Showing posts with label commodity prices. Show all posts
Showing posts with label commodity prices. Show all posts

Saturday, February 16, 2013

The Downside of a Currency War

. Saturday, February 16, 2013
6 comments

Matt Yglesias has suggested, many times, that there are no downsides to a “currency war”. Here is the most recent example. Now Paul Krugman and Greg Ip are on board. The basic argument is as follows: much of the world needs more monetary stimulus, and currency wars are a form of quasi-coordinated monetary stimulus. Hence, if we start a currency war we’ll all get monetary stimulus and a bunch of national economies will improve simultaneously. According to this view, currency wars not only are not negative-sum (the Barry Eichengreen finding concerning the 1930s devaluations), they aren't even neutral; they're positive-sum.

The problem with this way of thinking is common in a lot of commentary about economics: it refers to global dynamics purely in terms of local effects (if it refers to global dynamics at all). But global dynamics have global effects.

That is, this is a conceptual problem. If we think of the global economy as a single system comprised of many different interdependent units, then we would ask what the effect of a currency war would be on the system. There is no reason to think it would be the same everywhere. At the very least, we should think that parts of the system which control systemically important currencies would react different than parts of the system which do not. If we conceptualize the global economy in terms of the units, and not the interdependencies between them, then we end up only caring about what happens in the U.S. and EU.

Thinking in terms of systemic, rather than just local effects, leads us to the conclusion that there may some significant downsides to a currency war, although they are likely not to be primarily in the U.S. There is mounting evidence suggesting that the several food crises since 2007 have been a result of ever-expansionary Federal Reserve policy. For example, a 2009 paper suggested:

While the market dynamics during this period are still not well understood, a combination of macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation of the dollar and lower interest rates in the United States...
Krugman considered this view in 2011, and rejected it. He blamed the food crises on climate change. While that may be a contributing factor -- and noting that boosting demand in industrialized societies would only increase carbon emissions, and thus exacerbate the problem -- the role of the Federal Reserve cannot be dismissed so easily:



That's a pretty close association, and even more impressive as it tracks non-linearly.

And now the scholarly evidence is starting to mount. Here's another paper:
Released in July 2008, What’s Driving Food Prices? identified three major drivers of prices—depreciation of the U.S. dollar, changes in production and consumption, and growth in biofuels production.
More recently, David Leblang of the University of Virginia has presented a conference paper arguing that, through the channel of increased commodity prices, Federal Reserve interventions did have a role in the onset of the Arab Spring, via the mechanism of commodity price volatility. I can't find an online version of the paper, but he makes a persuasive argument.

This follows a lot of previous literature suggesting that commodity price volatility is associated with conflict in less-developed areas, and the Fed actions are associated with commodity price movements. In other words, the theoretical story is pretty sound. All you have to do is connect the dots. To connect the dots, you need to think systemically.

So this is the potential downside of a currency war: monetary stimulus in the countries which control major currencies, and volatility everywhere else. This is why the term "currency war" was coined by a Brazilian (and reiterated by a Russian), not a German. In the worst case scenario relatively rich people in what used to be called the global North get richer, while relatively poor people in the global South get poorer, and possible even face political instability and violence.

I'd like to see what Jay Ulfelder thinks about this line of thinking. In any case, the logic appeals to me.

Wednesday, January 18, 2012

(Terrible, No Good) GOTD

. Wednesday, January 18, 2012
0 comments



This, apparently, was Bloomberg's "Chart of the Day" (via, and HT to Leigh Caldwell on Twitter). In case you can't tell, the orange line is the U.S.'s legal debt ceiling, the white line is the spot price of gold.

It is a very bad, no good, terrible, very bad graph. Misleading at best. Can you tell why?

Here's a clue, but it won't work until tomorrow.

Wednesday, January 26, 2011

Political Instability and Commodity Prices

. Wednesday, January 26, 2011
0 comments

I've been pondering this from Yglesias for a few hours:

Think of a world in which there are two kinds of growth. One is leap-ahead growth in which technologically advanced societies dream up even more advanced technology. The other is catch-up growth in which technologically backwards societies learn to use the advanced technology that already exists in the advanced countries. In the twentieth century we saw some instances of catch-up growth, but leap-ahead growth accounted for the majority of global growth in output. One result of that is that we got much much better at extracting natural resources (energy, food, metal) from the fixed supply of land, and commodity prices generally went down. But over the past ten years, catch-up growth in India, Brazil, and (especially) China has been the majority of world growth. Consequently, the rate of stuff-utilization is going up higher than the rate of stuff-production, meaning we’ll see rising commodity prices rather than falling ones.

For rich countries, that’s inconvenient but we’ll deal. For China, it’s fine—the whole point is that incomes will be rising faster than prices. But for poor countries that aren’t growing rapidly, it’s potentially a disaster. This kind of trend is what’s driving the current instability in North Africa and will probably be a major story for years to come.


My first thought was "This sounds plausible" and then "But why just North Africa?". A quick glance around the region gives me pause. Yemen is growing at over 5%, yet there is instability. Tunisia has had solid growth for years, and has a GDP/capita of nearly $10,000, among the highest in the region. Egypt has had high growth rates (5-7%) as well. Lebanon has been growing from 7-9% per year, and has a GDP/capita of over $16,000. Obviously there has been instability in all of those places lately. But also in Iran, which has had anemic growth. Sudan has obviously had lots of conflict, but has it always corresponded with rising commodity prices? The current peace has occurred at a time when energy prices have been relatively high. I'm less familiar with the rest of North Africa, but I don't see an obvious pattern here.

This new research (ungated pdf here) seems to support Yglesias' position:

We examine the effects that variations in the international food prices have on democracy and intra-state conflict using panel data for over 120 countries during the period 1970-2007. Our main finding is that in Low Income Countries increases in the international food prices lead to a significant deterioration of democratic institutions and a significant increase in the incidence of anti-government demonstrations, riots, and civil conflict. In the High Income Countries variations in the international food prices have no significant effects on democratic institutions and measures of intra-state conflict. Our empirical results point to a significant externality of variations in international food prices on Low Income Countries' social and political stability.


But Paul Collier's research suggests that conflict is more likely when commodity prices fall. (More precisely, when prices are volatile.) Many low-income countries are commodity-exporters, so their incomes go up when global commodity prices rise. Does this imply that if commodity prices rise conflict is less likely? Does it depend on which commodity? Does it depend on how the income gains are distributed? Surely there is some research on these, but I'm not familiar enough with the civil war/development literature to reach any firm conclusions. The Blattman/Miguel survey of the civil war econ literature indicates that poverty and slow growth is the most consistent factor, not necessarily commodity prices.

My provisional takeaway is that it will depend on which commodity prices are rising and which countries are producing those goods. Prices of different commodities do not necessarily covary (or has that changed?), so the effects will not necessarily be homogenous across countries.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: commodity prices
 

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