In the above video from last Fall, Brad DeLong describes three types of inequality:
1. Global inequality, which was expanding from 1800-1975, and receding since (due primarily to China and India).
2. US inequality, which was declining from 1925-1980, but increasing since, in two ways:
2.a. The separation of the top 20% from the bottom 80%, partially as a function of college wage premium.
2.b. The separation of the top 0.1% from the rest of the top 20%, for reasons unexplained.
3. The rise of the top 1% globally -- the development of a new international plutocracy -- since... 1980 or so?
For reasons that escape me he does not link the three together. It seems an obvious thing to do. It's what Oscar Landerretche (the other participant in the discussion) does, in the context of explaining outcomes in Chile. But he doesn't do it.
This is something that has disappointed me about the conversation regarding American inequality over the past few years more generally. (I've written about it before.) Folks like DeLong, Krugman, Cowen, and others think in global terms quite frequently. But when they seek to explain the Great Stagnation and the rise of inequality they concern themselves almost entirely with local explanations. I think such analyses are very likely to suffer from omitted variable bias.
Around the 43rd minute, DeLong takes a direct question about this from the audience. He answers it fairly well, but still downplays the role of the global economy in influencing outcomes in the US, favoring cultural explanations (e.g. explosion of CEO pay) and changes to marginal tax rates. He does not consider that these might be related to global dynamics either. If global forces eroded the bargaining power of American Labor, then maybe that's why society has tolerated the enormous increase in executive pay. If global forces are pressuring American corporations through new competition, then maybe we've cut top-end taxation in an attempt to gain back some competitiveness.
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Saturday, March 9, 2013
Global Trends Are Not Caused by Local Factors
Labels: development, income inequality; globalizationSunday, March 21, 2010
Well, It's Come to This
Labels: income inequality; globalization
Emmanuel-across-the-Pond's love of poking fun of the U.S. is only matched by his love of poking fun of those who don't seek the utter humiliation and extirpation of the U.S. That means me. Which is all fine and good, and leads to some good discussions, but I fear that he's gone one step beyond this time.
First, he endorses a theory of inequality that relies on "assortative mating" to explain shifts in income inequality. The theory basically says that before the 1960s capital and labor were in an "asymmetric marriage" where Capital guaranteed capital to Labor, and Labor guaranteed labor to Capital so they could mutually benefit from each other's company. (Funny... the rest of us call that relationship by another name: "markets"). Anyway, the crack-up supposedly occurred in the 1960s, and now Capital and Labor keep to themselves, doing everything in their power to keep everyone below them in the income ladder from climbing up.
As his own data show, the cross-sectional divergence in income inequality across OECD nations is pretty stark, and there is nothing in this theory to explain why. Nor can he explain cross-temporal shifts; if Labor was bothered in the 1960s, presumably they should be even more angry now that income inequality has drastically increased. In fact, the 1960s was during the Golden Age of increased income parity in the Anglo-Saxon world; the Gilded Age began in the early 1970s. But as the recent debate over health care reform in the U.S. has shown, at least that part of the industrialized world is not interested in class warfare.
But then he says this (presumably with tongue in cheek, but who knows) in a subsequent post:
I would venture that limiting credit to these people is precisely what the doctor ordered. ...
Americans are great at GM foods; perhaps in the future they should churn out genetically modified persons who have "thrifty" genes once these are better understood.
Seriously, Emmanuel? Would that make the "asymmetric marriage" or "assortative mating" more efficient? And why stop with the "thrifty" genes? Jeebus... I never expected an endorsement of the Brave New World from someone with such a healthy distrust for the Anglo-American powers-that-be.
UPDATE: Just in case it isn't evident, I'm being somewhat sarcastic in this post, although I do think that Emmanuel, the theories he advocates in these posts, and his general interpretation of the global political economy is dead wrong.
