Showing posts with label Currencies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Currencies. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Is There An Asian RMB Bloc?

. Wednesday, November 28, 2012
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Michael Pettis says "no". But that doesn't mean the RMB doesn't matter. It does. Just not so much for the US or EU or the broader currency reserve and exchange system. It matters more for China's competitors in global export markets.

Read the whole thing. I'm looking forward to Pettis' forthcoming book as much as any scheduled for next year.

Monday, May 28, 2012

More on Cowen on Europe

. Monday, May 28, 2012
1 comments

In his op-ed, Tyler Cowen raises a concern about a euro-collapse that I haven't much seen previously:

We thus face the danger that the euro, the world’s No. 2 reserve currency, could implode. Such an event wouldn’t be just another depreciation or collapse of a currency peg; instead, it would mean that one of the world’s major economic units doesn’t work as currently constituted.
There are a lot of claims -- some implicit -- in here. I'll take them in turn.

1. Does an exit of several peripheral countries from the eurozone constitue an implosion of a reserve currency? I don't think so. The status of the euro as a reserve currency does not depend on Greece's membership, it depends on Germany's management of it. If the alternatives are to jettison Greece -- or even several of the GIPSIs -- or to devalue the currency to keep them in, the euro's status as a reserve currency might actually be improved by a smaller membership of weak countries.

2. How important is the euro as a reserve currency? Roughly as important as the German mark was pre-euro, perhaps in combination with the the franc. The euro has not advanced much above the mark+franc status as a global reserve currency, if any at all, since its introduction in 1999. So the global economy as a whole does not appear to be very dependent on the euro; it is dependent on the US and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Britain, and Japan.

3. Would a euro-exit be more severe than a collapse of a currency peg? It conceivably could, but again: what matters most is Germany, and markets' belief in Germany's credibility to maintain a valuable currency. Germany's economy is not on the verge of collapse, nor does it depend on Greece, and German policymakers have repeatedly chosen to maintain policy credibility over possibly saving peripheral members. How much do markets care about Greece? I'll return to that below.

4. Would a euro-exit signal that one of the world's major economic units doesn't work? No. Greece is not one of the world's major economic units. A euro-exit would signal that one of the world's major political units doesn't work, but I'm not sure that this is new information nor am I sure that markets care all that much. The the extent that markets prefer stability over instability any resolution may be preferable to continued uncertainty.

Let's look at some data. Has the euro has significantly weakened as the crisis has grown more severe?



A bit. But if we zoom out and look at a longer time series we see that the euro is now trading at historical levels:



If Greece leaves will the value of the euro hold? Considering that Greece is by far its weakest link I would think so. Indeed, the fewer non-German members in the euro the more credibility it has! Germany does not need to devalue.

Anyway, just how important is the euro? At the end of last year global dollar holdings were nearly 250% higher than euro holdings. Or consider the exchange market. The introduction of the euro did nothing to reduce the world's reliance on the dollar, as I discuss (and graph) here. The euro is used in roughly the same percentage of the world's Forex as was the mark + franc. The global economy survived the end of those currencies.

There is only one truly important global currency -- the dollar.

Perhaps most distressingly, Cowen seemingly misunderstands the arguments of Kindleberger that he references in the paragraph immediately following the quoted one above:
We are realizing just how much international economic order depends on the role of a dominant country — sometimes known as a hegemon — that sets clear rules and accepts some responsibility for the consequences. For historical reasons, Germany isn’t up to playing the role formerly held by Britain and, to some extent, still held today by the United States. (But when it comes to the euro zone, the United States is on the sidelines.)
I said a bit about that in my post yesterday, and I'll say more about it in another post (this is plenty long already), but if the hegemon is most important than we should really only be concerned about the US (the global hegemon) and Germany (the regional hegemon), not Europe's southern periphery. And the role of the hegemon is to stabilize the system, not necessarily to guarantee good outcomes for every constituent within it.

Think about it this way: if Germany left the euro and re-issued the mark, do you think it would be stronger or weaker than the Germany-less euro? Do you think the new mark would be used more as a reserve currency than the euro or less?

So why should we think that a Greek exit would be much worse than "another depreciation or collapse of a currency peg"?

Friday, May 25, 2012

When Did the Dollar Become the World's Reserve Currency?

. Friday, May 25, 2012
0 comments

New research from Livia Chitu, Barry Eichengreen, Arnaud J. Mehl. The abstract:

This paper offers new evidence on the emergence of the dollar as the leading international currency, focusing on its role as currency of denomination in global bond markets. We show that the dollar overtook sterling much earlier than commonly supposed, as early as in 1929. Financial market development appears to have been the main factor helping the dollar to surmount sterling’s head start. The finding that a shift from a unipolar to a multipolar international monetary and financial system has happened before suggests that it can happen again. That the shift occurred earlier than commonly believed suggests that the advantages of incumbency are not all they are cracked up to be. And that financial deepening was a key determinant of the dollar’s emergence points to the challenges facing currencies aspiring to international status.
I haven't read it yet, but I'm predisposed to disagree with the conclusion.

Friday, November 18, 2011

Review: Exorbitant Privilege

. Friday, November 18, 2011
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I read Barry Eichengreen's Exorbitant Privilege last night, whose subject is found in the subtitle "the Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System". From this, one might expect the bulk of the book to be a current discussion of the imminent fall of the dollar as the world's reserve currency, as well as predictions regarding what sort of system will replace it. This expectation is not well met.

As always, Eichengreen does best when he sticks to a narrative of economic history. There are two predominant strands here: chapters two and three, tracing the origins of the US as an international currency, from before the Revolutionary War until the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the 1970s; and chapter four, which recounts the series of economic and monetary integration regimes in Europe that culminated in the introduction of the European monetary union in 1999. Those two histories make up roughly the first two-thirds of this short book, the rest of which is dedicated to a discussion of the subprime crisis and other contemporary events.

