A nice discussion of my article with SBD at The National Interest has taken place in comments at the International Economic Law and Policy Blog, mostly centering on the question of investor-state dispute (ISD) clauses in trade deals. A bit wonkish (okay very wonkish), but potentially very important as well.
Mark Kantor, who is affiliated with Georgetown and Columbia Universities, has disagreed with our take on ISDs, which is that a US-EU trade deal could precipitate a general decline in their usage. He raises some very good points; you should read them. He may very well be correct. (Although he's wrong to say that we don't take into account recent US and EU ISD behaviors, including the inclusion of ISDs in the model BITs of the US and EU; in fact we mention that specifically.)
But I'm not quite ready to give up our claim just yet. Via Nathan Jensen, here's a recent report in Columbia FDI Perspectives by Joachim Karl of UNCTAD demonstrating, among other things, the increased costliness to governments (including those of developed economies) of ISDs. One highlight:
Governments face a dilemma. While many governments consider ISDS a key element of international investment protection, ISDS is becoming increasingly risky. For one, governments’ risk of being sued by foreign investors is growing. Second, when a dispute arises, the defence requires enormous resources; if a case is lost, damages can be very high. Third, governments live with an unpredictable arbitration practice without having the legal safety net of an appellate body like in the WTO. Fourth, complex domestic legal issues reaching beyond international investment law are examined by international arbitrators. Fifth, as more disputes are directed against countries with highly developed domestic judicial systems, governments need to ask themselves how positive discrimination of foreign investors in respect of ISDS can be justified.Karl notes that many countries are in something of a holding patterns regarding ISDs: not ready to do away with them, but not exactly expressing enthusiasm for them either. He also notes that the US is one of the leaders in restrictions to and regulations of ISDs. As such, if the US decides to de-emphasize ISDs it could provide momentum for a more general movement in that direction. the Here's part of the crux:
Overall, the existing ISDS system is no longer recognized as an indispensable core part of IIAs. Discontent is not limited to a few developing countries, but has spread to G-20 countries, including some of the BRICs. Further momentum could jeopardize the ISDS system as a whole.We suggest that, for political reasons, a US-EU FTA/BIT could be part of that momentum if it excludes an ISD, and there are good reasons to believe that it might. In fact, that is our argument.
We could be wrong, but it's nice to know that we're not the only ones thinking along these lines.
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