Wednesday, June 3, 2009
Nostalgianomics
Labels: immigration, income inequality; globalizationThe piece, by Brink Lindsey, could just as well be called "Why Paul Krugman Is Wrong About Everything". The conclusion sums it up:
Paul Krugman may long for the return of selfdenying corporate workers who declined to seek better opportunities out of organizational loyalty, and thus kept wages artificially suppressed, but these are creatures of a bygone ethos—an ethos that also included uncritical acceptance of racist and sexist traditions and often brutish intolerance of deviations from mainstream lifestyles and sensibilities.
The rise in income inequality does raise issues of legitimate public concern. And reasonable people disagree hotly about what ought to be done to ensure that our prosperity is widely shared. But the caricature of postwar history put forward by Krugman and other purveyors of nostalgianomics won’t lead us anywhere. Reactionary fantasies never do.
The whole thing is worth reading if only to understand where the debate is located and what the policy choices are. I do not agree with every conclusion that Lindsey makes, but the broad lesson -- that arguments based on fond remembrances of bygone eras are usually over-romantic -- is sound.
Monday, May 18, 2009
Happiness Is Keeping Poor People Away
Labels: immigration, income inequality; globalizationMatthew Yglesias posts a pretty picture showing a negative correlation between income inequality and income redistribution. This relationship is definitionally true, so at first I wasn't sure why he thought it was worth pointing out. But then he goes on to say that this means something else entirely:
I think the links between taxation, spending, and inequality are the most plausible explanation of the fact that the highest-taxed countries are the happiest. It can’t be that paying taxes makes Danes happy. But plausibly, living in a relatively egalitarian society makes people happy.
That certainly is plausible, especially to those (like Yglesias) who are attracted to arguments for progressive social policy from Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance". Unfortunately, as Wilkinson points out, the plausible causal inference isn't true:
Danes say they’re really happy and have the lowest inequality. But Americans are nearly as happy and have high inequality for an OECD country. Mexicans are a quite upbeat lot, but have really, really high income inequality. So there’s not much of a clear pattern in the data. The effect of inequality on happiness appears to be pretty strongly ideologically mediated. Unsurprisingly, high inequality tends to be disquieting to egalitarians. But it doesn’t so much bother meritocrats. Additionally, the causes of high inequality are various. Economic predation by political elites (lots of Latin America and Africa) is pretty likely to create a sense of victimization and injustice. But high levels of wealth creation in more or less fair institutions but with relatively little fiscal redistribution (the U.S.) doesn’t bother people as long as they think the system is more or less fair. So the national income inequality variable itself tends to have little or no independent effect. The effect it does have depends on other things people believe and care about and the specific causes of inequality in different places.
There are a lot of plausible explanations for why Danes are happy. One of them is that Denmark is a small, culturally homogenous country that preserves their homogeneity with strict immigration laws. These strict immigration laws prevent the migration of poorer people into Denmark, which keeps intra-national income inequality low (and possibly broadens the support for domestic redistribution, since the social spending won't go to immigrants) but increases the inter-national income inequality between Denmark and other, poorer, countries.
Yglesias does not describe which he prefers: within-country inequality or between-country inequality, and I'm sure he would recoil from having to make the choice. But there is often a trade-off. Without realizing it, he does seem to think that one of the two makes citizens happier, but I don't think he intends to espouse a "keep them out, keep them poor" attitude towards the developing world. Unfortunately, that appears to be the way it works: keeping immigrants out makes citizens of wealthy countries wealthier (on average), boosts support for income redistribution through social services, and makes people lucky enough to be born there happier than the unlucky ones born in poorer places.
This is why causal inference in the social sciences is so difficult: a plausible explanation isn't always borne out by the data. Sometimes this is made evident if we consider related questions. In this case, if we observe that poor countries are less happy than rich countries, which they are, should we conclude that it's probably because they don't have enough public transportation or a better pension system? Or maybe having access to better economic opportunities might improve the mood.
For the record, the other happiest countries are Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Sweden, and Norway. Bastions of diversity, they are not.
Sunday, February 10, 2008
How Unequal Are We?
Labels: income distribution, income inequality; globalization"The bottom fifth [of Americans} earned just $9,974 [in 2006], but spent nearly twice that — an average of $18,153 a year." How is that possible? " So begins a fascinating Op-Ed in today's New York Times written by two Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas economists. The editorial's broader purpose is to offer an alternative measure of economic inequality in contemporary America.