The problem with the book is that there is no conceptual frame shaping Eichengreen's discussion. From the subtitle and many of the chapter titles (the euro's "Rivalry" with the dollar; the greenback's "Monopoly No More"; the specter of a "Dollar Crash") you might expect Eichengreen to be pessimistic about the future role of the dollar in the international monetary system. In the introduction Eichengreen sets the book up in this way, arguing on page 6 that "The conventional wisdom about the historical processes resulting in the current state of affairs – that incumbency is an overwhelming advantage in the competition for reserve currency status – is wrong". But the core of the book actually makes the opposite case: the role of the dollar as the pre-eminent global currency is likely to remain for the foreseeable future, both because of the attributes of the US as the world's largest economy, and because of the deficiencies of the only conceivable challengers.

Concerning the latter, Eichengreen spends the majority of the time on the EU. He also discusses Japan (no desire for the yen to be a reserve currency), China (no capability for the yuan to be without major reforms which would likely be destabilizing), other currencies like the Brazilian real and Indian rupee (not big enough, or global enough, economies or financial systems), and the IMF "special drawing rights" (SDRs, which among other criticisms are only used as accounting devices, and are not accepted by any private actors as a medium of exchange), but dismisses them in short order. He dedicates a long chapter to European postwar monetary history, some of which may be interesting to those approaching this subject for the first time, but all of which has been dealt with in more detail, and with more theoretical and empirical care, elsewhere.

Without making too much of a case, Eichengreen seems to suggest that the subprime crisis may be a catalyst for a shift in the global monetary architecture. His discussion of the crisis is not strong, either as a standalone discussion or as a means of linking it to the potential for a change in the global reserve currency. For example, near the beginning of this chapter he claims "At the root of the crisis lay financial irregularities unchecked by adequate regulation" (p. 98). At this point most observers acknowledge that this was the manifestation of the crisis, perhaps even the proximate cause, but not the root cause. Eichengreen seems to understand this a bit later on, when he discussions macroeconomic imbalances in the global system, the global savings glut, the US domestic political economy that led to low national savings and persistent budget deficits, loose Fed policy and the "Greenspan put", etc. All of these are deeper causes than the inability of banks or regulators to judge the extent of risk embedded in asset-backed securities, which, in this context, appear to be more leaf than root.

The end of Eichengreen's discussion of the crisis leads him to marvel that the strength of the dollar was reinforced as a result of the crisis, not weakened. This may also surprise a reader not already aware of this phenomenon, since all of the book until that point has set the stage for a rapid move away from the dollar following a crisis, similar in speed and precedent to the rise of the dollar in the immediate aftermath of World War I. The rest of the book is dedicated to a discussion of why that is unlikely to happen.

As a part of that explication Eichengreen reverses what he wrote earlier about the incumbency advantage. In the first chapter he wrote that arguing that the status quo is durable precisely because it is the status quo is "wrong". But later, on pages 124-126, he argues that the "advantage of incumbency" is "not to be dismissed". Then he hedges again, writing of China on p. 146:

That said, Chinese policymakers are serious about transforming Shanghai into an international financial center by 2020. Doing so will require deeper and more liquid markets. It will require liberalizing the access of foreign investors to those markets, which in turn imply other changes in the country's tried-and-true growth model. Liberalizing the access of foreign investors to China's financial markets will in turn require a more flexible exchange rate to accommodate a larger volume of capital inflows and outflows. While these are not changes that can occur overnight, it is worth recalling how the United States moved in less than 10 ears from a position where the dollar played no international role to one where it was the leading international currency. There is precedent, in other words, for the schedule that the Chinese authorities aspire to meet.
This should lead us to a comparison of the the world in the 2010s to that of the 1910s, and the relative positions of the US and China within those worlds. In the earlier period the largest economy (the US) was not the issuer of the global reserve currency as it is now. Despite that, it took at least one World War, and the subsequent collapse of the global economy during the interwar period, for the dollar to supplant the pound sterling. To reach undisputed dollar pre-eminence took another World War. The rapid shift in the dollar was therefore a consequence of the rapid shifts in the organization of global security and economic apparatus. As bad as the subprime crisis has been, it has not been anywhere near that scale.

Perhaps because Eichengreen does not have a clear conceptual framework with which to make sense of his history, his views about the future are wishy-washy: the "fall of the dollar" mentioned in the subtitle is not inevitable, nor even likely; then again, the rise of the dollar was rapid, and China's economic rise is rapid, so who knows?

A better approach, I think, would be to try to understand monetary dynamics in a network context. Eichengreen considers this briefly, in footnote 50 on page 151, only to dismiss it just as briefly. This is a shame. If he better understood network dynamics he might not write things like this, from page 8:
There may have been only one country with sufficiently deep financial markets in the second half of the twentieth century, but not because this exclusivity is an intrinsic feature of the global financial system.
But what if it is? What if the distribution of financial liquidity is power-law distributed? What if this introduces scale-free dynamics into the global financial network? This would imply that there is only room for one reserve currency at a time, and that currency is likely to remain in place until there is such a large shock that the network itself is destroyed, at which point a new network is constructed with a new currency at the center of it.

Such a shock occurred from 1914-1945. It has not occurred since, which is why the dollar's pre-eminence has survived less-major shocks like the collapse of Bretton Woods, the rise of emerging market economies, the monetary unification of Europe, the end of the Cold War, and the subprime crisis. Such a history might lead us to expect more stasis than change in the coming years, barring a systemic collapse on a level not seen since the interwar period.

Eichengreen does not spend much time in this short book on theoretical explanations for the nature of the global monetary system, instead choosing to trace several historical developments. This is fine, but it leaves us with more description than explanation, and so teaches us little about what to expect from the future.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Will the Dollar Remain the Global Reserve Currency?

