Monday, June 13, 2011

Anonymous Goes After the Fed

. Monday, June 13, 2011
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As of tomorrow, June 14th (Flag Day?), the cyber hacktivist group Anonymous is beginning "Operation Empire State Rebellion". The goal: take down Bernanke, and who knows what else. The purpose: I'm not sure. Justice? Apparently Bernanke has given trillions of "taxpayer" dollars to bankers and other wealthy people, despite not actually possessing that ability. He also stands accused of not prosecuting bankers for the economic crisis, which he also does not have the ability to do. Bernanke has "devalued" the dollar, and just you nevermind for now that that is good for the unemployed and less good for the asset owners. (Indeed, progressives now call for more inflation and more devaluation of the dollar, while the wealthy call for less of both.) I don't know how replacing Bernanke, or destroying the banking system, is supposed to help the common man -- that's not why we call the 1930s depression "Great" -- but who cares? Let's smash some shit up.

Also making an appearance: our old friends the global banking cabal, which controls everything all the time. I was waiting for a more explicit reference to Jews, but (thankfully) it didn't quite sink to that level. And the Freemasons haven't shown up yet, either. But just you wait.

The conspiracies revolving around the Federal Reserve are not new of course. And there's certainly been a resurgence in recent years. There are elements both in the Tea Party movement (influenced by Ron Paul), and in the anti-corporatist/neo-anarchist sentiment that Anonymous is tapping into. A decent segment of the college-aged population has been exposed to Zeitgeist, which melded Christ-myth and 9/11 "trutherism" with old-fashioned bankers-run-everything to explain how the "one world government" will soon take over everything, and unfortunately many find it at least somewhat persuasive.

In belittling Anonymous and Zeitgeist I do not mean to say that monetary policy doesn't have important distributional implications, or that politics doesn't matter, or even that bankers don't have disproportional effect over politics. Regular readers will know that those are not my views. But unfortunately reality is not as simple as "the Fed gives away our tax dollars to international bankers". Policy has real tradeoffs, which should be debated and judged by an informed populace. But this type of conspiratorial propaganda obfuscates more than it enlightens.

So it will be interesting to see what Anonymous is able to do to disrupt the Fed. It has threatened the IMF, although the recently-disclosed attack appears to have come from another group, and clearly has geopolitical intentions. But let's hope, for the sake of the very people Anonymous purports to be defending, that they fail.

Friday, June 10, 2011

Eichengreen Podcast

. Friday, June 10, 2011
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Russ Roberts interviews Barry Eichengreen. Audio here, both streaming and MP3. I haven't listened to it yet, but I will soon.

The Irony of TGS

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Tyler Cowen writes a new preface for the pulp-and-glue TGS, and quotes this bit:

The original publication of The Great Stagnation was in eBook form only, and I meant for that to reflect an argument of the book itself: The contemporary world has plenty of innovations, but most of them do not benefit the average household. After all, the average household does not own an eReader. It’s not even clear whether the average household buys and reads books. So I viewed the exclusive electronic publication, somewhat impishly, as an act of self-reference to the underlying problem itself. It was therefore a bit amusing when some critics suggested that the new medium of the eBook itself refuted the book’s stagnation theory—quite the contrary.


I obviously can't judge what Cowen's intentions were, but how many strange arguments are in this paragraph? First, when has the publication of any book ever benefitted the average household in the macroeconomic sense he's talking about? Publishing has been about superstar economics since Gutenberg. But if we're talking about information access, it's inarguable that the average household is way better off than it was in 1890 or 1973. Which fact does not support Cowen's thesis.

Does Cowen remember hearing about an obscure book or music album when he was a boy, and not being able to get it because the local shop didn't carry it? I do, and I'm quite a bit younger than him so I'm sure he does as well. Maybe there was mail-order, but that would take weeks and involve getting a cashier's check or a money order and mailing it off, with hope that you weren't being gypped. That world doesn't exist anymore. That is a good thing. No it hasn't added many high marginal product jobs, but the previous scarcity didn't add many either.

