Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Basel Is Political

. Tuesday, June 21, 2011
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Wonky technical point with large ramifications:

This year has seen some improvement. Data submitted by banks in May were subject to “peer review” by a committee of experts from the European Banking Authority (EBA), a pan-European college of regulators, which is administering the tests. The committee concluded that some banks had been over-optimistic in their self-assessment. In some cases different banks had estimated very different probabilities of default and losses on similar underlying assets. Results were meant to be out this month, but all banks have now been asked to do their sums again and resubmit by the end of July.

National regulators have not taken kindly to this. Germany’s regulator, BaFin, has been involved in a public war of words with the EBA over its definition of capital. The EBA has adopted the Basel III standard for Tier 1 capital. That excludes “silent capital”, bond-like instruments which Germany used to recapitalise its banks. Germany has pointed out that banks have several years to be Basel-III compliant. But so far the EBA has resisted German demands to recognise silent capital.


Why is this provision in Basel? Because US and UK banks don't use silent capital to pad their ratios, so if US/UK regulators were going to up the statutory capital requirements for their banks, they wanted to make sure those banks weren't competing against firms (esp in Germany and Japan) that were gaming the system, and gaining a competitive advantage from it. Basel III looks the way it does for a reason, and that reason isn't simply technocratic.

Political Science Invented the Interwebs

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It's a series of tubes, right? Anyway, Errol Morris writes about how his brother helped set up the first e-mail system in the MIT political science department:

In 1965, at the beginning of the year, there was a bunch of stuff going on with the time-sharing system that Noel and I were users of. We were working for the political science department. And the system programmers wrote a programming staff note memo that proposed the creation of a mail command. But people proposed things in programming staff notes that never got implemented. And well, we thought the idea of electronic mail was a great idea. We said, "Where's electronic mail? That would be so cool." And they said, "Oh, there's no time to write that. It's not important." And we said, "Well, can we write it?" And we did. And then it became part of the system.


From political science to you, world. Kind of. Okay not really.

(How crazy is it that e-mail was originally deemed "not important".)

Via.

Monday, June 20, 2011

PSA

. Monday, June 20, 2011
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Blogging is likely to be light, as I'm in an undisclosed location Sundance country for the week. I'm hoping to have some things to say about this post from Quiggin, as I've been thinking along similar lines lately (i.e. what value Marx actually adds to the contemporary left). There's some other stuff I'm hoping to get to also, but I have some time constraints so please bear with me.

Trade, Exchange Rates, and Public Opinion

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Drezner wants to know what's up with Republicans not supporting free trade these days:

What's more disturbing, however, and uncommented until now, was the total lack of support for freer trade among the GOP field.

This came through loud and clear through what was said and what was not said in New Hampshire. Trade didn't come up all that much during the debate. Tim Pawlenty provided the only comment of substance, and it wasn't a productive one...

The other thing that was striking was what wasn't said during the debate. All of the candidates focused like sharks with frikkin' laser beams attached to them on the economy. The standard GOP litany of solutions for jump-starting the economy were offered: tax cuts, cutting regulation, tax cuts, cutting government spending, tax cuts, reigning in the Fed, tax cuts, ending Obamacare, tax cuts. Not one of the candidates, however, mentioned trade liberalization as part of their fornmula for getting America moving again.


This is more off-the-cuff observation than analysis, and I'm not sure how far it reaches (as Scott Lincicome points out in Drezner's comments), but let's take it as given and think about why might this be the case. Another of his commenters presents a typical explanation:

The obvious thing is that when most of the American people have been economically hammered for decades, they're not in an economically liberal mood. They've seen repeated free trade agreements lead directly to lower wages and layoffs, despite what the various propagandists have said.


Call this the "business cycle theory of trade attitudes": When economic times are good, public support for further liberalization is high. But during downturns, everyone wants protection. It's a fairly standard argument, and Drezner's co-blogger at FP makes it every day.

Thing is, there are good reasons to doubt it. Dr. Oatley recently published an article arguing that real exchange rate movements better predict calls for trade protectionism than the business cycle. His central finding?