. Wednesday, October 19, 2011
4 comments




Jeffrey Frankel summarizes some of his recent research on how some currencies become internationalized, and speculates on the implications of his work (and that of others like Eichengreen) for the rise of the renminbi as an international currency. He highlights two previous occasions change in reserve currencies: the shift from the pound sterling to the dollar in the 1930s-1940s, and the rise of the yen and German mark during the 1970s-1980s. (He mentions the rise of the euro since 1999, but the euro mostly just replaced the mark.) Frankel suggests that shifts in global reserve currencies come about when the following conditions are met:

1. A large volume of trade in the rising country.

2. Creditor status for the rising country.

3. Perceptions that the currency of the rising country will maintain its value.

4. Deep, liquid, open financial markets in the rising country.

China definitely meets the first two criteria, probably meets the third, and definitely does not yet meet the fourth although it has taken some baby steps in that direction over the past few years. But I'd add another criterion to the four above: a reserve currency becomes a reserve currency when it's already a reserve currency. In other words, the attractiveness of a currency is partly about the national characteristics that Frankel describes and partly about network externalities. The usefulness of a reserve currency is largely a function of who else uses it as a medium of exchange. If lots of other folks use it, it makes sense for you to use it too. If few others use it, there's not much point in your using it. Therefore, currency usage is determined by a preferential attachment decision rule: currencies that attract a lot of usage by foreign entities tend to attract even more usage; currencies that attract little usage tend to continue to attract little usage.*


For this reason, the reserve status of a currency tends to be pretty durable. As long as the currency network remains intact, central nodes tend to remain central nodes and peripheral nodes tend to remain peripheral nodes. It generally takes a major crisis for the network to disintegrate, thus it generally takes a major crisis for a displacement to take place even if Frankel's four conditions are otherwise met. The shift from the pound sterling (under the gold standard) to the dollar required several world wars and a global depression. These extreme events obliterated the network that had emerged during the "first age of globalization"(large pdf), and allowed the formation of the post-war reserve system based on the dollar.

In other words, I believe Frankel's criteria are necessary for a shift in global reserve currency, but are not sufficient. Previous systemic changes required major crises. There have been few of these; in the past half-century perhaps only a partial one: the dollar's status weakened a bit with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of exchange rates pegged to the dollar, which was in turn pegged to gold. This led to the emergence of the German mark and Japanese yen as important currencies, though clearly still subordinate to the dollar. The dollar's centrality remained through the "Bretton Woods II" system, in which industrializing economies exported capital to industrialized countries (particularly the United States) to facilitate growth and employment through exportation.

This monetary system actually reinforced the central role of the dollar in the international monetary system, but eventually culminated in the subprime crisis. Was this shock large enough to further the process of reserve diversification by disrupting the currency network? There are reasons to think so. The initial financial shock was probably the largest in history, and it emanated from the country at the center of the system: the United States. In hierarchal complex networks, major systemic change generally requires a large attack on the central nodes. For these reasons many expected -- and some hoped -- that the subprime crisis would lead to a reorganization of the international monetary system and the rise of a new reserve currency. Some hoped that the Chinese yuan would increase in global importance, others that special drawing rights at the IMF -- which are comprised of a basket of currencies -- would emerge as a central international reserve asset. Still others anticipated a greater role for the euro; while the European debt crisis now makes this look exceedingly unlikely, it never had much of a chance as Kathleen McNamara wrote in a 2008 article in RIPE.

So there are also reasons to be skeptical about a shift away from dollar dominance. Unlike the British in the interwar period, the US has proactively worked to stabilize the international monetary system. The Fed opened currency swap lines with almost every important central bank in the world from 2008-2010, ensuring that the financial system had ample liquidity. For the most part these actions have been successful, and as of year-end 2010 the dollar was as central to the international exchange network as it had been in 1998.** In other words, the US's actions prevented the network from unraveling the way it did during the interwar years.

In addition, there is no other country that is well-positioned to take over. The Chinese yuan is not yet convertible. The Japanese and Swiss economies are not large or dynamic enough. The euro is not stable enough. And that's... about it. So despite major upheavals in recent years, I do not expect major shifts in the international monetary system any time in the near future.

*Credit to Thomas for first making this point to me.


**I took a look at the data in a previous post, from which the picture at the top of this post is taken.  

Monday, August 15, 2011

Daily "Everything Is Screwy" Reminder

. Monday, August 15, 2011
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The Swiss government wants people to stop using the Swiss franc:

Yes, you read that right: if you want to lend Swiss francs or make a deposit in the next year, you must pay for that privilege, or so the Libor market implies. The normal assumptions of finance have been turned upside down; call it Alice in Wonderland economics. ...

What makes the Swiss situation so remarkable, however, is that it affects not just ultra-short rates. On Friday, futures markets predicted negative rates until 2013 (and minus 8 basis points next summer). This is unprecedented.


There is a huge surplus of demand for safe assets over supply. The Swiss government is not able or not willing to supply any more francs without getting something for it, because currency appreciation is killing their exporters and driving imbalances that could be painful to unwind. So maybe, just maybe, a much larger country with a much greater ability and capacity for the production of safe, liquid assets should do more to stabilize the international financial system.

In other words, the US should be much more in debt than it is.

ht: TC

Saturday, August 13, 2011

S&P and Exorbitant Privilege

. Saturday, August 13, 2011
1 comments




Layna Mosley, one of my professors here at UNC, has a guest-post at the Monkey Cage on the sovereign debt downgrade. I'm not going to excerpt much as it's worth reading in full, but I want to highlight a few things. First:

[O]n the basis of just its fiscal statistics, the U.S. would have been under pressure to accept an IMF program long ago. Of course, there are many differences between the US and the typical IMF borrower; the broader point is that the US can’t necessarily expect its “special” status vis-à-vis markets to persist indefinitely.


