Wednesday, October 5, 2011

New Research

. Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Political Uncertainty and Risk Premia 
Lubos Pastor, Pietro Veronesi 
NBER Working Paper No. 17464 
We study the pricing of political uncertainty in a general equilibrium model of government policy choice. We find that political uncertainty commands a risk premium whose magnitude is larger in poorer economic conditions. Political uncertainty reduces the value of the implicit put protection that the government provides to the market. It also makes stocks more volatile and more correlated when the economy is weak. In addition, we find that government policies cannot be judged by the stock market response to their announcement. Announcements of deeper reforms tend to elicit less favorable stock market reactions.

Does Short-Term Debt Increase Vulnerability to Crisis? Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis 
Efraim Benmelech, Eyal Dvir 
NBER Working Paper No. 17468 
Does short-term debt increase vulnerability to financial crisis, or does short-term debt reflect -- rather than cause -- the incipient crisis? We study the role that short-term debt played in the collapse of the East Asian financial sector in 1997-1998. We alleviate concerns about the endogeneity of short-term debt by using long-term debt obligations that matured during the crisis. We find that debt obligations issued at least three years before the crisis had a negative, albeit sometimes insignificant, effect on the probability of failure. Our results are consistent with the view that short-term debt reflects, rather than causes, distress in financial institutions.


New Research




Add to Technorati Favorites