The punch line is simple: measuring household income yields a 15:1 ratio between the highest and lowest fifths of the income distribution. This gap income lies at the base of most hand-wringing over globalization. Yet, if one measures household consumption expenditures instead of income, the ratio between the richest and poorest fifths falls to 4 to 1. Measured at the individual (rather than the household) level, the ratio falls further to only 2.1 to 1 (wealthier households have more people than poorer households). Thus, the extent of inequality we observe is sensitive to how we measure it.
I don't know if they are right when they assert that consumption expenditures provide a better measure of inequality than income. What I do know, however, is that different measures of the same concept can generate very different conclusions. As we often base policy on what we believe is happening, it might prove useful to examine multiple measures before deciding on a change in policy.
Update: Krugman posts on this article. He thinks it's inaccurate: "So my basic reaction to the piece was, there they go again. There’s some truth in what they say, but no news."
Friday, December 28, 2007
Krugman on Stolper Samuelson Effects in US Trade
Labels: China Trade, income distribution, income inequality; globalization, Stolper-SamuelsonIn case you missed it, Paul Krugman's Friday column focused on the distributional consequences of international trade. He argues that as imports from developing countries have risen during the last fifteen years, trade flows have begun to follow the expectations of standard comparative advantage. Consequently, trade has a more pronounced impact on wage inequality in the US today than it did fifteen years ago.
I am predisposed to the general argument, but am puzzled by the magnitude he claims. He asserts that "it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that growing U.S. trade with third world countries reduces the real wages of many and perhaps most workers in this country...The highly educated workers who clearly benefit from growing trade with third-world economies are a minority, greatly outnumbered by those who probably lose."
He draws on textbook Stolper-Samuelson logic to make the argument: "workers with less formal education either see their jobs shipped overseas or find their wages driven down by the ripple effect as other workers with similar qualifications crowd into their industries and look for employment to replace the jobs they lost to foreign competition. And lower prices at Wal-Mart aren’t sufficient compensation.
Yet, exactly how many workers have lost jobs to "foreign competition?" The competition Krugman emphasizes comes from imports of manufactured goods. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that manufacturing employment fell from roughly 17 million in 1997 to 14 million in 2006. That's a reduction of 3 million manufacturing jobs over ten years--300,000 per year on average--in a total labor force of 136 million people. To assert that this displacement imposed a substantial wage reduction on others seems a bold claim to make without providing any evidence to support it.
I look forward to seeing Krugman's research on this question develop. He has posted a few short pieces about the paper he is writing on his blog, here, here, and here. If you want to read what appears to be the state of the art on trade and income distribution, see Robert Lawrence's paper here.
Monday, November 12, 2007
Dollars per Second for High-Earning Americans
Labels: income inequality; globalizationAccording to Ken Rogoff, "The latest Forbes list of America’s wealthiest individuals showed that last year’s highest nine earners, whose ranks include New York City’s mayor, Michael Bloomberg, managed to increase their wealth by $5-9 billion last year. Yes, that is just the annual increase in their wealth. Collectively, their $55 billion in earnings outstripped the entire national income of more than 100 countries. To put these astronomical numbers in perspective, ... to be among the top nine earners in the United States, you had to pull in at least $150 per second , including time spent eating and sleeping. That is $9,000 per minute, or $540,000 per hour."
(hat tip to Greg Manikw)
Sunday, November 4, 2007
Globalization and Inequality
Labels: income inequality; globalizationThe World Economic Outlook (an IMF publication) dedicates a full chapter to exploring globalization's impact on income inequality. "Over the past two decades, income growth has been positive for all quintiles in virtually all regions and all income groups during the recent period of globalization. At the same time, however, income inequality has increased mainly in middle- and high-income countries, and less so in low-income countries."
The study highlights the distinct causal forces exerted by trade and foreign direct investment. Trade and trade liberalization reduce inequality; foreign direct investment increases inequality.
The bottom line, however, is that technological change rather than globalization per se is the main cause of rising income inequality.