I think the "many differences" part is really key here, as Layna gets to a bit further down:

In the U.S. case, the fact remains that Treasury securities are a favored “flight to safety” instrument for investors worldwide. When risk acceptance and global liquidity is high, investors look for high-risk, high-return assets – equity offerings in emerging or frontier markets, for instance. But when risk aversion is high, investors seek out safe havens. Treasury bonds have long been such a haven, both for domestic and foreign investors. Many holders of U.S. government securities are official entities (such as foreign central banks), while others are private investors.

What other options do these safety-seeking investors have? There’s the Swiss franc. And there’s gold. Both have experienced surges in prices that come from the search for safe investments. But where else might investors go? Certainly not into euro-denominated instruments, given the continuing crisis in the euro-zone. And probably not into renminbi-denominated instruments; for all of the speculation that the dollar’s “exorbitant privilege” is reaching its end, don’t expect it just yet.


The US is different from other countries that might go on to a IMF program in a lot of ways, but most importantly because it can create the most important store of value in the world, and it can do so whenever it pleases. Ireland, for example, cannot. Neither can Greece or Thailand or Malaysia or even Japan. Gold is limited by quantity, which is why prices are through the roof. Swiss francs are limited by the small size of the Swiss economy and its lack of centrality in the global economic system. The dollar is not only the most-used and most-traded currency in the world, it is also embedded in the global economy in ways that other currencies are not.

The graph above was constructed with BIS data. (Just ignore the isolates like "OtherEMS" and "FRF", which aren't actually in the currency system anymore; I was too lazy to take them out before making the graph.) Node size represents the % of total global currency exchange in a country's currency, and tie thickness represents the (bilateral) size of currency exchange between two currencies. The US is obviously the most central node and is also the largest by far; Swiss francs ("CHF") are much smaller and only has ties to Europe and the US. For the rest of the world shifting out of dollars into the Swiss franc isn't even really an option. For that matter, neither is the euro or yen. Only the US dollar has a truly global reach.

Network externalities can be very powerful. If everyone in the world is using dollars as a medium of exchange, it makes sense for you to use dollars as a medium of exchange. And if you use dollars, then your trading partners and counterparty investors benefit from using dollars. This effect reinforces itself as it spreads through the international economic system. Self-reinforcing patterns are path-dependent in complex networks; it usually takes the destruction of the entire system to reverse them.

And since the US is the only country that can create dollars, it has a very important capability that countries on IMF programs do not: the ability to service its debts with paper, with a strong presumption that it will not be punished for doing so as long as network dynamics remain self-reinforcing. So far the lesson from the S&P downgrade is that those externalities are not only still in effect, but are intensifying.

In other words, the US's peers are not Greece and Ireland, or the countries involved in the 1990s Asian flu. The US's peers are not even France and Germany, which are large industrial countries but do not control the printing press. Nor even Japan, which is sustaining a debt/GDP of nearly 200%. The US has no peers, and this shows up in the bond market data (to be discussed in a future post).

Several times in her post Layna explicitly or implicitly references Barry Eichengreen, who has written a lot on capital, debt, and currency. In a recent column, Eichengreen argues two things. First, that the argument of his recent book Exorbitant Privilege is essentially wrong: the global currency system will not move to a USD/euro condominium in the near term, because "a pox has been cast on both their houses". Second, that there are no other viable alternatives in the form of national currencies -- he explicitly mentions the Swiss franc, Canadian dollar, Chinese RMB, and Australian dollar as being insufficient, despite being the main contenders -- and international baskets like the IMF's SDRs suffer from a lack of liquidity and over-exposure to the USD and euro. So he suggests moving to global GDP-indexed bonds. But this ignores politics. If Europe can't even issue Euro-bonds, and if SDRs are unattractive for a number of reasons, why should we think that a global effort will be more successful?

So I agree with Layna: the era of "exorbitant privilege" is not only not over, but this crisis has seemingly reinforced it. You don't hear much talk about "decoupling" these days.

Wednesday, July 13, 2011

Would A Yuan Appreciation Narrow the Trade Imbalance?

. Wednesday, July 13, 2011
0 comments

Probably not:

Moreover, the impact of higher dollar prices for Chinese goods might well be to raise the U.S. import bill. In particular, U.S. spending on Chinese goods would rise unless higher prices induced a proportionately larger decline in import volumes. For example, if a 10 percent rise in the price of Chinese products resulted in only a 7 percent decline in the volume purchased, spending would rise by roughly 3 percent. Significantly, empirical studies have been as likely to find that higher prices raise U.S. import spending as lower it. Regardless of the direction of the spending impact, these offsetting price and volume effects imply that the impact of a Chinese currency appreciation on U.S. import spending would be small.

Finally, the impact of a stronger renminbi on U.S. imports would be limited by the fact that most goods purchased from China come from industries in which U.S. producers no longer have a substantial presence. Indeed, out of more than 400 detailed production categories, 60 categories account for some 80 percent of U.S. purchases from China. The same 60 categories account for less than 15 percent of U.S. manufacturing shipments. With little U.S. capacity at the ready, higher Chinese import prices might be more likely to spur increased imports from Korea or Vietnam than increased U.S. production. If so, a smaller U.S. trade deficit with China would be offset by larger deficits with other countries.


The last point is key, I think. I'm not as concerned about the short-run elasticities as the long-run structural issues.

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Misc IPE Developments and Research...

. Wednesday, July 6, 2011
0 comments

... That I won't properly blog.

-- US and Mexico finally reach agreement on cross-border trucking. This issue has been festering since NAFTA's beginning, but came to a head a few years ago when Mexico got fed up and enacted retaliatory tariffs. To be clear: the US has been in the wrong here all along. Via Greg Weeks on Twitter, who also noticed Chomsky criticizing Chavez.

-- US, EU, and Mexico win case against China in the WTO over Chinese restrictions of exports of rare earth metals. China said the restrictions were for environmental reasons, but they were pretty clearly intended to benefit domestic manufacturers by subsidizing the price of an important input into production.