Second, maybe the average/median person does not have an eBook reader, but that's their own fault. eBook readers are literally free, once the hardware is obtained. The average/median person in America has a computer, tablet, smart phone, and/or ready access to one of those devices*. The eBook software on all of those devices is free. If they aren't reading, it's not because of Stagnation. It's because of taste.

Third, why is all this amusing? Tyler Cowen would be practically anonymous were it not for the innovations he now says are mostly inconsequential. Through those innovations he has a famous blog, a NYTimes op-ed column, a notable economics textbook, a book deal with a mainstream press, etc.

I certainly don't begrudge him any of those things... I'm a big fan. I never would have heard of Cowen were it not for 21st century technology, but through new media I've gained access to Cowen in a way I never would have before. Cowen is one of the lower-case superstars in a superstarish economy. He's been able to market himself and his skills because of the very technological innovations that he argues aren't terribly important. Without them, he wouldn't have the forum to make his argument. So the publication history of TGS is just an extension of Cowen's career to this point.

So yes, it is ironic. He can't shrug it off that easily.

*Note I didn't say everyone had access to them, just the mean/median person, who is probably the same person for these purposes.

Krugman vs. Krugman

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Krugman today:

What lies behind this trans-Atlantic policy paralysis? I’m increasingly convinced that it’s a response to interest-group pressure. Consciously or not, policy makers are catering almost exclusively to the interests of rentiers — those who derive lots of income from assets, who lent large sums of money in the past, often unwisely, but are now being protected from loss at everyone else’s expense. ...

No, the only real beneficiaries of Pain Caucus policies (aside from the Chinese government) are the rentiers: bankers and wealthy individuals with lots of bonds in their portfolios.

And that explains why creditor interests bulk so large in policy; not only is this the class that makes big campaign contributions, it’s the class that has personal access to policy makers — many of whom go to work for these people when they exit government through the revolving door. The process of influence doesn’t have to involve raw corruption (although that happens, too). All it requires is the tendency to assume that what’s good for the people you hang out with, the people who seem so impressive in meetings — hey, they’re rich, they’re smart, and they have great tailors — must be good for the economy as a whole.


Krugman a few weeks ago (emphasis added):

The past three years have been a disaster for most Western economies. The United States has mass long-term unemployment for the first time since the 1930s. Meanwhile, Europe’s single currency is coming apart at the seams. How did it all go so wrong?

Well, what I’ve been hearing with growing frequency from members of the policy elite — self-appointed wise men, officials, and pundits in good standing — is the claim that it’s mostly the public’s fault. The idea is that we got into this mess because voters wanted something for nothing, and weak-minded politicians catered to the electorate’s foolishness. ...

The fact is that what we’re experiencing right now is a top-down disaster. The policies that got us into this mess weren’t responses to public demand. They were, with few exceptions, policies championed by small groups of influential people — in many cases, the same people now lecturing the rest of us on the need to get serious. And by trying to shift the blame to the general populace, elites are ducking some much-needed reflection on their own catastrophic mistakes.


Note that the italicized portion leaves interest groups out of it; that column was attacking elite ideology rather than interest groups. I like the more recent Krugman better, for reasons I've already described. What was missing from the older Krugman was just this sort of interest group political story. Leaving them out of the story in the way older Krugman did before is thus missing a huge element. Interest groups come in all shapes and sizes, but right now the policy space does appear to be fairly strongly skewed in favor of creditors rather than debtors. There is a way to link the two Krugmans -- interest groups influence the elite via lobbying and contributions -- but in that case elites are merely an intervening variable, rather than the primary causal variable. The more recent Krugman is honing in on the fundamental cause.

I think the more recent Krugman probably overstates the case a bit, but it's an op-ed not a long-form essay so that's understandable. Anyway, I'm happy influential folks are starting to think and write in these terms. It's not too often that this kind of overt political economy is on the NYTimes op-ed page.