The empirical analysis therefore provides robust support for the real exchange rate hypothesis. The number of antidumping petitions rises as currencies strengthen and falls as currencies weaken. This relationship holds even once we control for other likely causes of industry demand for protection such as import growth and changes in macroeconomic conditions. ...

Thus, real exchange rate movements provide at least as strong an explanation for temporal variation in protectionism than the most popular alternative business cycle hypothesis.


Douglas Irwin has a recent article on the link between exchange rates and trade policy in historical perspective. So what's happened to real exchange rates in the US?



Looking at this in light of Oatley's paper, it's not all that surprising that Bush wasn't able to do much on trade during the 2000s. He entered office during a period immediately following a huge exchange rate appreciation that peaked with the early-naughties recession. Second, though the exchange rate depreciated during the decade, that process slowed and mildly reversed in 2008-2009. Recall, as Drezner does, the anti-trade competition that Hillary Clinton and Obama engaged in during the 2008 primary. We're still living through that, so it shouldn't be too surprising that momentum for new trade agreements has stalled in both parties.

In other words, Drezner, Lincicome, and Oatley could all be right: elite Republican opinion on trade might not have changed all that much (Lincicome), but they are choosing to remain eerily quiet on the issue (Drezner) as real exchange rates have yet to depreciate enough to restore American competitiveness (Oatley). The optimistic take for the globalist is that real exchange rate movements are occurring, and if recent trends continue we should expect greater enthusiasm for more liberalized trade in the coming years.

Sunday, June 19, 2011

Schelling and the Euro

. Sunday, June 19, 2011
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Ryan Avent:

It's really a mess. But one thing should be clear: it's in the interest of all the negotiating parties to be as apocalyptic in their warnings as possible. If the Greeks don't draw a hard line, they get a raw deal, and the same goes for the European Union, and the constituent governments, and the ECB, and the IMF. Ultimately, everyone expects that the negotiators will back down and an agreement will be reached, but in the mean time it's worth it to negotiate like a madman. The big downsides to this are, first, that it gives everyone reading newspapers a fright. And second, when so many parties are playing this brinkmanship game, there's always a risk that something goes awry and a deal isn't reached. Frankly, Europe isn't giving markets a lot of reason to be confident that the process of handling Greek insolvency is actually, underneath all the posturing, under control.


The logic of brinksmanship was put famously (and well) by Thomas Schelling. He described nuclear deterrence as two countries, chained together, dancing closer and closer to the edge a cliff, over which they'd both tumble if one of them slipped. And I've written similar things along those lines over the past year or so. At this point, however, I wonder how well the metaphor fits. The Greek political economy does not remotely resemble a unitary actor, at this point. Tens of thousands rioting in the streets, government turnover and possible recall, etc. It looks like Greece is racing full-steam towards the edge, attached to the rest of the EMU by a fairly thin cord, while Germany and France stand well back from the edge, holding scissors and debating whether and when to cut loose.

It's unclear whether this puts "Greece" at any bargaining advantage, because it's unclear what "Greece" represents and therefore what it desires. More accurately, there is an internal battle in Greece over the value of Euro membership. Germany and France can alter the terms of that membership on the margins, mostly by buying time, but they can't change the game. Even if some elites wanted to, Germany and France are limited by their domestic polities as well.

We need a new metaphor.

Saturday, June 18, 2011

Who Doesn't Love a Grand Theory Debate?

. Saturday, June 18, 2011
2 comments

Well, me. Nevertheless, Nexon on Caverley, Caverley responds.

No deep thoughts from me, as I haven't read the article under discussion, but it seems that Caverley is arguing that neocons support democratization at least in part because it would weaken their (our?) enemies. Nexon argues that no neocons actually say that, nor do they have good reason to think it given their reliance on both neoclassical realism and some forms of (non-Wilsonian) liberalism, neither of which make that case. From where I sit that sounds right enough, and yet... even if neocons don't make that case, perhaps they should.