-- Brazil's real continues to rise, and they don't like it. Is this what adjustment looks like? And is it just me, or do all of Latin America's major economies look fairly fragile right now?

-- John Quiggin has an excellent series of posts [1, 2, 3] on what remains of Marxism if we ditch the assumption that revolution is both necessary and sufficient for positive social change. The answer, it seems to me, is very little that we can't get elsewhere. I've been thinking about this a lot lately, prompted by this awful book by Terry Eagleton (and even worse promo essay). I will probably be returning to the topic eventually.

-- Chinn, Eichengreen, and Ito do a "forensic analysis" on global macro imbalances in the run-up to the crisis. They aren't very optimistic about corrections in the near future. And Chinn describes an important-looking paper by Rose and Eichengreen on the effects of abandoning currency pegs for gaining policy flexibility elsewhere.

-- Tim Harford explains what all the fuss about bank capital is about. Excellent intro for those unfamiliar with the topic.

-- An aggravated take on the current US political economy of banking and bailouts.

-- The BIS compares the internationalization of the 2008 banking crisis, as compared to the 1931 banking crisis. The takeaway is that we only got a Great Recession (Little Depression? What are we calling this?) in 2008 because the lack of a gold standard allowed large liquidity injections.

-- Ha-Joon Chang and Jagdish Bhagwati debate the merits of a strong manufacturing base in The Economist. I wonder if the vote tally is a sign of the times? Ryan Avent adds some levity.

-- Cosma Shalizi reviews the new Easley-Kleinberg book on networks in The American Scientist. A free pre-print of the book is still available here (very large pdf).

Sunday, June 5, 2011

The International Forex Network, 1998-2010

. Sunday, June 5, 2011
8 comments















This weekend I got bored of cleaning some BIS banking data, so decided to play around with their foreign exchange data while watching the Cardinals beat up on the Cubs. There's less of those data, so it was easy to quickly get it cleaned and loaded into R. From there, I made the above graphs. The BIS only collects these data every three years, so the above visualizations represent the last five surveys, covering 1998-2010 (data here)*. These are bilateral ties, e.g. the USD<->EUR ties represent the nominal dollar value of all transactions between those two currencies. The thickness of the tie represents the amount of those transactions, divided by a constant (75) for all periods to make the visualization better. The size of the nodes represents the percentage of total forex transactions involving that currency.

These are quick-and-dirty. I used a simple Fruchterman-Reingold layout to emphasize centrality. Some currencies didn't exist for the whole series -- the euro in 1998; in later periods the franc, mark, ECU (XEU), and "Other EMS" which were rolled into the euro -- but I just gave them zero ties rather than spend the time to remove the actual nodes. (Hey, it's a weekend blog post.) The non-existent currencies are easy to see, as they are disconnected from the rest of the network. Just pretend they aren't there. Also, as I type this I realize that node size for "Other currencies" (Oth) is wrong because I inadvertently left some minor ones out, but the ties are correct and the node size wouldn't change by much since those are all small currencies.

Still, there's some interesting stuff to see. Most immediately obvious, the amount of foreign exchange increased noticeably from 1998-2010, as evidenced by the increasing thickness of the ties across the period. There was a 20% jump just from 2007-2010, which the BIS attributes mostly to technological improvements that lowered transaction costs and high-frequency trading.

Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the shape of the network has changed very little over the past dozen years. The US was the most central node, and the largest in 1998. The increased activity in the intervening years hasn't changed that at all. In 1998, the US was involved in 86.8% of all foreign exchange transactions**. In 2010, the number was 84.9%. The US's centrality (by this measure) peaked in 2001, when 89.9% of forex transactions involved the dollar. Similarly, despite much fanfare the euro has not moved to an especially central position. In 1998 the German mark (30.5%) and French franc (5%) were involved in 35.5% of forex transactions; in 2010 the euro (which absorbed not only the mark and france but other currencies as well) was one of the currencies traded in 39.1% of transactions. The yen decreased very slightly from 1998-2010 (21.7% to 19%), and the pound sterling increased slightly (11% to 12.9%), but in general the network changed very little. The Chinese yuan increased its share by 900% from 2004-2010... but was still on one side of less than 1% of forex transactions in 2010 (from 0.1% to 0.9%). This is shocking: despite all their growth over the past dozen years, in which their GDP has nearly quintupled, the world's second largest economy (third if we consider the eurozone as a collective, as we should for these purposes) is involved in fewer than 1/200 foreign exchange transactions. Nothing else changed much either. There are more thick ties in 2010 than there was in 1998, but all of them include the USD.

USD<->EUR transactions accounted for 28% of all transactions in 2010, close to its 2001 peak of 30%. USD<->JPY was second, with 14%. No other pair had more than 9%, and no pair that excluded USD had more than 3%. The extreme inequality in these relationships is shown by the fact that almost every currency in the network above is tied to the USD in all periods. Very few are tied to any others, short of EUR<->GBP and EUR<->JPY. China, in particular, is conspicuously weakly-tied considering the fact that it is the world's second-largest economy and it engages in so much trade.

There's been a lot of talk in recent years about a "post-American world", and the rise of a multilateral international monetary system to replace the US's "unipolar moment" in the 1990s. Several countries have spoken loudly about trying to displace the dollar as the world's reserve currency, replacing it with the IMF's SDRs or an international basket. These data indicate that such discussion may be premature. While it's possible that such a transition could happen in the future, there has been very little movement in that direction over the past dozen years. Given the fact that complex networks with an unequal topology have a habit of reinforcing themselves over time, we should qualify claims that the US dollar's role in international currency markets is in terminal decline.

*The BIS site says that there have been eight surveys, but the data I downloaded only had the five I present.

**Percentages in this paragraph, and this paragraph only, are out of 200% rather than 100% because each transaction involves a pair.

