistan, and what implications that could have for political stability and economic development in Afghanistan. Since his post, it has come out that this is not exactly a new find (it's been known since at least 2007), and the timing of the NY Times article is a bit suspect. All of which is true, but doesn't really change what the important questions are, such as what effect will these resources have on Afghanistan's political and economic development? Alex highlighted many of them, as did Andrew Exum:
I have been reading Paul Collier's The Bottom Billion in between editing chapters of my dissertation (which is tough enough to do when my local coffee shop has the World Cup on all its televisions), and Collier describes the characteristics that "trap" countries in cycles of civil conflict: low income, slow growth, and dependence on primary commodity exports. I don't need to tell you Afghanistan has the first and third characteristics in spades, and you may have noticed that Afghanistan has already been in a pretty miserable cycle of civil conflict since the PDPA coup in 1978. Does this resource find make civil war more or less likely? The statistics, I'm afraid, suggest the former.
Somewhat ironically, Collier's research methods are exactly those that Exum disapproved of in our dispute from a few months back. But I'm glad that Exum is broadening his horizons in this case, and even though I don't think Collier's book is perfect, there are still a lot of lessons to be learned from it.
The wild card in Collier's work, and in this particular case of Afghanistan, is the presence of an external military in the state with resources. Collier argues in later chapters of his book that the presence of an outside intervener can change the "trap" dynamics that many poor countries find themselves in. (In fact, he's been criticized fairly strongly for this "colonialist" aspect of his work, and for the statistical methods he uses to reach his conclusions. I told you it was ironic that Exum was praising it, given his previous stances.) So while the combination of "ethnic/tribal/ideological rivalries + poverty + natural resources = conflict + economic stagnation" most of the time, adding "external intervention" to the left-hand side of the equation can, in some circumstances, change the right-hand side quite dramatically.
It's impossible to know from Collier's work alone whether that can happen in Afghanistan's case or not. But given that these resources are in Afghanistan no matter what the U.S. does, it's probably better for Afghans that we're there. Of course, if that's true than it also true that it would be disastrous for the U.S. to withdraw from Afghanistan any time soon.
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
The Last 200 Years
Labels: developmentThis video has been bouncing all over the net lately, and with good reason: it's excellent. So here it is again, for those who haven't seen it.
Monday, May 31, 2010
PSA
Labels: developmentThe World Bank's Annual Conference on Development Economics is going on right now, and the proceedings can be watched live (and perhaps later, not sure about that) here. Speakers include Elinor Ostrom, Joseph Stiglitz, and Robert Solow.