Thursday, June 9, 2011

The Politics of Housing Is Salient

. Thursday, June 9, 2011
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Another anecdote:

An unprecedented alliance of organizations from the real estate industry, new home builders, mortgage companies, banks, civil rights groups and other lobbyists have descended on Washington, D.C. lawmakers to push against legislation that would require 20% down payments for a mortgage.

The Qualified Residential Mortgage “QRM” proposal would limit the number of home buyers qualified to make a purchase, require higher credit scores and send mortgage underwriting back more than 30 years. Members of Congress are struggling to reach a balance to provide new regulations for home mortgages, implement financial reform legislation and provide realistic reforms on home mortgages. ...

“The Qualified Residential Mortgage (QRM) will define who will and who will not get the most affordable mortgage products, potentially prohibiting a significant segment of qualified borrowers from being able to achieve homeownership,” said Mortgage Bankers CEO David H. Stevens. “Allowing more time for comment will enable us to prepare a more thoughtful and comprehensive analysis and response.” ...

Groups from both major political parties wrote to the six federal agencies last week implementing mortgage changes, which are the SEC, FDIC, HUD, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal housing Finance Agency and the Federal Reserve to urge them to focus of “sound underwriting, safe loans,” mortgage borrowers’ ability to repay loans and fully documented loans, and not to require larger down payments as they work on regulations to improve the mortgage finance system.


When major elements of both political parties line up with citizens' groups, finance, and a major industry (construction) on the same side of a policy, is it any wonder that policy gets pushed in that direction? This was what I was driving at in my previous posts on housing politics and the blame game.

Via Arnold Kling, who says that part of this is wrong: this is anything but "unprecedented"; it's been the same political dynamic for the past 20 years (some of which Kling observed directly, working at the Fed and Freddie Mac).

Wednesday, June 8, 2011

Follow-Up on TGS Graphs

. Wednesday, June 8, 2011
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Daniel Davies and Alex Tabarrok objected to the graphs of GDP I included in this post on The Great Stagnation. Specifically, they didn't like the fact that the hypothetical lines I drew reflect constant linear growth rather than constant percentage growth. I.e., I didn't compound the growth when i drew those lines. They're right that the latter is a better measure of trend (it's what is used in almost all statistical analyses), so here's a new graph that takes that into consideration.

This graph shows the actual GDP per capita growth (circles) for the US, OECD, and entire world. The lines that begin in 1974 reflect what GDP per capita would look like if it had continued to grow at the 1960-1973 rate*. Note that a "Great Stagnation" hypothesis would expect significantly weaker growth post-1973, not the same amount and certainly not more. So the fact that the US was above the trend line until the early 2000s provides fairly strong evidence that if we're in a Great Stagnation it's more recent than Cowen argues, and doesn't correlate with stagnating median incomes all that well. In fact, the US does better than either the OECD or the globe, if "better" is defined as "closest to 1960-1973 trend", although the OECD trend line is quite a bit steeper**.

Anyway, just wanted to make sure I didn't leave the impression that my main point (about distribution) relies on faulty extrapolation.

*Specifically, I regressed a year counter on the log of GDP per capita (constant dollars, via WDI) from 1960-1973. The coefficient estimate represents the average growth in GDP per capita per year during that period. I then took that coefficient estimate and added it to 1973's GDP per capita to get 1974's predicted point, added the same constant to the predicted 1974 to get the predicted 1975, and so on.

**Of course the US is a big part of both OECD and world economies; if you removed the US from those groups the US would likely look still better in comparison. Although in the OECD's case, they added some countries during the series (e.g. Mexico, Slovakia) with lower per capita GDP than more established industrialized countries.

The Next Trade Spat?

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This has been brewing:

"The trade war between China and Europe will not break out over manufacturing industry, customs duties, dumping or the yuan exchange rate, but on a front that no one expected: in the sky," writes La Stampa, in the wake of a threat voiced by the Beijing representative at the IATA (International Air Transport Association) Conference to simply close Chinese air space "if the EU, as it has already decided, introduces an emissions tax on all intercontinental flights leaving the EU on 1st January." The European Commission plans to grant a "license to pollute" similar to those already esablished for other industrial sectors to every airline operating in Europe, explains Le Monde: 82% of emissions rights will be free, but a 18% will have to be purchased on "carbon credits market."