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

This Is What Adjustment Looks Like (An Ongoing Series)

. Wednesday, May 4, 2011
0 comments



A dollar decline is what we would expect from a country with a large current account deficit and weak demand-side of the economy. And that's what we're getting. This is a bad thing for consumers, but a good thing for producers (at least exporters), and right now the country needs jobs more than anything. It's bad the US's external creditors, but good for the US's internal debtors (including the sovereign). If the dollar stays low, it will be interesting to see how other countries react. Another round of competitive devaluations? Internal macroeconomic adjustment, leading to a rebalancing?

I don't think this has much to do with QE2; it's exactly what we'd expect from a country in the US's position. But changes in the dollars value will force change on the US's trading partners, which is more or less everyone. It will be interesting to see what choices other countries make.

Wednesday, April 20, 2011

Some Politics of U.S. "Hooliganism"

. Wednesday, April 20, 2011
5 comments



Paul Krugman sends us to Vlad "the Destroyer" Putin:

“Look at their trade balance, their debt, and budget. They turn on the printing press and flood the entire dollar zone — in other words, the whole world — with government bonds. There is no way we will act this way anytime soon. We don’t have the luxury of such hooliganism,” he said.


As Krugman notes, it takes two to tango. A big reason the U.S. has such a large trade deficit is because emerging markets have undervalued their currencies relative to the dollar*. And the big reason the U.S. has engaged in so much monetary stimulus is to boost employment, some of which would could have happened through the nominal exchange rate if so many other countries weren't actively managing their currencies. But adjustment still needs to happen, so now we're seeing pressures on the real exchange rate rather than the nominal exchange rate. In other words, inflation in emerging economies will rise until things become more into balance. And now Russia, and China, and Brazil, and others are complaining about the inflationary pressures that U.S. monetary policy is putting on their economies. But they can't have it both ways: while the U.S. economy is depressed, adjustment has to coming through the nominal exchange rate or the real exchange rate.

This isn't hooliganism. This is using monetary policy in textbook ways. As it happens, U.S. monetary policy has a great effect on external economies, which is why Putin calls the whole world the "dollar zone", but let's be clear: those countries want the U.S. to pursue less expansionary monetary policy so they can free-ride on it. It's fine for them to have that preference, and as I've argued before, I think the U.S. should allow some free-riding. But the U.S. government has citizens to satisfy as well, so those countries can't very well expect the U.S. to pursue a contractionary policies while the economy is so weak.

Krugman explains this as "capital wants to go South". I actually don't think that's right. I think capital "wants" to go North: witness the flight to safety, the historically low U.S. bond rates, the fact that the S&P downgrade warning had no effect on those rates, the rallying U.S. equity markets. Look at how developed countries increased their holdings in U.S. banks immediately following the banking crisis (clear in the animation here).

There's nothing preventing capital flight from the U.S., and yet that hasn't happened. Likely because while the U.S. has some problems, compared to many other large economies they are manageable. They aren't trying to stave off the collapse of a currency union, or a nuclear meltdown, or all the things China has to deal with. There's a high demand for safe, liquid assets, and the U.S. public and private sectors can provide more of those anyone else. The U.S. is at the center of the global financial network, which appears to behave in some ways according to a preferential attachment decision rule. Remember the Leontief paradox: factor-price equalization is not always the norm.

The U.S. government, on the other hand, wants some capital to go South. In other words, it doesn't want deflation, and it does want some dollar depreciation to boost employment via exports. The South, on the other hand, doesn't want capital inflows. Brazil has put currency controls in place, China has a closed capital account and fixed exchange rates, etc. The U.S. is trying to force adjustment through the real exchange rate, meaning higher inflation in exporting economies with managed exchange rates. These choices are political, not responsive to some economic natural laws.

*There's a lot of moving pieces here: budget deficits are a result of tax cuts + spending hikes (Medicare Part D plus wars), and then the recession. This also feeds into the national accounts. And while that is an accounting identity, not a behavioral relationship, I don't think it's a stretch to say that deficit spending is encouraged by low borrowing costs. Indeed this is what the Keynesians are arguing now, and it's one reason why Dick Cheney said that "deficits don't matter". During Bretton Woods II, there's been a huge rightward shift in the supply curve of funds available for the U.S. (either as sovereign, or as businesses and individuals) to borrow. When that happens, we'd expect the quantity demanded and thus equilibrium debt levels of the U.S. to also go up.

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

This Is What Adjustment Looks Like (An Ongoing Series)

. Tuesday, March 15, 2011
0 comments

Wen Jiabao gave a long press conference at the end of China's national legislative conference, at which the new five year plan was approved. Some highlights:

Its strategy promises a surge in government spending on domestic security and social programs like medical insurance, but offers little in the way of legal, political or banking reform. One principal goal, the government has said, is to lessen economic dependence on factory exports and build up innovation and domestic consumption.

Mr. Wen described the war on inflation as the government’s top priority. Figures released three days earlier showed that consumer prices rose 4.9 percent in February compared with the same month a year before, the latest in a series of indications that China’s economy is beginning to overheat.

The prime minister partly blamed international factors for the soaring costs, among them spiking oil prices because of the unrest in the Middle East and North Africa. He also pointed to looser monetary policy in the United States, where the Federal Reserve had expanded monetary supply in recent months — a policy known as quantitative easing — in an effort to assist the economy. ...

Mr. Wen promised that the increase in the renminbi’s value would continue. But he added: “It should be a gradual process because we must bear in mind its impact on Chinese businesses and the employment situation.”

He stressed that China’s five-year target of a 7 percent annual rise in the gross domestic product should not be considered low, insisting, “it will not be easy for us to achieve.”


High Chinese inflation + nominal remnimbi appreciation = fairly significant real exchange rate appreciation.