Academic IR writes all the time about how democracy can enfeeble states. And also about how it can strengthen them. Democracies supposedly constrain leaders by both making it difficult for them to go to war, but then make them try like hell to win once they get in one. Democracies are supposedly better are imposing audience costs, but that's a double-edged sword. Etc.

If we buy any of this*, then a statement like "democratization will strengthen states in some ways and weaken them in others" that is followed by a statement like "from the perspective of the United States vis-a-vis new democracies, the latter will usually out-weigh the former" is not implausible on its face**. Was Japan strengthened by post-WWII democratization, along with the economic integration that followed from it? I think so. Was Japan strengthened in its bilateral relationship with the U.S. by that process? Arguably no. It became completely dependent on the U.S. for its security, and to a large degree its economic prosperity. Relative to China, Japan got stronger. Relative to the U.S., perhaps not.

To think about it in another way: the neocon goal of a "league of democracies" would certainly have the U.S. as the most central node. Network externalities being what they are, the effect would be to reinforce American power. (Somewhat perversely, this isn't too far from Ikenberry's view.) It can then make an offer to other states: democratize and you'll get the benefits of being in the network, but only as a peripheral node. Such an arrangement could simultaneously increase America's relative power while improving material conditions for the new democracy. Thomas Friedman (does he count as a neocon?) would call it the "Golden Security Straitjacket". Speaking of the devil, Friedman has written a bunch about the benefits of authoritarianism.

So perhaps Nexon is right that neocons don't believe in "democratic enfeeblement". But maybe they should. It could follow from their other beliefs.

*I'm not necessarily saying we should. I hope Phil Arena chimes in.

**To be clear, Nexon doesn't argue that it is; only that Caverley's paper doesn't establish the claim that neocons actually believe this, despite using strange readings of cherry-picked texts.

Over-Regulation Isn't Surprising

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Yves Smith:

Something very peculiar is afoot. Well after the bank regulatory reform debate was supposedly settled, central bankers seem to be reopening that discussion. It’s puzzling because the very reason the banks won so decisively was that central bankers were not prepared to get all that tough with their charges.

I’m not clear what has led central bankers to get a bit of religion. Is it the spectacle of the Bank of England talking about breaking up the banks (they won’t get their way thanks to bank lobbyist working over the Independent Banking Commission, but no one doubted their sincerity)? Or the Swiss National Bank imposing 19% capital requirements, which as we discussed, is likely to lead to the investment banking are of UBS being domiciled elsewhere (assuming a country capable of bailing it out will have it)? Or perhaps it is central bankers being forced to recognize that their Plan A of extend and pretend and super low interest rates simply won’t lead banks getting to meaningfully higher capital levels when the staff continues to take egregious amounts out in compensation? Or have they realized how bad bank balance sheets are in the Eurozone and how tight the linkages still are among the major capital markets players, and they belatedly realize they need them to be much more shock resistant?

The bottom line is that various central bankers have taken the surprising step of insisting their banks meet more stringent requirements for the biggest banks than those originally planned to be to be included in Basel III.


Basically, the point is that some countries' regulators are considering implementing stricter regulations than those agreed in the multilateral Basel accords. How "peculiar" is this? Not very. The above heat map* shows capital-to-asset requirements for about 140 countries in 2006. The data come from this World Bank survey, which was the third of its kind. The darker the color, the higher the minimum ratio required by governments. (White countries are missing data, which means non-respondents to the survey.) At the time, the Basel requirements were 8% capital, of which 4% needed to be equity capital, represented by the beige color of the United States. The interesting thing about this is the number of countries that had tighter restrictions than those minima. It's nearly half of the sample**.

This might surprise some, who believe that absent a tough international standard national governments will "race to the bottom" in order to give their firms a competitive edge. But that doesn't tend to happen. Nor does it happen much in the private sector. Banks routinely over-comply with capital requirements, as doing so signals to investors that they are safe firms, which in turn lowers their borrowing costs. Pre-crisis almost all of the major banks had capital ratios that were not only well above the Basel II requirements, but also above the proposed Basel III requirements as well***. Rather than push up against the regulatory capital minimum, banks tried to signal credibility by maintaining capital ratios that were often twice as large as legally required. In some cases, banks lobbied their governments for stricter regulations, especially if those could also be applied to their foreign competitors or otherwise shield them from competition. Note that the countries with darker colors above, i.e. those with stricter regulations, are most often middle income countries most in need of signaling credibility.