My understanding is that so long as the EU rules are applied non-discriminatorily, such an emissions tax is WTO-legal.

Creditor-Debtor Politics

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There's been some good discussion of this report by Robert Kuttner, explaining the political battle between creditors and debtors. Kuttner starts off:

Economic history is filled with bouts of financial euphoria followed by painful mornings after. When nations awake saddled with debts incurred to finance wars, episodes of failed speculation, or grand projects that haven’t paid off, they have two choices. Either the creditor class prevails at the expense of everyone else, or governments find ways to reduce the debt burden so that the productive power of the economy can recover.

Creditors—the rentier class in classic usage—are usually the wealthy and the powerful. Debtors, almost by definition, have scant resources or power. The “money issue” of 19th century America, about whether credit would be cheap or dear, was also a battle between growth and austerity.


And concludes:

These issues are treated as either impossibly technical or as non-debatable. They are neither. We need to democratize the money issue once again.


I like this framing because it moves us past lax psychological explanations ("pain caucus"), willful ignorance ("economists have unlearned what Say and Mill knew"), and hard-money/anti-debtor moralizing. It gets us to what's really important, which is the political dynamic of creditor-debtor relations, and the fact that different groups have different preferences over policies which are motivated by their interests. In other words, we're talking about political economy, which I obviously think is a step in the right direction. As I argued in my anti-econ rant from a few weeks back, talking about optimal policy makes little sense when you start from the assumption that there is not optimal policy; that policy is about distribution.

And there's a lot of research in IPE and CPE linking governments controlled by left parties to higher inflation, indicating that interest-based explanations work pretty well*. See, eg, this classic 1977 study by Hibbs, and this article by Franzese on how central bank independence is a myth. There's a lot of stuff since then too (see cites on the first page of this article on trade by Milner and Judkins).

Here's Krugman:

I don’t mean to suggest that it’s all cynical; my experience is that there are relatively few people who consciously keep a secret set of intellectual books, who preach Neanderthal goldbuggism because it’s in their interests while rereading Keynes by dead of night to figure out what’s really happening. Instead, people generally manage to believe whatever is in their interests. ...

Still, thinking of what’s happening as the rule of rentiers, who are getting their interests served at the expense of the real economy, helps make sense of the situation.


In a follow-up, he took a rough cut at figuring out who belongs in which group. Yglesias notes that older people, who are out of the labor market, have fewer debts, and have more financial assets that could lose value via inflation, are another interested group. And, of course, older Americans tend to vote more often than younger votes.

Steve Randy Waldman picked up on the financial political economy angle:

Banks, after all, are not only creditors. They are also the economy’s biggest debtors. In theory, bank loyalties ought to be mixed. On the one hand, banks prefer deflationary, zero-forgiveness tight-money policies, to maximize the real value of their assets and of the lending spread from which they draw profits and bonuses. On the other hand, troubled banks are very happy to support loose money and expansionary policy, even at risk of inflation. For bank managers and shareholders, it is bad to have the value of past loans eroded by inflation. But it is much worse to lose their franchises entirely, to have their wealth, prestige, and freedom put at risk in the aftermath of an explicit bank failure. When banks are in trouble, they are perfectly happy to support all manner of expansionary policy, as long as short-term interest rates are kept low. Even a broad-based inflation helps troubled banks twice over, by increasing borrowers incomes and by steepening the yield curve. Increased incomes ensure that loans will be repaid in nominal terms, preventing insolvency due to credit losses. A steep yield curve permits banks to recapitalize themselves via maturity transformation, using deposits to purchase Treasury notes while the central bank promises to hold short rates low for a few years.