Monday, March 14, 2011

On the Dollar, Euro, and RMB

. Monday, March 14, 2011
0 comments

I had been planning on blogging about Barry Eichengreen's recent book-hype talk -- about the coming decline of the dollar as pre-eminent global currency (see here and here, for examples), and the rise of the Euro and RMB as its replacements -- but I haven't had the time. Thankfully, Michael Pettis wrote a characteristically long, thorough post on why that won't be true (for the RMB at least) any time in the foreseeable future. Highly recommended. The gist:

1. In order for China's currency to become a significant international reserve currency, even at the level of the yen, its internal economy would have to go through wrenching reforms.

2. China's financial system cannot handle the international competition that would come from capital account liberalization.

3. China has no reason to want the RMB to be a reserve currency, at least as long as it thinks it can benefit from the export-led growth that comes from a low peg to the dollar.

Pettis also notes that everyone was saying the same things about the yen knocking off the dollar 20-30 years ago. And while the yen is an important international currency, it's just not in the same league as the dollar. Pettis is higher on the Euro (I'm not, at least not for another decade), but acknowledges that for that to happen the Euro will likely need to first kick some members out. Right now, dollar holdings are about 250% higher than Euro holdings despite the fact that the EU has a larger cumulative economy, and obviously the Euro has things to work out before full confidence is restored.

Pettis also explains why having the world's reserve currency isn't always good for the U.S., and can be very good for other countries, especially those that pursue growth via exports. Which then begs a question: if the U.S. is willing to provide a public good at its own expense, and other countries benefit from that, then why wouldn't the dollar persist as the pre-eminent global currency? A move away from the dollar would represent a redistribution to the U.S. from other countries relative to the status quo. It seems like those countries would be happy to take advantage of that situation as long as they are able. It's true that the U.S. is able to fund its debt cheaply because of the high demand for dollars, but that would be true even if it didn't issue the largest reserve currency. Other advanced industrialized countries pay the same rates, or in some cases less, on their bonds than the U.S. does, and they are able to borrow in their own currencies as well.

In other words, there isn't any particular reason to expect the international monetary system to change much, especially in the short run, most likely because of positive feedback loops. The dollar's status as reserve currency isn't primarily an indication of the U.S.'s current or future economic performance, it's an remnant of its past role at the center of Bretton Woods. And while the U.S. gets some privilege from issuing the reserve currency, it isn't all that exorbitant. The international monetary system benefits from having a universally convertible currency, no matter what it is. So the dollar is the reserve currency, and will remain the reserve currency, mostly because it has been the reserve currency.

If that's the case, then the dollar's role as the pre-eminent reserve currency is likely a stable equilibrium for some time to come.

Tuesday, February 1, 2011

This Is What Adjustment Looks Like (An Ongoing Series)

. Tuesday, February 1, 2011
0 comments

Gradual and uneven, but happening:

More steps toward the internationalization of the China’s capital markets are likely. There is talk that in the coming months, China may allow foreign companies to list their shares on the Shanghai stock exchange. There may be efforts to encourage the Panda bond market (foreign companies issuing yuan bonds on the mainland). The development will take place under the guiding hand of China, for whom stability remains a guiding principle. This evolution will build institutional capacity, but a fully open capital account and full convertibility of the yuan still appears to be at least several years away. It is far premature to speak of a challenge to the greenback by the redback (yuan), though it continues to catch the fancy of many observers.


Much more here. Meanwhile, here is the latest on Chinese inflation, large wage increases, and the real exchange rate. This part is interesting:

China’s $6 trillion economy used to be heavily dependent on exports for growth. Exports still account for about one-fifth of the economy, after excluding goods that are merely imported to China for final assembly and then re-exported. But China’s economy has grown powerfully for the last two years mainly on the strength of investment-led domestic demand. That demand, partly fed by low-interest lending by state-owned banks, is another factor in China’s inflation.

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

Iceland Is Not A Good Example For Running An Economy

. Tuesday, December 21, 2010
0 comments



Krugman posts the above graphic showing GDP declines in the Baltics as compared to Iceland. He uses it to argue that the Baltics, which chose internal devaluation rather than sacrifice their exchange rate pegs to the Euro, did much worse than Iceland, which had no currency peg to defend, and so devalued their currency rather than their internal economy. The below picture, covering roughly the same time period, shows this:



Ignore that sharp downward tick at the end and what you see is that the krona fell by roughly half against the euro from the end of 2007 to its 2009-2010 levels, which then stayed fairly constant. To which Krugman says:

Now it’s true that the Baltic countries have been able to maintain their fixed exchange rates. And this is crucial because ….?


I'm not sure if "crucial" is the right word, but a 50% currency devaluation hurts a small open economy like Iceland quite a lot. Before the crisis Iceland mostly produced two goods: fish and finance. It imported almost everything else, and many of those imports came from the eurozone. When its currency dropped in value by 50%, that means that those imports became 100% more expensive. This represents a huge drop in standards of living.

Krugman approvingly references this IMF report on Iceland, noting:

Iceland, as even the IMF says, has been able to “preserve the Nordic social model”; there has been a lot of distress, but not much extreme hardship.


Yes, but according to that report Iceland has only been able to preserve the Nordic social model by exploding sovereign debt from under 30% of GDP pre-crisis to over 115% of GDP now. Of course, servicing that debt becomes much more expensive when the krona is devalued. The IMF also suggests that to get its fiscal house in order Iceland will need to go on its own austerity program to run a 6% of GDP primary surplus over the medium-run. Also note that the Icesave situation has not been resolved; Iceland may yet need to redistribute funds to depositors in Britain and the Netherlands. This will be much more expensive with a devalued currency, but Iceland's IMF funding is contingent upon reaching an agreement.

None of this is to say that the Baltics have had it any better. Output and employment losses have indeed been more severe there, partially because they kept their exchange rate pegs, but also because they are just generally not as well developed politically or economically as Iceland (a member of the OECD with strong economic ties to Europe's center, remember). The point is that these crises are just not easily resolved. The choice between internal devaluation and currency devaluation is not simple for small open economies. Both involve major reductions in standards of living, even if only one of them shows up in the GDP statistics.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

From Iceland to...

