As congressional Democrats put the brakes on ratifying the Bush administration's free trade agreements with Peru and Panama, House Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel "accuses the administration of trying to...make it look as if Democrats don't want a deal. "They can bark at the moon, but I want a treaty," says Mr. Rangel. "I would cry if I wasn't able to do this."
At issue is whether Peru and Panama must enact labor side agreements before Congress ratifies the treaties. Rangel asserts that "rank-and-file Democrats simply don't trust the White House to enforce the labor commitments once Congress approves the deals."
While one might agree or disagree with Democrats' goals and/or methods, it is hard to discount their fear that neither the White House nor governments in Peru and Panama would worry too much about the labor side agreements once Congress approves the treaty. Seems like a variant of the time consistency problem: once Congress commits, the others have little incentive to live up to their side of a bargain.
IPE @ UNC
IPE@UNC is a group blog maintained by faculty and graduate students in the Department of Political Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The opinions expressed on these pages are our own, and have nothing to do with UNC.
Bookshelf
Tags
Academia Adjustment Afghanistan Africa AIG America Argentina Austerity Bailout Banking Bargaining Basel Bernanke Bias Blogging Business cycle; recession; financial crisis Cap and Trade capital controls capital flows central banks; moral hazard Chavez China China Trade Climate Change Contentious Politics Cuba Currencies Currency Crises; financial crisis Current Account Data Debt Debt; China; United States; Decession Politics Decoupling Deflation democracy Democrats; Trade policy development Diplomacy Dollar; China; Currency Manipulation; Exchange Rates dollar; exchange rate policy ECB ECB; Fed; Monetary Policy Economic Growth Economics Egypt election EMU; monetary union Environment EU; Agriculture; Common Agricultural Policy Euro Europe; labor; immigration European Union Exchange Rates Farm Bill; Agriculture FDI Fed; Monetary Policy finance financial crisis financial crisis; subprime Fiscal Policy; monetary policy; elections Fiscal Stimulus Foreign Aid Foreign Policy France Free Trade Agreements G-20 G20 Summit Game Theory Germany global recession globalization Grand Theory Great Britain Greece health care reform Hegemony Human Rights Iceland imbalance IMF immigration Incentives income distribution income inequality; globalization India Inequality inflation institutions Interests international finance International Law International Monetary System International Relations Investment IPE Iran Iraq Ireland ISA Italy Japan labor markets Latin America Libya Macroeconomics Marxism Mexico Microfinance Miscellany monetary policy Monetary policy; Federal Reserve moral hazard Narcissism Networks Nobelist Smackdown North Korea Obama Oil PIGS Pirates Political Economy Political Methodology Political Science Political Survival Political Theory Power Protectionism Protests Public Choice Public opinion Rational Choice regulation Research Review Russia Sanctions Security Dilemma security threats Soccer Social Science Sovereign Debt Spain Sports Statistics stock markets Systems Tariffs TARP Taxes TBTF Technocracy technology terrorism Trade trade policy UNC Unemployment United States US-South Korea Venezuela WTO WTO; Doha
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Crocodile Tears?
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
0 comments:
Post a Comment