Obviously this over-compliance didn't do much good in 2008, but that doesn't mean it wasn't happening.

I presented some preliminary research on this at this year's International Studies Association meeting. It's not yet in suitable shape for me to post the paper, or to report any firm conclusions, but one thing I think is fairly clear: popular commentators, and most academics, have been thinking about the relationship between firms' and governments' preferences over regulatory policies in some pretty wrong ways. It isn't just a race to the bottom. There's more going on.

*Created using the wonderful, free Open Heat Map web program. Click for larger image.

**43%, if I remember correctly. And that doesn't include other "pseudo-regulations", like the US' requirement of 10% capital to be considered "well-capitalized" by the FDIC, that operated as de facto requirements.

***At least in terms of capital; leverage and liquidity is another thing entirely.

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

Who Gets Optimized?

. Wednesday, June 15, 2011
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Ryan Avent reports on some research from the SanFran Fed that includes the above figure:

[I]t's clear what was going on; the ECB stood idly by while the periphery overheated because it was making policy with an eye toward the core nations. Now that the peripheral booms over which the ECB presided have collapsed, the central bank is...continuing to pursue a policy that's most appropriate for the core economies.

Now perhaps the ECB thinks it isn't responsible for managing divergent economic cycles within the euro zone. Indeed, the ECB may well be trying to force core nations to take on this responsibility and move toward closer fiscal union. If the ECB is unsuccessful in winning such progress from core governments, however, we shouldn't be surprised if peripheral economies find euro-zone policy intolerable and—eventually—drop out of the system entirely.


For those in the dark, the Taylor Rule is one simple device for determining what monetary policy should be. Krugman makes the appropriate caveat:

So here’s the thing: if you use the output gap Taylor rule that, for the US, corresponds to the unemployment version of the rule used in the SF Fed letter, it surely implies a negative interest rate. In short, the ECB has no business raising rates.

What is true, however, is that the rule might still point to a rate rise for Germany.

So the point is that while the ECB could suffer from a one-size-fits-all problem, the fact is that it isn’t even doing that; it’s tightening when only Germany even arguably needs it.


The deal underlying the foundation of the Euro was that peripheral countries would get a reduction in currency risk and therefore lowered borrowing costs. They would also get access to Europe's biggest markets at a fixed exchange rate. In exchange, they would lose monetary policy autonomy. That worked as long as their economies were growing, but obviously creates problems when the economy contracts. This is classic trilemma politics: fixed exchange rates are fine while there's growth, but monetary policy autonomy becomes more pressing during contractions. It's a lot like the Asian crises in the late 1990s.

Meanwhile, I see that Trichet is defending the eurozone by saying that the US is not an optimal currency area either. This gets said a lot, certainly more often than any definition of which currency area is "optimal" or even what that means, and there is certainly some truth to it. But my definition of what size zone is "optimal" would be something like: "As large as is politically feasible, as long as there is a fiscal adjustment mechanism included". In other words, I don't think size of area is the real problem. It's about the political organization of the area, and what other institutions come along with the currency.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

The BIS Misses Monetary Moral Hazard

. Tuesday, June 14, 2011
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That's the "Bank for International Settlements", the group comprised of central bankers from the leading world economies. Here's what they're saying:

However on one key issue the Bank of England’s FPC [Financial Policy Committee] appears to fall short. The potential trade-offs between monetary policy and financial stability are not addressed. In an opinion piece today, the former Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee [MPC] member Sushi Wadwhani has highlighted the dilemma.

For example, suppose we have an emerging house price bubble and the FPC increases capital requirements which, through widening lending margins, slow the economy, and this leads the MPC to expect inflation to undershoot the target over the next two years. Under the proposed structure, it is envisaged that the MPC would lower interest rates in order to keep inflation at target. If so, would this not largely offset the actions of the FPC and keep the house price boom going?