. Thursday, December 9, 2010
0 comments

Dave Hart at IPE Journal has a nice historical discussion of "hot money" flows, and their relevance today.

In fact, many emerging markets are toying with capital controls as a way to limit volatility. Brazil has done so, and there is speculation (so far un-founded) that Malaysia will follow suit. Brazil was even somewhat successful in getting pro-capital control language in the G20 communique from Korea ("practical tools to overcome sudden reversals of flows," anyone?). The large exporters will also continue to keep large foreign exchange reserves as a buffer - a policy that turned out to be rather justified in recent years, despite the distorting effects it has on global imbalances and the huge opportunity cost.


He concludes that this is likely to be a growing issue over the next few years, and adds "We do not know who will be blowing up their Land Rovers next."

Wednesday, November 10, 2010

Emmanuel's Gonna Love This

. Wednesday, November 10, 2010
2 comments



Via the whole internet.

Saturday, January 9, 2010

Nobody Could Have Seen This Coming

. Saturday, January 9, 2010
0 comments




Remember that currency revaluation in North Korea? Yeah, that's not going so well:

North Korea’s currency reform has apparently failed to tame inflation. The state has paid the first salaries since the shock currency reform late last year, with the State Security Department and the Ministry of Public Security, the frontline agencies dedicated to protection of the regime, paying soldiers 6,000 won each — 3,000 won in average monthly pay plus a 3,000 won bonus.

Soldiers usually received about 3,000 won in the old currency. That this effectively doubled means the currency reform, which exchanged old won for new at a rate of 100:1, has not been able to stop inflation. ...

But commodity prices skyrocketed. Inflation is soaring as market traders are hoarding goods, anticipating that the real value of the new currency will plummet. According to a North Korean source, 1 kg of rice cost about 30 won right after the currency reform but is now closing in on 1,000 won. The U.S. dollar was exchanged at the rate of 75 won to the greenback right after the currency reform but soared to 400 won in late December. There is speculation that it is now only a matter of time before the rate will reach 3,000 won, the same as the unofficial exchange rate of the old won.

Market traders are angry as they have realized that they were robbed of nearly everything they earned. A former senior North Korean official said, “The latest currency reform is more cruel than the previous reform in 1992. It’s tantamount to the state confiscating 99 percent of people’s money.”


It's about time for North Korea to test-fire another missile, eh? That always seems to distract from domestic turmoil.

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

North Korea Redenominates Currency

. Tuesday, December 1, 2009
1 comments

International news agencies and informants inside of North Korea are reporting that North Korea issued an order yesterday morning to redenominate the won, North Korea's currency. The Central Bank of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has slashed two zeroes off of its currency and has placed limits on how much of the old currency can be converted into new bank notes.

Choi Soo-young, an expert on the North Korean economy at the government-financed Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, said: “The primary aim is to control inflation. But the North also wants to stop the [black and unofficial] market[s] from prospering too fast.”
North Korea's black market in both currency conversion and goods have flourished over the last decade years as the government turned a blind eye to their presence. But, the government has begun shutting down unofficial food and goods markets across the country as it tries to reassert its control over the economy. The DPRK also reinstituted its rationing policy in 2005. Under this rationing policy, the government runs stores where North Koreans go to purchase their necessities at low, state-subsidized prices. One reason the government has sought to reassert its power over the domestic food and goods markets,
is that the mix of state and private activity has fueled inflation, partly by drawing goods that would otherwise be sold at low, state-subsidized prices into more lucrative private markets.
The action is being aimed at negating profits that have been made in the black market over this period and decrease the growing gap between rich and poor in the country, hence the limit on how much of the old currency can be converted. By capping the amount that can be converted, the government essentially wipes out all of the wealth above that cap. One way to get around this cap would be to exchange the old currency into foreign exchange, but this option is very difficult since your typical North Korean doesn't have access to forex markets that can be used to convert the currency. Those that were able to convert the old currency into foreign exchange prior to the announcement lucked out.

My guess is that this action will fuel a new black market in old currency, with prices being posted at these unofficial markets in both new and old won, although the old won being accepted only at a large premium. Over time, the excess old currency would make its way through the system and end up being converted into new currency by those who have yet to reach their ceiling. One possible way this can happen is by merchants in these unofficial markets identifying those that haven't reached their ceiling and paying them off to convert the currency for them. This may fuel a side market in currency converters and if the market works like it sounds like it would in my head, it would end up being a boon for really low income North Koreans.

One of the long-term effects of this redenomination will be an increase in demand for foreign exchange from North Koreans. The people recognize that their currency's value has declined rather drastically over time and have now experienced what their government does when it chooses to redenominate. Dr. Layna Mosley and I are currently working on a paper (should be ready sometime in the spring) on the reasons why and at what point in time developing countries choose to redenominate their currencies. One of the initial findings is that countries that redenominate once have a much higher rate of redenominating again. Based on this evidence, my second guess is that this redenomination will fuel a new black market in foreign exchange and people will try to hold as much of their income and savings in yen, yuan or dollars in order to insulate themselves from any future redenomination. An interesting extension of this argument is that these unofficial markets may essentially dollarize or "yenanize" as a result of citizens holding more foreign exchange. This may take a long time though, since, as noted above, North Korea isn't the most free society in the world and getting access to foreign exchange in order to feed demand will take time.

Noting that the rise of the black market in North Korea is a reason for the redenomination is important, but it's not the main reason for the redenomination. Choi Soo-Young, in her quote above, hits the nail right on the head. Persistent inflation is the primary reason for the redenomination. An important finding of the paper that Dr. Mosley and I are preparing is that inflation, specifically persistent hyperinflation, is the primary indicator that explains why and when countries choose to redenominate. The rise of the black market is one contributing factor to rising inflation in this case, but it is inflation itself that has historically provided the impetus for redenomination across the developing world, and it is no different in this case.

International Political Economy at the University of North Carolina: Currencies
 

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