But banks’ interests are aligned with those of debtors only to the degree that banks, like debtors, are at risk of real insolvency. When we committed to a policy of “no more Lehmans”, when we made clear via TARP and TGLP and the Fed’s alphabet soup that big banks would have funding on demand and on easy terms, when we modified accounting standards to eliminate the risk that bad loans on the books would translate to failures, when we funded their recapitalization on the sly, we changed banks. We transformed them from nervous debtors into pure rentiers, who see a lot more upside in squeezing borrowers than in eliminating a crippling debt overhang. And since banks are, shall we say, not entirely disenfranchised among policymakers, we increased the difficulty of making policy that includes accommodations between creditors and debtors, accommodations that permit the economy to move forward rather than stare back over its shoulder, nervously and greedily, at a gigantic pile of old debt.


This dynamic is part of what drives the results I found in this paper, discussed here and here, except I added in politics of central banking and regulation as well. One implication is that regulatory central banks essentially have no choice but to provide easy money to banks during downturns. Banks know they'll have access to these funds when needed, so they act more riskily during booms. It's monetary moral hazard**. In other words, I believe this same rentier/debtor politics can make financial crises more likely.

There is another element to this. Increased inflation in the US will narrow the real exchange rate adjustment that is boosting American competitiveness relative to exporting countries like China. To the extent that we want to boost employment through exporting, increased inflation could prolong that process. And if the problem is not just immediate unemployment, but medium-run global rebalancing, then it might not be as simple as "poor want inflation, rich want deflation".

This political cleavage is what the current austerity/stimulus battles are about, in both Europe and the US. I previously surveyed some of the IPE literature on this question, discussing its findings in relation to the eurozone, here.

*Sometimes these are phrased in terms of resolving the Phillips curve tradeoff in one direction or the other. More recent econ work has questioned the validity of the Phillips curve, but that doesn't necessarily imply that the perceived politics changes. This isn't my area of substantive expertise, and I understand that there's a bit of controversy in the comparative literature, but I believe the implications for monetary politics hold up pretty well.

**Note that we haven't seen the ECB behave this way, at least not on the level of the Fed, which is why the political battles in Europe are over fiscal transfers.

Re: That EMU Stealth Bailout

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See Daniel Davies' comments on my original post, plus this from Whelan at IIEA and this from Storbeck. Via Felix Salmon, who also had this to say.

The upshot is that this appears not to be the stealth bailout that I thought it was, although I have to admit that at this point I'm confused on a few points and will need a bit of time to sort through it all. Also, even if this isn't a stealth bailout I think that's probably a shame. The monetary authorities can do much more to help the Europeriphery, while the fiscal authorities are out of political bullets. So I'd rather have some clandestine bailouts than not.

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

The World's Central Banker

. Tuesday, June 7, 2011
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I've written about this in terms of lender of last resort, but Edward Hugh says the Fed's importance goes well beyond that:

If the global economy has been growing reasonably well over the last six months it is because what Nouriel Roubini once called a “wall of liquidity” is seeping out of the United States, where solvent domestic demand for credit is flat and will remain flat due to the private indebtedness problem (remember US “over consumption” (the high proportion of GDP which has been consumption driven) has only been the mirror image of Chinese “over investment” and we that live in a world which badly needs to rebalance).

This “wall of liquidity” has been force feeding strong growth in a number of key emerging markets, and this growth has been generating strong demand for exports from a number of developed economies, and most particularly from Germany. Thus the German boom is no mystery, and has been intimately tied to the implementation of QE2 in the US. Note, in the chart below, how the German manufacturing PMI was slowing in the summer of 2010, how it surged in the autumn (QE2) and how it is now swooning again. There is no mystery to these “soft spots”, all you need to ask yourself is where the demand is coming from. ...

Maybe it seems peculiar to be arguing that policy in the Federal Reserve should be partially conditioned by policy failures in countries like Italy, Spain and Greece, but such is the nature of the inter-connected world we live in.


This is Kindleberger's Decession Politics.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina
 

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