The BIS report concedes that the short-term interests of monetary policy and financial stability policy may occasionally diverge. Mr Wadwhani argues this means a single committee should be responsible for both monetary policy and financial stability. While BIS accepts that would facilitate coordination and force policy makers to confront the trade-offs at stake, it concludes that responsibility for the two policies can be separated, as long as it is clear which takes priority.


What does this mean? In England, the the Monetary Policy Committee is tasked with conducting a monetary policy that will keep the economy on a path of steady growth with low and stable inflation. The Financial Policy Committee is tasked with maintaining financial stability. But there is an important tradeoff between monetary policy goals, which are counter-cyclical, and financial regulatory goals, which are pro-cyclical. Having two separate institutions pursuing opposite goals can be self-defeating, which is why Sushi Wadwhani suggests having a single institution responsible for both. And the BIS seems to agree:

The logic for central bank involvement is well established. The financial crisis showed that central banks are ultimately lenders of last resort to the financial system, and so should pay proper attention to its overall health. Moreover central banks’ primary policy mandate, monetary policy, has a strong influence on financial stability; think quantitative easing today, or the consistently low interest rates in America that encouraged a bubble in real estate prices in the 2000s.

The BIS wants all central banks to be given legal responsibility for financial stability, arguing that macroprudential regulation requires the same autonomy as monetary policy. ...

For now though, the direction of travel is clearly towards legally defined responsibilities for financial stability and the centralisation of power within central banks. Unusually that points towards emerging market structures, rather than American or European ones.


So the BIS wants a single institution -- the central bank -- to be responsible for both monetary policy and financial stability. It acknowledges the tradeoff between the two, but does not specify how that tradeoff is likely to be resolved. Note the bolded portions above. But what are appropriate ways to resolve the tradeoff? How do we make it "clear which [goal] takes priority"? Which goal should take priority?

I've argued in my research (currently under review and previously discussed here), building off of prior work by Copelovitch and Singer, that the tradeoff is resolved by central banks that also regulate in a way that the BIS might find perverse: by privileging banks' interest. Copelovitch and Singer find that regulatory central banks allow higher inflation -- i.e. more access for banks to cheap funds, which then fuels economic expansions -- than nonregulatory central banks. I extend that by arguing that banks respond to this policy dynamic by acting more riskily when regulated by central banks, because they believe that they'll have access to those funds in times of need. I call this "monetary moral hazard", distinct from the fiscal bailout moral hazard involved with TBTF firms, and support for such a relationship shows up in the data.

In other words, the BIS (and Bank of England) are correct that there is an important tradeoff between macroeconomic management and financial stability. But resolving that tradeoff by locating regulatory authority in central banks resolves the tradeoff in a way that may not promote financial stability, instead creating monetary moral hazard. One possible way to get around this dynamic (that I do not explore in the paper) is via much stricter statutory regulations by removing discretion from regulators, which is more or less the opposite of what the BIS is proposing. Many in England and elsewhere have called for stricter laws along these lines, and while the international Basel III agreement has taken a step in that direction, it's not a very large one.

Monday, June 13, 2011

The IMF Is Political, Not Technocratic

. Monday, June 13, 2011
0 comments

AFoE:

To spell it out, Egypt and Belarus are both looking for around US$3 billion. Egypt gets it with an explicit deferment of structural reforms as long as there is an “action plan.” Belarus will have to do reforms before there’s a loan. Does anyone else see a political version of moral hazard here?


For more on this dynamic, see this excellent book by Grigore Pop-Eleches. The "Arab Spring" may end up as an out-of-sample test of his central hypotheses. For the US's role in conditioning the IMF's behavior, see this by Thacker, this by Oatley/Yackee, and much of James Vreeland's career.

I don't have too much worry of a moral hazard here, since it didn't very well serve Mubarak's interests to hang on for the best possible IMF deal.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina
 

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